Anonymous
HRTO FILE NO.:2012-12585-I
SOCIAL
TRIBUNAL.: 1106-04904
(01/06/11 to 30/11/11) INTERIM
ASSISTANCE ORDER: 1106-04904
CHILD/HOUSING/HOMLESS SHELTER/PRIVATE PROSECUTION punishment
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
______________________________________________
IN THE MATTER of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
-and-
IN THE MATTER of a COMPLAINT by Wayne Ferron against
THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL and
THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF SALVATION ARMY IN CANADA
for violation of
Section. 1, 8, 9, 11, 29, 47 of the HUMAN RIGHT ACT
and Article 2(1), 3, 14(1), 23.87, 23.101, 23.105, 25(c), 26, 27, 50, and 51
________________________________________
FINAL-AMENDED-AMENDED
APPLICANT’S FACTUM
FIRST HEARING ON MATTER
______________________________________________________
Pursuant to Section. 1, 1.20, 1.21, 1.22, 3.5, 8, 9, 11, 29, 47 of the Human Rights Code, Section. 15 of the Charter, Article 2(1), 3, 14(1), 23.87, 23.101, 23.105.25(c), 26., 27, 50, and 51 of the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, and Section 1 and 2 of the BILL OF RIGHTS.
Wayne FERRON
HOMELESS VAGABOND
leegalpoet@gmail.com
HRTO – Registrar
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
655 Bay Street, 14th floor
Toronto, ON M7A 2A3
Phone: 416-326-1519
Toll-free: 1-866-598-0322
Fax: 416-326-2199
APENDIX A - RESPONSE to RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS - PAGE 317
TAKE NOTICE: At the time of cause of action, the applicant had full custody of his none adult child he loves with all his heart, and full responsibility, with the full protection of child care laws.
INDEX
SHORT ESSENTIAL FACTS page 3 - 23
ASSUMPTIONS page 24 - 25
PREMISE page 26 - 29
OVERVIEW page 30 – 64
DENIAL OF GOODS AND SERVICES S. 1 page 30 – 32
APPLICANT ACCOUNT page 32 – 40
RESPONSE TO NO NOID page 40 - 49
DISCRIMINATION page 50 - 60
LINKAGE page 53 - 58
REPRISALS page 59 – 60
CASE LAW page 61 - 63
REPRISALS page 61
POLICE SERVICES page 62
DISCLOSURE page 62
FAIRNESS page 63
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS page 63 – 64
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER page 64
THEFT page 65
WITNESS LIST page 66 - 70
SUMMARY OF FACTS page 71 -135
NO FINAL ORDER: CV 12-71600(civil matter) page 71 – 74
HRTO PROCESS page 74 – 82
GOODFAIT page 82 – 99
CIVIL MATTER CV 12-71600 page 100 – 111
JOHN GESCHER(BLOCKING SERVICE) page 112 – 126
HRTO DISCLOSURE page 127-133
HRTO ASSERTS DENIAL OF EVIDENCE page 133-135
LEGAL ARGUMENTS page 136–302
PREMISE 140-142 PREMISE (12&13) 218-234
PREMISE (1 &2) 143-149 PREMISE (14&15) 235 -239
PREMISE (3&4) 150-152 PREMISE (16&17) 240 -242
PREMISE (4&5) 153-161 PREMISE (18&19) 243 -245
PREMISE (6) 162-173 PREMISE (20) 246
PREMISE (7) 174 PREMISE (21) 247 -250
PREMISE (8) 175-194 PREMISE (22) 251 -302
PREMISE (9) 195-199 REMEDY 303 -313
PREMISE (10&11) 200 -217 APENDIX A 317 -359
SHORT ESSENTIAL FACTS:
1.) The Applicant’s civil matter CV 12-71600 has never received a FINAL ORDER for CV 12-71600, nor HAS IT BEEN APPEALED, while about half the RESPONDENTS for the same matter has failed to respond despite being served the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600); nor has the same civil matter in question ever been appealed, the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE has failed to disclose a CV 12-71600 FINAL ORDER, the RESPONDENTS has failed to disclose a CV 12-71600 FINAL ORDER, and Ms. Kathrine Kirkpatrick the lawyer for York Region Police Services and the Applicant’s lawyer for CV 13-1060 has failed to disclose a CV 12-71600 FINAL ORDER; furthermore, all the above failure to produce a final order for CV 12-71600 occurred after a formal REQUSITION to disclose the same final order by the Applicant. They all fail to respond and failed to disclosed and serve the FINAL ORDER FOR CV 12-71600.
2.) CV 13-1060 is a separate and distinct application filed by Ms Kathrine Kirkpatrick(employee of BLG) while acting as legal counsel for YORK REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE byway of legal fraud. CV 13-1060 was appealed to COURT OF APPEAL for ONTARIO byway of leave and filed under the motion number M42812. Which was Appeal to the SUPREME COURT OF CANADA under file number SCC 35821, while it would seem she was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
3.) Ms Katharine Kirkpatrick, has acted as legal counsel in the past for a none-legal entity whom was acting in the capacity of a YORK REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE OFFICER, but was not listed in the system as such. In addition the false none-legal entity went by the manicure B. Hird when misleading and swearing a false POSITIVE OATH before a Honourable Justice of the Peace, and maliciously procured Information 07-02500 while under oath, and acting within the capacity of possessing personal knowledge of allegation in the same information 07-02550, while securing the same voidable information 07-02500 with a false signature from a mislead Judicial Officer who was engaged in a judicial function. Ms Katharine Kirkpatrick, secured monies for the aforementioned none-legal entity B. Hird before a Honourable Judge in the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE(central west)-CIVIL, while it would seem she was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
4.) Date of the serving of ONTARIO WORKS EVICTION NOTICE(Nichole Arbour/Rudo Chiyangwa), the 15 August 2011, and Wayne Ferron had until the 22 August 2011 to leave THE REGION OF PEEL HOMELESS SHELTER forthwith while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
5.) The Applicant (Wayne Ferron) and Mr. Harry Boom’s time interval of contact was [11 August 2011 to 01 October 2011] directly and vicariously
6.) The INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER for SOCIAL TRIBUNAL FILE.: 1106-04904 was enforceable or fully active in the time interval [01 June 2011 to 30 November 2011]
7.) HRTO FILE NUMBER.: 2012-12585-I occurrence is in the time interval [01 September 2012 to present, ongoing suffering because of delay has been the cross I have to carry.
8.) The Applicant’s (Wayne Ferron) incident with Mr. Harry Boom is in the time interval [08 September 2011 to 16 September 2011]
9.) The Applicant’s (Wayne Ferron’s) incident with Mr. BLESSING ANYANWU, is in the time interval [01 September 2012 to 05 September 2012]
10.) In the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF SALVATION ARMY’ S initial response (no response from the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL), Mr. BLESSING ANYANWU, ADMITTED TO REPRISAL and denial of goods and services with a justification of the same REPRISAL against Wayne Ferron the Applicant, in an EMAIL to the Lawyers of the Salvation Army, which runs contrary to the policy on SHELTER STANDERS, Ontario HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, and the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, while it would seem he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
11.) Initially, the RESPONDENTS seem to try to paint a false picture of the PEEL REGIONAL HOMELESS SHELTER’s, care, control, total responsibility, and liability being given or delegated to the GOVERNING COUNSEL OF SALVATION ARMY for the same homeless shelter, the Applicant had to prove in his first filed legal documents that this was not the case, while it would seem not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
12.) John Gescher (john.gescher@peelregion.ca), the original lawyer for the REGION MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, failed to respond or reply to the Application(2012-12585-I), and was infact actively blocking or filtering the Applicant’s HRTO 2012-12585-I, LEGAL services byway of email, and causing them to be returned, while it would seem he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
13.) The REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, did not make a reasonable legal reply or OFFICIAL RESPONSE until the year 2015, even though HRTO 2012-12585-I was filed with the HRTO-REGISTRAR in September 2012, even though the respondents were being granted a request for delay or deferral without the service of a NOTICE OF INTENSION TO DEFER, and without a response from the REGIONAL MUNICIPLE OF PEEL, while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
14.) Blair Maccredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his last RESPONSE, admitted to Mr. Harry Boom discharging or evicting Wayne Ferron(Applicant) without written articulated notice in his submissions, without reasonable notice, and for the unlawful justification, of no ONTARIO WORKS FINANCIAL SUPPORT, which blatantly contradicts, and unlawfully disobeyed the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER (FILE.: 1106-04904) , that was in full force(Section 3.1 C.C.C.) at the time in question, in contravention Section 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
15.) THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL acting in conjunction with it’s business subordinate THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene or assisted in contravening Section 127(1), Section 22.1, and Section 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA when INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER: 1106-04904 was in full force in accordance with Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE of CANADA, while it would seem that both the RESPONDENTS were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
16.) THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL acting in conjunction with it’s business subordinate THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene or assisted in contravening Section 322(1), 334, 380(1), 22.1, and 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA byway of not returning the $10.00 CANADA POST MONEY ORDER(Serial No.: 11 466 978 57 ), and the $5.00 personal check payment for services not rendered or responded to, after the Applicant exercised his “colour of right” over the same quantum of money on many occasion, and the INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER: 1106-04904 was in full force in accordance with Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE of CANADA, while it would seem that both the RESPONDENTS were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
17.) Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene Section 8. of the ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
18.) Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
19.) Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), and THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY’S OWN POLICY, MANIFESTO, CODE OF CONDUCT, the HOLY BIBLE, and JESUS’S teachings, while it would seem that they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
20.) Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, falsely accused the Applicant (Wayne Ferron) of “MISREPRESENTION to the TRIBUNAL” in contravention of Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, without the disclosure of the FINAL ORDER CV 12-71600 to prove there allegations, even after being formally requested to do so by the Applicant; Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
21.) NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed. I have requested a copy if one exist, but so far there is no proof of the existence of one.
22.) HRTO 2012-12585-I was DEFERED or DELAYED on 13 September 2013, at the request of the respondents a full response.
23.) APPLICANT filed RETURN TO MOTION OR APPLICATION HRTO 2012-12585-I on or about 06 March 2015.
24.) The SALVATION ARMY and ONTARIO-WORK, for the second time ASPER the IPC directions, I made a request
for personal information collected or maintained at PEEL REGION
RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS (“THE HEAD”), in addition
to the $5.00 search fee being paid inclusive in the $10.00 Canada
-Post money order being sent to PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL
EMERGENCY SHELTERS (“THE HEAD”). The CANADA POST
MONEY ORDER contain the following information:
CHECK SERIAL NO.: 11 466 978 57
SECURITY CODE.: 697 965 794
OFFICE NO.: 102 205
ONTARIO-WORKS (“THE HEAD”) at PEEL REGION
RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, and THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF TH SALVATION, failed to respond, and complete the
Aforementioned information request for personal information, and also failed to return the $5.00 search fee in contravention of Section. 334, 322(1), 22.1, 22.2 and 380(1) the Criminal Code of Canada.
25.) REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL) was filed on or about March 9, 2015.
26.) The IPC APPEAL FOR “DEEM REFUSE” REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL), was on or about May 9, 2015, and again on May 14, 2015.
27.) The CASE ASSESSMENT DIRECTION (2012-12585-i) was received on 29 May 2015.
28.) The Conformation Letter for the Applicant’s REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY (2012-12585-i), was received on May 21, 2015.
29.) The Applicant, did not know how to REACTIVATE, until AN APPLICATION NOTICE, a REPLACEMENT EMAIL ON MAY 13, 2015, which contained a reprinted January 9, 2015 HRTO letter. The January 9, 2015 letter gave directions on how to reactivate a deferred Application.
30.) The Applicant was notified or directed to reactivate HRTO 2012-12585-I on or about the 9 January 2015; however, he did not know about Jan 9, 2015 directions. He had medical problems that need immediate attention, and still does!
31.) A very large and significant number of the respondents in CIVIL MATTER CV 12-71600 has refused or failed to respond, even though they were served the STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600.
32.) Requisitions to RESPONDENTS and other related entities such as; Ms. K. Kirkpatrick, and the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE-REGISTRAR, to disclose the final order for CV 12-71600 (Applicant’s Civil Matter.) All of the aforementioned entities has refused or failed to do so.
33.) BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP(“BLG”) lawyer or employee Kathrine Kirkpatrick, fraudulently procured a VEXACIOUS ORDER (CV 13-1060) for civil matter CV 13-1060 in contravention of Section 137, 22.1, 22.2 & 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, with false evidence and misleading methods while before the Honorable Justice Andrea. Not only did the COURT OF APPEAL-REGISTRAR failed or refuse to schedule MOTION FOR DIRECTION(C56817) to remedy missing exhibits from file C56817, determine status of incomplete TRANSCRIPS(C56817), and remedy MS. Deborah Krick’s(Assistance Attorney General), improper removal of court file C56817 from the COURT OF APPEAL-RECORDS without a Court Order, lawful cause or reasonable justification. Furthermore, the COURT OF APPEAL-REGISTRAR failed or refuse to schedule MOTION FOR DIRECTION(C56817) to remedy missing exhibits from file C56817, determine status of incomplete TRANSCRIPS(C56817), and remedy MS. Krick improper removal of court file C56817 from the COURT OF APPEAL-RECORDS without a court order. On the 13th of August 2013, Assistant Crown Attorney Deborah Krick whom has carriage, and control of matter M42322, admitted in open court to having possession of COURT OF APPEAL file C56817.
34.) In addition to the Crown(Mrs. Krick) using the same VEXACIOUS ORDER(CV 13-1060), to defeat the course of justice(A NUMBER OF PRIVATE PROSECUTION) at the COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO, in contravention of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, in contravention of her oath to the public, in contravention of the CROWN’S POLICY, in contravention of Section 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, and in contravention of Section 504, 138, 137 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA; in addition to actively defeating the federal jurisdictional principal PARAMOUNTCY or using PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION to defeat FEDERAL LEGISLATION (challenging the CCC, the RULE OF LAW, and the present jurisdictional legal structure), just to enable their clients continued unlawful immunity from the ENFORCEMENT & RULE OF LAW, byway of bypassing DUE PROCESS OF LAW with vicarious access to the PUBLIC PURSDE; while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
35.) The SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE-CIVIL_REGISTRAR, has never notified the Applicant (Wayne Ferron) of a FINAL ORDER for CV 12-71600(civil matter), in contravention of Section 59.02 & 59.03 of the RULES OF CIVIL PRACTIC, Section 395. Of the FEDERAL COURT ACT
36.) As one direct example of the different treatment affecting his dignity, self-worth, life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness; the applicant was subjected to distinction byway of discrimination or unequal treatment at the COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO while trying to affect and perfect a LEAVE OF APPEAL HEARING(C56817 et al) for PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS; The allege accuse(Ms. Joanne Stuart), works out of the same Toronto Region Office of Ministry of Attorney General, as Ms. Deborah Krick whom was Crown’s council in the same Appeal, and was at least a Professional colleague of the allege accuse Ms. Joanne Stuart, in representing the Attorney General of Ontario within the same public institution; so there is a public appearance of the aforementioned action being improper or a blatant violation of judicial/Crown independence, and unfear regardless of whether this was or was-not the case. In addition, Applicant’s Public Evidence for his Private Prosecutions, where sanitized from the COURT OF APPEAL RECORDS.
· PLEASE SEE JUSTICE PEPALL AUGUST 13, 2013 ENDORSEMENT AND THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE JURIANSZ SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 ENDORSEMENT
[1] Pursuant to Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106;
Inspection of files
26. (1) Where the necessary facilities are available, any person may, with supervision and without interfering with the business of the Court, inspect a Court file or annex
Removal of documents from file
(2) Nothing shall be removed from a Court file or annex except
(a) under an order of the Court;
(b) by an officer of the Registry acting in the course of his or her duties; or
(c) in accordance with rule 26.1.
Removal of files
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, no Court file or annex to a Court file shall be removed from the Registry by any person other than
(a) a judge, prothonotary or referee; or
(b) an officer of the Registry acting in the course of his or her duties.
SOR/2002-417, s. 3.
Definition
26.1 (1) In this rule, “appeal” includes an appeal of an order of a prothonotary, an application for leave to appeal and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Removal of exhibits from file
(2) Subject to subsection (4), exhibits put into evidence shall remain in the Court file either
(a) until the time for an appeal has expired, if no appeal has been taken, or
(b) until the appeal is disposed of, if an appeal has been taken.
SOR/2002-417, s. 4.
[2] Pursuant to the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106;
Reasons
393. The Court may deliver reasons for judgment
(a) orally from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing of a proceeding; or
(b) after having reserved judgment at the conclusion of a hearing, by depositing in the Registry written reasons, signed by the judge or prothonotary who delivered them.
394. (1) Where the Court gives reasons, it may direct one of the parties to prepare for endorsement a draft order to implement the Court's conclusion, approved as to form and content by the other parties or, where the parties cannot agree on the form and content of the order, to bring a motion for judgment in accordance with rule 369.
(2) On the return of a motion under subsection (1), the Court shall settle the terms of and pronounce the judgment, which shall be endorsed in writing and signed by the presiding judge or prothonotary.
395. (1) Subject to subsection 36(3), the Administrator shall send without delay a copy of every order made and of any reasons given other than in open court to all parties
(a) by registered mail;
(b) by electronic means, including facsimile and electronic mail; or
(c) by any other means, as directed by the Chief Justice, likely to bring the order and any reasons to the attention of the party.
(2) If an order and any reasons are transmitted by electronic means, the Administrator shall confirm receipt by the party and place proof of that receipt on the Court file.
SOR/2010-177, s. 6.
[3] Pursuant to RULE 59.02 of RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE;
ENDORSEMENT BY JUDGE OR OFFICER
59.02 (1) An endorsement of every order shall be made on the appeal book and compendium, record, notice of motion or notice of application by the court, judge or officer making it, unless the circumstances make it impractical to do so. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.02 (1); O. Reg. 19/03, s. 10.
(2) Where written reasons are delivered,
(a) in an appellate court, an endorsement is not required;
(b) in any other court, the endorsement may consist of a reference to the reasons,
and a copy of the reasons shall be filed in the court file. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.02 (2).
[4] Pursuant to RULE 59.03 of the RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE;
PREPARATION AND FORM OF ORDER
Preparation of Draft Formal Order
59.03 (1) Any party affected by an order may prepare a draft of the formal order and send it to all other parties represented at the hearing for approval of its form. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.03 (1);
[5] Lawyers are required by the RULE 4.01(2)(e) on page 53 and page 54 of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT which directs as follows;
“Relationship to the Administration of Justice
4.01 The Lawyer as Advocate
(2) When acting as an advocate, a lawyer shall
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal conduct...”
[6] Pursuant to VIDÉOTRON LTÉE et al. and NESTAR COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al., 2003 FCA 56;
“[6] The authorities are clear that where an order or decision is not pronounced or delivered in public, the order or decision is not made until such time as the order or decision is entered by the
Registry or when the parties are notified of the decision.
{...}
Strong J., in concurring reasons, was also of the view that the time to appeal could not begin to run until the judgment had been entered. At page 218, he made the following remarks:
I do not recognize the handing by the judge to the registrar, not in open court but in his office or perhaps in the street, as a "pronouncing of a decision" within the terms of rule 269.”
[7] Pursuant to NIKE CANADA LTD. and NIKE INTERNATIONAL LTD. - and - JANE DOE and JOHN DOE et al., T-1636-99 on page 4;
“ORDER
UPON PLAINTIFFS" EX PARTE MOTION made on September 27, 1999, for
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Commencement and Term of Order
1. The terms of this Order shall become effective against each Defendant only from the commencement of the day on which it is served on that defendant and shall remain in effect for fourteen days thereafter, unless otherwise ordered by the Court...”
ASSUMPTIONS:
1. The reasons why HRTO-REFUSED the APPLICANT’S REQUISITION FOR INFORMATION(IPC) byway of “DEEM REFUSED” was to insure fairness and efficiency in the process.
2. The reason why the HRTO 2014-12585-I was delayed, thereby causing my child and I sustained and delayed suffering was to insure fairness and efficiency in the process.
3. The reason why HRTO-REGISTRAR ignored my call for help, and advice of pending medical emergency and social emergency concerning my children, was to insure fairness and equity in the process.
4. The reason why HRTO-REGISTRAR refused me and oral hearing, and advised me to file my legal document as hard copy at great cost even though it is known that I am a homeless vagabond with no income, was for fairness, equity, and efficiency in the process.
5. The RESPONDENT was served the initial filing documents (FORM 1 & VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT), and chose not to respond, nor to challenge the same allegations.
6. APPLICANT’S ALLEGATIONS ARE TRUE
7. TIME: APPLICANT’S COMPLAINT WAS DEALT WITH IN AN EFFICIENT AND TIMELY MANNER.
8. PROCEDURE IS FAIR AND EQUAL.
9. NATURAL JUSTICE was not violated.
10. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS was not violated.
11. There was EQUAL ACCESS TO EVIDENCE and JUSTICE.
PREMISE:
1.) Did the REGION OF PEEL disobey or contravene the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL Interim Assistance Order.: 1106-04904 for THE SOCIAL TRIBUNAL FILE.: 1106-04904 in the time interval [01 June 2011 to 30 November 2011]?
2.) Was the year of the incident with Mr. Harry Boom year 2011?
3.) Was the year of the incident with Mr. Blessing Anyananwu, Year 2012?
4.) Was the Year of the HUMAN RIGHTS INCIDENT (2012-12585-I) YEAR 2012;
5.) Are the two independent incidence concerning Mr. Harry Boom and Mr. Blessing Anyanwu the same or overlapping incidence?
6.) Did the RESPONDENTS mislead the HRTO tribunal?
7.) Did the respondents delay OR DEFERED HRTO 2012-12585-I, BYWAY OF A REQUEST FOR ORDER and by HRTO-RULE 7. On the basses of the two independent incidence concerning Mr. Harry Boom, and Mr. A Blessing are the same or overlapping incidence?
8.) Is there a CONTRAVENTION NATURAL JUSTICE?
9.) Is there CONTRAVENTION PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS?
10.) IS HRTO 2012-12585-I VOIDABLE?
11.) Did Agents of THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, a RESPONDENT, contravene Section 127(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA?
12.) Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers for the THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL , contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT?
13.) Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene of Rule A 7.1 of the HRTO RULES?
14.) Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene Section 8. of theHUMAN RIGHTS CODE?
15.) Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene Section 139 or SECTION 22.1 or Section 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA?
16.) Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT?
17.) Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene of Rule A 7.1 of the HRTO RULES?
18.) Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene Section 8. of theHUMAN RIGHTS CODE?
19.) Did the RESPONDENTS, act in “GOOD FATE!”
20.) Has the process for HRTO 2012-12585-I been fair?
21.) Did the RESPONDENTS violate legislation?
22.) “[6] The issues to be addressed at the hearing are as follows:
a. Should the Tribunal waive the requirement in Rule 14.4 that a request to reactivate a deferred Application be filed no later than 60 days after the other proceeding has concluded?
b. Whether the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the substance of it has been appropriately dealt with in another legal proceeding, in this case the civil suit(s) commenced by the applicant?”
OVERVIEW:
DENIAL OF GOOD AND SERVICES SECTION 1.
[8] HRTO COMPLAINT: denial of goods and services (Section 1. HUMAN RIGHTS CODE), BYWAY OF denial of a HOMELESS SHELTER that had viable vacant space for three days without lawful cause by distinction(DISCRIMINATION), and the threat to action of denial of the goods and services of a HOMELESS SHELTER FOR THE sole justification of lawful legal action or actions (REPRISALS).
[9] DISCRIMINATION BY DISTINCTION, because I didn't witness any other HOMELESS SHELTER clients being denied homeless shelter services or turned away from the PEEL REGION HOMELESS SHELTER while waiting for three days or more outside, without food, water, or homeless services from a homeless shelter which had available space and available homeless services just across the street that the Applicant was unjustly barred from accessing.
[10] Immediately upon becoming homeless, I went to the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, located in the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL in the city of Mississauga, to seek out emergency shelter.
[11] The REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, blatantly refused to grant me(Wayne Ferron) access to the publicly funded facility which provides shorter living facility and services for homeless people from the Region of Peel Emergency Shelter needs, in addition to being bound by the ''SHELTER STANDERS'' agreement and the HUMAN RIGHT'S ACT.
[12] I am presently homeless, impecunious, and financially destitute. It seems that this is the way court cases or won, by way of “civil death”, social warfare, and denial of all the things Section 7. Of the Charter guarantees (life, liberty, security, and the pursuit of happiness).
APPLICANT’s ACCOUNT
OF DENIAL OF GOODs AND SERVICES
[13] On September 1, 2012 I became homeless.
[14] On September 1, 2012 I went to 2500 Cawthra Rd in the Region of Peel, in the City of Mississauga at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, for help AT ABOUT 11:00 P.M..
[15] On September 1, 2012 at about 11:00 P.M., it was boldly asserted to my person in clear and distinct language that I was “restricted” and to “leave” the premises, without the process of an intake assessment.
[16] On ward from September 1, 2012 I spent the nights and days homeless on the other side of the road to the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, without food or water except for I kind act by a client of the same shelter buying food and giving it to my person.
[17] Onward from September 1, 2012 I spent the nights and days homeless on the other side of the road across from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. I called the REGION OF PEEL HELP LINE to no avail, I call the PROVINCIAL OMBUSMAN COMISSION to no avail, and I called the PROVINCIAL HUMAN RIGHT COMMISSION to no avail; it was a long weekend with a government holiday, so all the aforesaid public institutions were closed for the long weekend.
[18] On September 2, 2012 at REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, an employee came across the street to inform me that the Manager restricted me and I will have to see the manager ( The director, Mr. Blessings), before I can be admitted to the same shelter. Moreover, I was advised that the managers, mainly (The director, Mr. Blessings) would be back after the holidays on 4/09/2012.
[19] After waiting outside for two days without food or water, the PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS employees called the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE (Officer 3424, and Officer 3470) to have my person removed from public property across the street from the same shelter, the same Officers made a determination that they could not reasonable do what was being requested of them.
[20] On September 5, 2012 I went to speak to the Managers, mainly (The director, Mr. Blessings) as per the Intake Clerks at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. I spoke to two Managers extensively who neither knew, nor was able to articulate the moral or legal justification for restricting my person from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. While others who had numerous policy infringement were admitted. Moreover, they said I must speak to another manager( The director, Mr. Blessings) due in one hour.
[21] On September 5, 2012 at about 11:00 a.m., at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, I was advised in clear direct language by the Manager( The director, Mr. Blessings) that I (Wayne Ferron) was restricted from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER for a pending action against the REGION for HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION of Section 1. Of the Act.
[22] I informed him that I was only suing for $1.00 and for the good of the public; Furthermore, the legal action was on principal of improving the fair treatment of homeless individuals, or maybe I was the only person being discriminated against?
[23] I was promptly shown the door even though I advise the 3 Managers present with a qualification of uncertainty that the action being taken against my person may not be legal, for you cannot hold one's legal rights hostage, to discriminate against a person within the context of equal, and fair services to all Canadians.
[24] I was promptly; shown the door, in fact it was held open for me.
· PLEASE SEE time of filing EXHIBIT A, and SUMMARY OF FACTS.
[25] On September 1, 2012 I became homeless. Ontario-Works HAS NO RECORDS OF ME BEING RESTRICTED FROM THE REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER; the matter of restriction from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, seem to be arbitrary, frivolous, vexatious, and motivated by revenge in an effort to extract vigilante justice for past complaints on HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
[26] In my view forcing a person to suffer homeless when there is access to facilities to help with this said problem is an unlawful act. NOTE AND RECALL, Ontario-works HAS NO RECORDS OF ME BEING RESTRICTED FROM THE REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. Which infers that the REGION OF PEEL has no record of me being restricted? NONE! I am not even flag for any pass unreasonable acts or acts of omission. Besides, it was more than a year since I had been in any homeless shelter.
· PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT A
[27] The above incidence made me feel like an undesirable human being with less social value or sub human trouble maker, whom was being punished for taking action endorsed by the will of Parliament.
[28] I was made to suffer homelessness, loss of dignity, hunger and forced to battle the natural elements for trying to affect my legal rights to bring before a court of competent jurisdiction, matters which affect the public good and the public confidence and trust in services involving a civil society.
[29] Violation of Parliamentary legislation is to be dealt with by the courts of competent jurisdiction and not by way of vigilante punishment as though the law isnot a slave to certain particular element of society.
[30] I was not given reasonable notice of my RESTRICTION, even though I requested personal Information disclosure on more than one occasion; the information request were simply ignored and the said institution fail to return the necessary monies to start the search and disclosure process, in contravention of Section 322(1), 334, and 380(1)
of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
[31] I should have been properly notified of the said RESTRICTION if it existed, processed by the intake office, then my application denied for a lawful, policy or moral written articulated justification. This did not happen! I did not have due process or equal treatment given to citizen belonging to nations which effect civilized practice of law or are signatures to the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL COVENANT; a promise to the international community to treat your citizens humanely, and Ontario/Canada are nation states which have signed the aforesaid promise .
[32] My complaint was on a matter of principle, the public good, to recognize and acknowledge that homeless people are also people with freedom rights and human dignity; hopefully in the adjudicative process, the human condition for Canadians my improve, even if it is just a little.
[33] We are all social beings, whom must live and interact with each other because of the very nature of who we are. This is a necessary thing for social beings. It make me happy and I feel fulfilled when we are respectful to each other and are Christ like in our treatment of each other.
RESPONSE TO NO NOTICE OF INTENT OT DISMISS
[34] The following was on the title page of the RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS…(2012-12585-I), but the same document was not referred to or mentioned in the
CASE ASSESSMENT DIRECTION(2012-12585-i). Disclosed to the RESPONDENTS and HRTO-REGISTRAR in the same filed RESPONSE;
“RESPONSE
TO RICHARD HENNESSY ADJUDICATION,
without response from RESPONDENTS,
NOTICE to dismiss matters with
HRTO FILE: 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I,
and without any resolution of my stolen property being returned to my person to enable full access to public medical services, public goods and public services or RESTITUTION of DIGNITY
Morganv. HermanMillerCanadaInc., 2013 HRTO 650 (CanLII)
MarinelandofCanadaInc., 2005 HRTO 30,
“JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED”
PLEASE STOP PUNISHING MY CHILDREN with denial of PUBLIC goods and service AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT(S. 12); for the unlawful crime of acting within the capacity of a PRIVATE PROSECUTOR (s. 507 C.C.) and endeavoring to enforce our beloved CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA”
[35] The following was asserted in the RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS…(2012-12585-I);
“TAKE NOTE: There has been no response from the respondents, which implies that they except all my allegations as the unchallenged truth or the unchallenged factual evidence for HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I,and 2014-19377-I. I am willing to and would life to testify under oath to assist the court in its finding of facts of all the above matters to render a fair and just decisions.
If it is the case that the above matters are not in the correct jurisdiction, I respectfully request that the same matters be transferred to the correct jurisdiction to affect DUE PROCESS OF LAW for the just determination of a judicial matters HRTO FILE: 2012-12585-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I,and 2014-19377-I. Note that I have filed some of the same matters to the Federal Human Rights is which they have responded as having no jurisdiction for the matters.
According to employees of the Federal Human Rights Commission and according to Mr Richard Hennessy of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, they both do not have jurisdiction for the two matters which Mr. Richard Hennessy is endeavouring to dismiss: AGAIN, PLEASE TRANSFEREE ALL MATTER’S Mr. Richard Hennessy has given notice to dismissed to the proper jurisdiction, if my CHILDREN and I as Canadians has the right to the rights given in the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE! Does the following rights stated below apply to my children and I?
Services
1. Every person has a right to equal treatment …
2. (1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of accommodation...
8. Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Ac
9. No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under this Part.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 9.
Citation: Bajouco v. McMaster 2011 HRTO 569
Morganv. HermanMillerCanadaInc., 2013 HRTO 650 (CanLII)
MarinelandofCanadaInc., 2005 HRTO 30,
“Employee Awarded Human Rights Damages Without Discrimination
Morganv. HermanMillerCanadaInc., 2013 HRTO 650 (CanLII)
Is an act of reprisal in response to an unfounded human rights complaint grounds for an award of damages under the OntarioHumanRightsCode? According to a recent decision from the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario,Morganv. HermanMillerCanadaInc., 2013 HRTO 650 (CanLII), the answer is yes.{...}
The Duty to Address and Respond
In reaching the decision that Mr. Morgan had been discriminated against, Adjudicator Debané made reference to the 2005 decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario inLaskowskav. MarinelandofCanadaInc., 2005 HRTO 30, which discusses the obligation of an employer to adequately address and respond to allegations of Code-related discrimination and harassment in the workplace.
Adjudicator Debané then went on to hold that an applicant need not prove that discrimination has occurred to benefit from the protection of section 8 of the Human Rights Code; the applicant must only have a genuinely held the belief that the respondents were infringing his Code rights. (See paragraph 87.)
Section 8 oftheOntarioHumanRightsCode provides that:
Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Act{...}
Based on that rule of law, Adjudicator Debané found that the decision to terminate Mr. Morgan’s employment was made as a reprisal because he had claimed his Code rights by raising issues of harassment and discrimination in his workplace. Adjudicator Debané also found that the employer failed to adequately address, or take any steps in response to, Mr. Morgan’s, albeit unfounded, allegations of discrimination and harassment. On this second point Adjudicator Debané wrote that:
Instead of dealing with the applicant’s allegations in an appropriate manner, the company chose to terminate the applicant’s employment.{...} Although reprisal need only be one factor in the decision to terminate the applicant in order to find that the applicant was terminated contrary to his right to be free from reprisal under the Code, in my view the reasons in the respondent’s termination letter were otherwise pre-textual. (Para. 108)” (ParSeanBawden —LabourPains)”
HUMAN RIGHTS PREAMBLE: “...public policy in Ontario to recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to provide for equal rights and opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to law…”
Pursuant to ONTARIO CIVIL PRACTICE;
“…the Ontario Court of Appeal has made it clear in numerous cases that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plenary trial remains the mode for the resolution of disputes and Rule 20 does not represent court reform, or the reform of the adversary system, in disguise{...}
A motion judge ought not lose sight of her or his narrow role in determining whether a genuine factual issue exist, and must be careful not to assume the role of a trial judge by adjudicating any genuine factual issues which do exist. The motions judge ought never assess credibility, weight the evidence, or find the facts, all of which are functions reserved to the trial judge. However, an issue of fact must relate to material fact; otherwise it cannot give rise to a “genuine issue for trial.” Moreover, merely raising an issue of credibility will not be an answer to a motion for summary judgment; the issue of credibility must be material and genuine:...“
(page 543, ONTARIO CIVIL PRACTICE 2009, THOMSON CARSWELL)
{...}
COMPLAINT HRTO FILE: 20114-19377-I
[79] Good, Services, and Facilities (Form 1-C) (form1,21-question 6)
When you chooses goods and services as your area of complaint and fill out FORM 1, it directs you to fill our FORM 1-C, where you choose POLICE SERVICES as the area in GOODS AND SERVICES that you are complaining about.
Police services (FORM 1-C, C1)
{...}
COMPLAINT HRTO FILE: 20114-19377-I
[79] Good, Services, and Facilities (Form 1-C) (form1,21-question 6)
When you chooses goods and services as your area of complaint and fill out FORM 1, it directs you to fill our FORM 1-C, where you choose POLICE SERVICES as the area in GOODS AND SERVICES that you are complaining about.
Police services (FORM 1-C, C1)
[80] HRTO FILE: 2014-19680-I PLEASE STOP CHANGING MY PREMISE!
Please transfer to a court of competent jurisdiction for a just determination.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLAINT ON DENIAL OF COURT SERVICES WHICH ARE STILL PENDING (certified reproduction or production of evidence as witness by the court in accordance with the EVIDENCE ACT, the COURT REPORTERS sworn oath to give equal TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES, and the COURT REPORTER’S ACT; order of SOME CERTIFIED transcripts ARE STILL PENDING, some TRANSCRIPTS(C 56718) payed for and received or not certified in accordance of the laws and rule of evidence, and REQUISITIONS(c 56718) were not responded to) (s. 1). - Pursuant to Mr Richard Hennessy (Registrar) who seem to be acting in the capacity of a lawyer for RESPONDENTS, who are not honourable enough to respond to serious allegations of concern to the PUBLIC GOOD;
“Re: Wayne Ferron v. Ministry of the Attorney General (Court Service Division), John Gerretsen, Arlene Gorewicz, Santiago Orbe and Joy Webster
Subject: Notice of Intent to Dismiss
The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) is in receipt of an Application, HRTO file number 2014-19680-I, filed by Wayne Ferron on December 19, 2014.
The HRTO has reviewed the Application. It appears the Application is outside the HRTO’s jurisdiction because:
• while your response to question #7 of the Application alleges that the last incident of discrimination you experienced occurred on or about January 2, 2014, a review of your Application indicates that it is either not clear what incident of discrimination is alleged to have occurred on this date or how the incident described as occurring on that date constitutes an incident of discrimination within the meaning of the Code....”
PLEASE SEE APPENDIX: A
Janzen v. Platy enterprises ltd., [1989] 1 SCR 1252, 1989 CanLII 97 (SCC)
Citation: Bajouco v. McMaster 2011 HRTO 569
Morganv. HermanMillerCanadaInc., 2013 HRTO 650 (CanLII)
MarinelandofCanadaInc., 2005 HRTO 30,
“Employee Awarded Human Rights Damages Without Discrimination”
REPRISALS (for all matters - HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I):
[81] For loving the Law and endeavouring to act with in the capacity of a Private Prosecutor and in accordance with Section. 507 of the CRIMINAL CODE of CANADA. In addition to LEGAL BULLYING and harassment after I became hated and despised in legal circles. Now I am just left to die with no legal rights, no human rights, no access to EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE benefits entitlements, no access to Public goods and services, and no access to full medical services.
Services
1. Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 1; 1999, c. 6, s. 28 (1); 2001, c. 32, s. 27 (1); 2005, c. 5, s. 32 (1); 2012, c. 7, s. 1.
Reprisals
8. Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Act, to institute and participate in proceedings under this Act and to refuse to infringe a right of another person under this Act, without reprisal or threat of reprisal for so doing.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 8.
Infringement prohibited
9. No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under this Part.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 9.
Act binds Crown
47. (1) This Act binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 47 (1).
1) DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
2) DENIAL OF DIGNITY AND WORTH OF A HUMAN BEING
3) DENIAL OF LEGAL RIGHTS
4) DENIAL OF GOODS AND SERVICES
5) DENIAL OF EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS ENTITLEMENTS
6) DENIAL OF FULL ACCESS TO MEDICAL SERVICES
7) DIMINISHING OF MY CHILDREN RIGHT TO A FAIR AND EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION
8) DENIAL OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS
9) LEGAL BULLYING
[82] DISCRIMINATION (discrimination by distinction for all matters - HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I):
I am relying on the following legislation;
ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS CODE
Services
1. Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 1; 1999, c. 6, s. 28 (1); 2001, c. 32, s. 27 (1); 2005, c. 5, s. 32 (1); 2012, c. 7, s. 1.
Reprisals
8. Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Act, to institute and participate in proceedings under this Act and to refuse to infringe a right of another person under this Act, without reprisal or threat of reprisal for so doing.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 8.
Infringement prohibited
9. No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under this Part.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 9.
Act binds Crown
47. (1) This Act binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 47 (1).
Police Service Act:
Declaration of principles
Police services shall be provided throughout Ontario in accordance with the following principles:
1. The need to ensure the safety and security of all persons and property in Ontario.
2. The importance of safeguarding the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Human Rights Code.
R.S.Q., chapter C-12
Charter of human rights and freedoms
Exercise of rights and freedoms.
9.1. In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec.
CHAPTER I.1
RIGHT TO EQUAL RECOGNITION AND EXERCISE OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Discrimination forbidden.
10. Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap.
Discrimination defined.
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right.
1975, c. 6, s. 10; 1977, c. 6, s. 1; 1978, c. 7, s. 112; 1980, c. 11, s. 34; 1982, c. 61, s. 3.
Harassment.
10.1. No one may harass a person on the basis of any ground mentioned in section 10.
1982, c. 61, s. 4.
Discriminatory notice forbidden.
11. No one may distribute, publish or publicly exhibit a notice, symbol or sign involving discrimination, or authorize anyone to do so.
1975, c. 6, s. 11.
Discrimination in juridical acts.
12. No one may, through discrimination, refuse to make a juridical act concerning goods or services ordinarily offered to the public.
1975, c. 6, s. 12.
Clause forbidden.
13. No one may in a juridical act stipulate a clause involving discrimination.
______
Human Rights Code
R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER H.19
Constructive discrimination
11. (1) A right of a person under Part I is infringed where a requirement, qualification or factor exists that is not discrimination on a prohibited ground but that results in the exclusion, restriction or preference of a group of persons who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination and of whom the person is a member, except where,
(a) the requirement, qualification or factor is reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances; or
(b) it is declared in this Act, other than in section 17, that to discriminate because of such ground is not an infringement of a right.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 11 (1).
Discrimination because of association
12. A right under Part I is infringed where the discrimination is because of relationship, association or dealings with a person or persons identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination.R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,s. 12.
DISTINCTION:
[83] PERMISSIBLE THEFT - Officer Pekeski(2261) and Ms. Joanne Stuart are allowed to steal my property and continue to keep the same stolen property without the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW or the application of the CRIMINAL CODE being applied against there crimes. I am the only one in Ontario that I know that is experiencing the aforesaid. It seems as though THE MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL is protecting Ms. Joanne Stuart and Officer Pekeski(2261) from the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW byway of an act of omission.
[84] CRIMINAL CODES DOES NOT PROTECT ME PROTECTION - Officer Pekeski(2261) and Ms. Joanne Stuart are allowed to steal my property and continue to keep the same stolen property without the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW or the application of the CRIMINAL CODE being applied against there crimes. I am the only one in Ontario that I know that is experiencing the aforesaid. It seems as though THE MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL is protecting Ms. Joanne Stuart and Officer Pekeski(2261) from the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW byway of an act of omission.
[85] PARAMOUNTCY DOES NOT APPLY TO ME - Officer Pekeski(2261) and Ms. Joanne Stuart are allowed to steal my property and continue to keep the same stolen property without the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW or the application of the CRIMINAL CODE being applied against there crimes. Furthermore, when I tried to prosecute them, a provincial legislation was used to declare me as a vexative litigant; and defeat my prosecutions, take away all my legal rights, and take away my Human Rights. I am the only one in Ontario that I know that is experiencing the aforesaid. It seems as though THE MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL is protecting Ms. Joanne Stuart and Officer Pekeski(2261) from the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW byway of an act of omission.
[86] DENIED FULL ACCESS TO MEDICAL SERVICES - Because Officer Pekeski (2261) was allowed to steel from my property (wallet, ID, ETC…), and continue to keep my stolen property (wallet, ID, ETC…), which is a requirement for access to public services. I am the only one in Ontario that I know that is experiencing the aforesaid. It seems as though THE MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL is protecting Ms. Joanne Stuart and Officer Pekeski(2261) from the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW byway of an act of omission.
[87] DENIED FULL ACCESS TO GOODS AND SERVICES -Because Officer Pekeski (2261) was allowed to steel from my property (wallet, ID, ETC…), and continue to keep my stolen property (wallet, ID, ETC…), which is a requirement for access to public services. I am the only one in Ontario that I know that is experiencing the aforesaid. It seems as though THE MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL is protecting Ms. Joanne Stuart and Officer Pekeski(2261) from the enforcement of the RULE OF LAW byway of an act of omission…”
[36] The following is the same articulation in explaining discrimination in the RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS(2012-12585-i);
DISCRIMINATION BY the DISTINCTION
of SYSTEMIC RACISM or SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION:
LINKAGE FACTORS
1. RACIAL PROFILING
2. SYSTEMIC RACISM or SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION
3. YORK REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES - ALPHA FILE
4. PEEL REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES - ALPHA FILE
5. TORONTO REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES - ALPHA FILES (THERE are two occurrences of trying to deny me Police Services-TAKE NOTICE: I was almost run over by someone whom was in the process of contravening the HIGHWAY TRAFFIC ACT, and all that I seem to being told is that my life is worthless, I have no human rights, I have no legal rights and HRTO has no jurisdiction to return my dignity to my person - that Division 13 of the TORONTO POLICE SERVICES was served first with the initial filing of the COMPLAINT against Officer Green on denial of police services which is contrary to the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, POLICE SERVICE ACT, CRIMINAL CODE, and CHARTER. tHERE STILL HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE FROM THE TORONTO POLICE SERVICE OR OFFICER GREEN, NO INVESTIGATION, NO DISCLOSURE OF INVESTIGATION BY HRTO (i have requested disclosure, no response) The RESPONDENTS has had my material since Nov 2013, and has still not responded.))
6. MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL SERVICES(Probation Officer assaulted me, then along with her college and maliciously procured legal documents to charge me, summon for fingerprinting, attempted to imprison me for 15 days byway of manufactured evidence after the probation period granting the MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, authority over me was expired) - FILE or FILES
[215] So the law enforcement proceed vicariously through Doctors and Brampton Form 1. to give you a psychiatric assessment to manufacture our mental profile or Brand you as mentally Incompetent, thereby erasing all your Rights and freedom within this society. The ones in position of public authority should know or aught to have known that the aforementioned apparent actions is more inline with the actions of a Police State and a crime against society at large.”
8. INTERPOL (information is shared with international members to facilitate crime fighting beyond a NATION state borders)
9. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT( according to Officer in charge, information in ALPHA FILE is sent to Federal Government)
LINKAGE
OR APPLICANT PROFILE IN ALPHA FILE
1. John Gerretsen (PRIVATE PROSECUTION), (Attorney General [20 Oct 2011 – 25 March 2014]), choosing not to enforce the CRIMINAL CODE of CANADA , with respect to Officer Pekeski (2261) theft of my personal proper(HEALTH CARD etc.) or the prosecution of Ms. Stuart his agent and representative for her criminal actions ).
2. Ms. Joanne Stuart(PRIVATE PROSECUTION), who stole my FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST in addition to committing legal fraud, and misleading at least one Justice and the COURT OF APPEAL court;
3. SALVATION ARMY, and To the REGION OF PEEL(PRIVATE PROSECUTION), refusal to return forthwith my $5 0r $10 check made out to the Minister of Finance and my $10(11 466 978 57 ) money ORDER issued by CANADA POST to the SALVATION ARMY for the SALVATION ARMY and ONTARIO WORKS.
CANADA POST MONEY ORDER INFORMATION:
SERIAL NO.: 11 466 978 57
SECURITY CODE: 679 965 794
OFFICE NO.: 102 205
4. PEEL REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES(PRIVATE PROSECUTION), refusal to respect my COLOUR OF RIGHT, respect the CRIMINAL CODE, and enforce the RULE OF LAW, in the the prompt return of all my belongings stolen or confiscated or whatever the case may be, by their agent subordinate Officer Pekeski(2261) whom disclosed to my person the false identity of Officer Perkins(2261) in addition to the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE disclosing his identity as Officer Perkins(2261), when his legal name is Officer Pekeski(2261).
5. YORK REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES(PRIVATE PROSECUTION), refusal to respect THE CRIMINAL CODE and enforce the RULE OF LAW;
6. TORONTO REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES(PRIVATE PROSECUTION), refusal to respect THE CRIMINAL CODE and enforce the RULE OF LAW;
7. ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE(CENTRAL EAST REGION)-REGISTRAR and the failure to return promptly the evidence(AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE FERRON C51190) I disclosed to Your Worship Justice Malik for my field information against Geoffery Farday; I have exercised my colour of right in requesting the same Affidavit evidence to no avail.
8. Intoxication on Alcohol above the allowable limit while driving (slander/false fact)
9. Drug Addict/consumed drugs with an inference of crack cocaine (slander / false fact)
10. Violent (slander/false fact-
11. Assaultive (slander/false fact)
12. Mentally Diseases (slander/false fact)
13. Criminal Convic (NOT LEGALLY EXISTING AFFIANT B. HIRD: False oath and misleading a judicial officer to defeat the course of justice. Information 07-02500 filed by Police Officer B. Hird who does not lawfully exist)
14. Vexatious (PUNISHMENT FOR PRIVATE PROSECUTION: Private Prosecutor of those with self immunity above the law. All my legal right/human rights was stolen in all of ONTARIO by BLG(Katherine Kirkpatrick), via fraudulent means and based on a fallacy in her arguments. JUSTICE ANDRE'S ORDERS take all of my legal rights (HUMANITY) away in all of ONTARIO, by way of PROVINCIAL legislation overcoming FEDERAL legislation(PARAMOUNTCY), and PRIVATE PROSECUTION of people in high public office who believe they are above the law, immune to the law, and does not have to answer to the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA for alleged criminal offenses. In short they serves THE LAW, but they are not subject to THE LAW. Because of my just private prosecutions (Section 507.1 and 504).)
15. Frivolous (PUNISHMENT FOR PRIVATE PROSECUTION: Private Prosecutor of those with self immunity above the- The JUSTICE OF THE PEACE INTAKE OFFICE, at the ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE (A GRENVILLE and WILLIAM DAVIS COURTHOUSE); I was refused legal services provided to the public to affect LEGAL RIGHTS in giving full answer for alleged crimes(Offence Number: 8271152B ) I was charge within the Province of Ontario without reasonable cause or articulated legal justification. I was discriminated against with systemic prejudice, called “CRAZY GUY..” by YOUR WORSHIP at first instant without the same HONOURABLE JUSTICE OF THE PIECE KNOWING me or possessing personal knowledge of me, in addition to being defamed with slander by YOUR WORSHIP whom was seized with my AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE FERRON (Court File Number: 3160-8271152B), in front of the administrative staff and public in the SAME INTAKE OFFICE. The aforesaid was not only discrimination by distinction without lawful cause, but also conducted in secrecy, and also enforced in secrecy while participants willfully concealed their identities from my person even though they are required not to do so(OPEN COURT POLICY).)
16. PRIVATE PROSECUTOR (PUNISHMENT FOR PRIVATE PROSECUTION:arrested, assault, slandered, called names, falsely imprisoned, VICTIM OF THEFT, convicted without notice or trial, and being punished with reprisals for trying to prosecute those whom I witness contravening the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA in the territorial jurisdiction of Ontario and in accordance with section 507 of the Criminal Code and Supreme Court case law case law and section 15 of the Charter).
1. Blackman (VISIBLE MINORITY WHO HAVE JUST ACCEPTED RACISM AS A PART OF NORMAL EVERYDAY LIFE: who has been pulled over many times and then Officers asserting they smell alcohol when I don’t EVEN DRINK, or asking me for drug dealers when I DON’T CONSUME DRUGS. Or a group of young white males driving by in a ford pickup truck and calling me “nigger” for who knows what. This has been my experience since I was small.)
2. INFERIOR EDUCATION- (SYSTEMIC RACIAL TARGETING by the ONTARIO GOVERNMENT to be plucked out of ELEMENTARY SCHOOL at a tender age (grade 5) and sent to a inferior highschool (W.J. FENTON S. S.) to learn how to cook, clean, weld, and operator machines; but I did self study at the library by myself. Though myself math, physics, philosophy, and the unteachable thin of thinking, just to find out that I was smarter or as smart as the other children in my same elementary school. BILL DAVIS signed the certificate for ONTARIO SCHOLAR and signed the CERTIFICATE FOR THE GOLD MEDAL IN ALL ONTARIO BOXING. Now the BRAMPTON COURTHOUSE which is named after him abuse me by way of court service workers, JUSTICE CALL ME NAMES(‘CRAZY GUY’), ASSAULT ME, arrest me, falsely imprison me, threaten to call the police to throw me out of the courtroom and courthouse for HAVE TOO MUCH EVIDENCE and just exercising my rights to PRIVATELY PROSECUTE CRIMES to which I have personal knowledge and is the main witness.)
TAKE NOTICE: I JUST RECENTLY CAME OFF THE STREETS OF TORONTO AS LIVING AS A VAGABOND. MY RESIDENCE FLOODS AND IS INFECTED WITH BLACK MOLD; I AM FORCED TO LIVE INHUMAINLY AND EXPECTED TO BRING MY DAUGHTER WHOM I HAVE FULL CUSTODY FOR, TO LIVE THERE. I am left to die in the said conditions by ONTARIO-WORKS. PLEASE SEND ANY LEGAL SERVICE MATERIAL BY REGISTERED MAIL, TO BE PICKED UP AT THE POST OFFICE; THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT MATERIAL SERVED AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS BY REGULAR MAIL WILL BE RELAYED TO MY PERSON, IN ADDITION TO THE SMALL POST BOX CONTENTS BEING EXPOSED TO THE NATURAL ELEMENTS. I AM NOT HOME IN THE DAYTIME, I MOSTLY ONLY SLEEP AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS.)”
[37] REPRISALS: (PUNISHMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLAINTS, CIVIL ACTIONS, OR PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS), The following are some REPRISALS against my person for being a private prosecutor ;
1. the CROWN(Ms.. Krick) being allowed to UNLAWFULLY remove PRIVATE PROSECUTION PUBLIC EVIDENCE (C 58716-INCRIMINATE THE CROWN) from the COA-RECORDS while affection a unwritten restriction of the PUBLIC HAVING ACCESS TO THE SAME PUBLIC FILE without reasonable cause. THERE IS NO EQUALITY IN THE LAW!
2. missing and lost private prosecution public evidence;
3. impeded or restricted access to PRIVATE PROSECUTION public evidence;
4. harassment while filing required court documents for PRIVATE PROSECUTION;
5. unlawful imprisonment while attempting to file PRIVATE PROSECUTION information;
6. conviction without notice or fair hearing;
7. BARRED FROM DEFENSE OR OBTAINING JUSTICE: and finally stopping me from exercising my legal rights by banning me from all courts in Ontario, taking away all my legal rights in Ontario by fraudulent means, and in addition to impeding or restricting my HUMAN RIGHTS;
8. COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO refuse to deal with the matter;
9. SUPREME COURT OF CANADA refuse to deal with the matter;
10. now my EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE benefits are impeded, I have no social services rights, and access to goods, services (Health services, Police Services etc. are impeded), which are enjoyed by other CANADIANS have vanished. All I have access to now is SECOND HAND SMOKE, DISEASE AFFLICTING THE HOMELESS, OUT OF THE COLD SHELTERS, and SOUP KITCHENS.
[38] CASE LAW-REPRISALS:
1. Bajouco v. McMaster 2011 HRTO 569
Morganv. HermanMillerCanadaInc., 2013 HRTO 650 (CanLII)
MarinelandofCanadaInc., 2005 HRTO 30,
“Employee Awarded Human Rights Damages Without Discrimination
Morganv. HermanMillerCanadaInc., 2013 HRTO 650 (CanLII)
Is an act of reprisal in response to an unfounded human rights complaint grounds for an award of damages under the OntarioHumanRightsCode? According to a recent decision from the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario,Morganv. HermanMillerCanadaInc., 2013 HRTO 650 (CanLII), the answer is yes.{...}
The Duty to Address and Respond
In reaching the decision that Mr. Morgan had been discriminated against, Adjudicator Debané made reference to the 2005 decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario inLaskowskav. MarinelandofCanadaInc., 2005 HRTO 30, which discusses the obligation of an employer to adequately address and respond to allegations of Code-related discrimination and harassment in the workplace.
Adjudicator Debané then went on to hold that an applicant need not prove that discrimination has occurred to benefit from the protection of section 8 of the Human Rights Code; the applicant must only have a genuinely held the belief that the respondents were infringing his Code rights. (See paragraph 87.)
Section 8 oftheOntarioHumanRightsCode provides that:
Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Act{...}
Based on that rule of law, Adjudicator Debané found that the decision to terminate Mr. Morgan’s employment was made as a reprisal because he had claimed his Code rights by raising issues of harassment and discrimination in his workplace. Adjudicator Debané also found that the employer failed to adequately address, or take any steps in response to, Mr. Morgan’s, albeit unfounded, allegations of discrimination and harassment. On this second point Adjudicator Debané wrote that:
Instead of dealing with the applicant’s allegations in an appropriate manner, the company chose to terminate the applicant’s employment.{...} Although reprisal need only be one factor in the decision to terminate the applicant in order to find that the applicant was terminated contrary to his right to be free from reprisal under the Code, in my view the reasons in the respondent’s termination letter were otherwise pre-textual. (Para. 108)” (ParSeanBawden —LabourPains)”
[39] CASE LAW-HRTO/POLICE SERVICES:
1. Morgan v. Toronto Police Services Board 2014hrto1548
2. Toronto Police Services Board 2013hrto1298
3. K.M. v. Kodama 2014hrto526
[40] FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/DISCLOSURE
1. Wozenilek v. The Book Shelf of Guelph Limited
2. 2008hrto454-1
3. 2012hrto2307-1
4. disclosure-freedom of information - Toronto Police Services Board and Christopher Fitkin 2009hrto1220
5. disclosure-Peel Regional Police Services - 2006hrto18
6. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION - C.M. v. Toronto Catholic District School Board 2012hrto2307
7. freedom of information- Ihasz v. Ontario (Revenue) 2014hrto376
8. INFORMATION-Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities 2015canlii24834.pdf
[41] FAIRNESS, JUSTNESS, EXPEDITIOUS/RULE A3.1
1. M.K. v. 1217993 Ontario, 2011 HRTO 1362
[42] NATURAL JUSTICE/PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
1. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc
2. R. v. Punko, 2012 SCC 39
3. R. v. Thorburn, 2010 ABQB 390
4. R. v. Labadie, 2011 ONCA 22
5. R. v. Wells, 2012 ABQB 77
6. reference re YOUNG OFFENDERS ACT (P.E.I),
7. CERTIFIED COPY OF Jason Gorda's RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION RECORD(M61/12)
8. Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170
9. CASE LAW- Law Society of Upper Canada v. Raymond Li, Docket: 2004-00034
10. CASE LAW- Law Society of Upper Canada v. Raymond Li, Docket: 2004-00040
11. R. V. Little john & Tirabasso, [1978], 41 C.C.C. (2d) 161, “this court accept as self-evident the proposition that a person charged with a serious offence is under a grave disadvantage if, for any reason, he is deprived of the assistance of competent counsel:” see p. 173:,
12. R. v. Rowbotham
13. R. v. McGibbon
14. NIKE CANADA LTD. and NIKE INTERNATIONAL LTD. - and - JANE DOE and JOHN DOE ET. AL.(T-1636-99)
15. VIDÉOTRON LTÉE et al. and NESTAR COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al.(2003 FCA 56)
16. R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFERE (RULE 14.2)
1.) Laba v. Windsor (City), 2009 HRTO 382 (CanLII), retrieved on 2015-06-17
2.) Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.
3.) Oram v. Abitibi Consolidated Company of Canada
4.) Samuel v. Waterloo Regional District School Board, 2011 HRTO 498 (CanLII)
[43] THEFT
1. R. v. C.C., [2012] N.J. No. 121 (P.C.)
2. R. v. Reid, [2012] N.J. No. 164 (P.C.)
3. R. v. Prowse 1998 CanLII 18024
4. R v Fulcher, 2007 ABCA 381 at para 30
("[A]bsent truly exceptional circumstances, the sentencing goals of deterrence and denunciation demand a sentence of imprisonment rather than the imposition of a conditional sentence for crimes of embezzlement or theft by an employee.")
WITNESS LIST:
[44]
Rhondda Margetts Final COURT ORDER ON CV-12 -71600
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE(Central West region)
Provincial Courts Civil Filing Offices
Brampton Superior Court of Justice
7755 Hurontario St, Brampton, ON, L6W 4T1
905-456-4744
NOTE: Please bring a copy of CV 12-71600 FINAL ORDER and an official copy of CV 12-71600 FINAL ORDER & CV 13-1060 FINAL ORDER with signature in blue ink, which should have been disclosed and served on Wayne Ferron in accordance with law and judicial policy, but was never done.
[45]
Cindy Kreiger ONTARIO WORKS - WORKER(CASE WORKER# 353)
REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL
10 Peel Centre Drive,
Brampton, ON, L6T 4B9
(905) 791 – 7800
NOTE: Please bring a list of all the document Wayne Ferron disclosed to you personally, for ONTARIO WORKS.
|
[46]
Paul Richards HRTO-did not accept HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLAINT for filing nor pushed sam complaint to hearing (July 11, 2011) HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
655 Bay Street, 14th floor
Toronto, ON, M7A 2A3
416 326 1312
1 866 598 0322
NOTE: Please bring a copy of the complaint and a copy of the HRTO responding letter with your name and signature.
[47] |
Blessing Anyanwa SHELTER SUPERVISOR
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTER
2500 Cawthra Rd, Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
905-281-1272
NOTE: Please bring a copy of the email to the LAWYER of the salvation army, which makes a statement concerning the reasons why the Applicant was not admitted to the REGION OF PEEL HOMELESS SHELTER at 35 Cawthra Rd, Mississauga, from September 1, 2012 to September 5, 2012.
[48] |
Nicole Arbour ONTARIO WORKS - WORKER(? )
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTER
2500 Cawthra Rd, Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
905-281-1272
NOTE: Please bring a list of all the necessary documents you personally collected from Wayne Ferron for ONTARIO WORKS and a copy of the EVICTION letter for Wayne Ferron from the REGIONAL OF PEEL HOMELESS SHELTER.
[49]
Rudo Chiyangwa SALVATION ARMY COUNSELOR
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTER
2500 Cawthra Rd, Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
905-281-1272
[50]
David Misir -IPC case Manager
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
2 Bloor Street East, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario M4W 1A8, Canada
email: info@ipc.on.ca.
Toronto Area: 416-326-3333
Long Distance: 1-800-387-0073 (within Ontario)
TDD/TTY: 416-325-7539
Fax 416-325-9195
NOTE: Please bring a copy of your letter to Wayne Ferron and your letter to ONTARIO WORKS concerning Wayne Ferron freedom of information request.
[51]
Harry Boom SALVATION ARMY COUNSELOR
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTER
2500 Cawthra Rd, Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
905-281-1272
NOTE: Please bring name and contact of ONTARIO WORK’S COUNCILOR who worked as partner with you and witness the events in question.
NOTE: Please bring copy of Eviction letter for Wayne Ferron, and documentation proving Wayne Ferron was not receiving ONTARIO WORKS financial assistance, and the official documented reason for the meeting of the evocation of Wayne Ferron.
[52]
ONTARIO WORKS WORKER/works as Harry Boom’s partner (Policy of at least two person speaking to a any homeless client at all time, so their is always a witness to events.
[53]
Ms. Forgol Intake Clerk
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTER
2500 Cawthra Rd, Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
905-281-1272
[54]
Ms. Tiffany Intake Clerk
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTER
2500 Cawthra Rd, Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
905-281-1272
[55]
Allison Waltho Shelter Supervisor
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTER
2500 Cawthra Rd, Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
905-281-1272
NOTE: Please bring the documents detailing why you gave the final order to intake Wayne Ferron into the REGION OF PEEL HOMELESS SHELTER, just to allow Mr. Harry Boom to evict or discharge Wayne Ferron from the same homeless facility two weeks later.
[56]
Mark Wilson Manager
STREET TO HOME
Toronto Shelter Support and Housing administration
Brampton Superior Court of Justice
124 Peter St., ON, M5V 2H3
TEL: 416-392-0090
FAX: 416 338 4760
[57]
Anthony Singh Assistant Manager
STREET TO HOME
Toronto Shelter Support and Housing administration
Brampton Superior Court of Justice
124 Peter St., ON, M5V 2H3
TEL: 416-392-0090
FAX: 416 338 4760
[58]
Toby Druce FREE DENTAL CARE (STREET TO HOME)
STREET TO HOME
Toronto Shelter Support and Housing administration
Brampton Superior Court of Justice
124 Peter St., ON, M5V 2H3
TEL: 416-392-0090
FAX: 416 338 4760
[58.5]
PEEL REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES
(Officer 3424, and Officer 3470)
[59]
Wayne Ferron Applicant /
WITNESS WITH PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
HOMELESS VAGABOND
TORONTO, ONTARIO
[59.5]
i.) TANYA GALLOWAY
ii.) ANN C. DINNERT
iii.) JOHN H. GESCHER
THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL
10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A and B,
Brampton, ON L6T 4B9
Phone: 905-791-7800 EXT 4586 •
Toll-free: 1-888-919-7800
tanya.galloway@peelregion.ca, john.gescher@peelregion.ca
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
NO FINAL ORDER: CV 12-71600(civil matter)
[60] The Applicant’s civil matter CV 12-71600 has never received a FINAL ORDER for CV 12-71600 NOR HAS IT BEEN APPEALED, while about half(1/2) the RESPONDENTS for the same matter has failed to respond despite being served the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600); nor has the same civil matter in question ever been appealed.
[61] The SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE has failed to disclose a CV 12-71600 FINAL ORDER, the RESPONDENTS has failed to disclose a CV 12-71600 FINAL ORDER, and Ms. Kathrine Kirkpatrick the lawyer for York Region Police Services has failed to disclose a CV 12-71600 FINAL ORDER; furthermore, all the above failure to produce a final order for CV 12-71600 occurred after a formal REQUSITION to disclose the same final order by the Applicant (Wayne Ferron), they all fail to respond and failed to disclosed, and serve the FINAL ORDER FOR CV 12-71600. Which was Appeal to the SUPREME COURT OF CANADA under file number SCC 35821, while it would seem the RESPONDENTS were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[62] CV 13-1060 is a separate and distinct application filed by Ms Kathrine Kirkpatrick(BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP(“BLG”)) while acting as legal counsel for YORK REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE byway of legal fraud. CV 13-1060 was appealed to COURT OF APPEAL for ONTARIO byway of leave and filed under the motion number M42812.
[63] Which intern was Appeal to the SUPREME COUT OF CANADA under file number SCC 35821.
[64] Ms Katharine Kirkpatrick, has acted as legal counsel in the past for a none-legal entity whom was acting in the capacity of a YORK REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE OFFICER, but was not listed in the system as such or even as existing.
[65] In addition the false none-legal entity went by the manicure “B. Hird,” when misleading and swearing a false POSITIVE OATH before a Honourable Justice of the Peace, and maliciously procured voidable Information 07-02500 while under oath, and acting within the capacity of possessing personal knowledge of allegation in the same information 07-02550, while securing the same voidable information 07-02500 with a false signature from a Judicial Officer who was engaged in a judicial function.
[66] Ms Katharine Kirkpatrick, secured monies for the aforementioned none-legal entity B. Hird before a Honourable Judge in the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (central west)-CIVIL, while it would seem she was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
HRTO PROCESS
[67] On September 20, 2012, the HRTO- REGISTRAR was sent HUMAN RIGHTS MATTER HRTO 2012-12585-I, concerning the service at REGION OF PEEL HOMELESS SHELTER.
[68] Pursuant to HRTO-Registrar’s letter titled, NOTICE OF INCOMPLETE APPLICATION(2012-12585-I), which state the following;
“Subject: Second Notice of Incomplete Application
The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) is in receipt of your submissions in response to the Notice of Incomplete Application of October 18, 2012. However, the Application remains incomplete and cannot be processed by HRTO at this time for the following reasons:…”
( HRTO letter for 2012-12585-I, December 10, 2012 )
[69] Pursuant to HRTO-Registrar’s letter titled, NOTICE OF INCOMPLETE APPLICATION(2012-12585-I), which state the following;
“Subject: Failure to Respond to Notice of Incomplete Application
On December 10, 2012 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) sent you a letter to notify you that your Application was incomplete and could not be processed. You were asked to respond to specific questions outlined in the Notice of Incomplete Application by January 7, 2013. As of today’s date, the requested missing information has not been provided to the HRTO.
Attached you will find a copy of the HRTO’s December 10, 2012 Notice and a list of the questions you are required to answer. Please return the requested information as outlined to the HRTO by January 29, 2013. If the HRTO does not receive the requested information by this date, your…”
( HRTO letter for 2012-12585-I, January 29, 2013 )
[70] On April 12, 2013 THE GOVERNING COUNSEL OF THE SALVATION ARMY served and filed a letter seeking an extension of time to response to HRTO 2012-12585-I , ARTICULATED THE FOLLOWING;
“Attention: Richard Hennessy, Registrar
Dear Mr. hennessy:
Re: Wayne Ferron v. Salavation Army
HRTO File Number 2012-12585-I
I am in-house legal counsel for the above-named respondent.
The Salvation Army’s response is due on April12, 2013. I have been unable to obtain definitive instructions from my client in time to meet the above deadline. Kindly note that The Salvation Army is exploring the possibility of settling this matter.
In light of the above, I ask that the Tribunal provide The Salvation Army with a two week extension to provide it’s response.
(Legal Counsel, Elena Constantin, April 12, 2013 The Salvation Army Letter)
[71] HRTO 2012-12585-I was DEFERED or DELAYED on 13 September 2013, at the request of the respondents with the added benefit of not giving a full response.
“
HRTO FILE: 2012-12585-I
|
Re: Wayne Ferron v. The Regional Municipality of Peel and the Governing Council of Salvation Army in Canada
Subject: DEFFERRED APPLICATION – Advise of Status
On September 13, 2013 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) issued Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1544 deferring this Application pending the completion of a civil matter, pursuant to Rule 14 of its Rules of Procedure.
{…}
Sincerely,
Richard Hennessy
Registrar
cc. John Gescher (via e-mail)
Blair McCreadie”
TAKE NOTICE: That the Applicant is living as a HOMELESS VAGOBOND and do not have access to all the documents for HRTO 2012-12585-I; hence the Applicant requested disclosure of information and access to case files, so that he may know his case and give full answer. HRTO has not honored nor completed the APPLICANT’S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST HRTO 2012-12585-I et al, and the same request has been appeal to the INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSION under the a status of “DEEM REFUSAL.”
[72] On or about June 30, 2013, the Applicant served and filed RESPONSE to RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS HRTO 2012-12585-I , which articulated the following in which Wayne Ferron requested “…January 2014 HEARING date…”;
“TAKE NOTICE: The Applicant has not been given an official response from the RESPONDENING parties, nor has he been properly served with official documents which has been filed with the TRIBUNAL, nor has he been instructed how, and where to serve the RESPONDENTS additional documents; 2500 Cawthra Employees has threaten to throw rece
The Applicant respectfully requntly filed legal documents by the Applicant into the garbage.
est 4 weeks to file a proper response, to documentations and argument of the RESPONDENTS, he was never properly served in accordance with civilized practice of law. Moreover, the Applicant notified all parties officially in accordance with the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and Canadian civilized practice of law.
Again, the applicant intents to serve, and file medical information relevant to the matter before the TRIBUNAL; the Applicant is asking for a January 2014 HEARING date, so he can accumulate enough funds to collect and serve his relevant medical information; I am a human being with human worth and would like to be treated in a dignified manner.
Pursuant to the documentation served on my person at the wrong address (neighborhood which I have no dealings with and does not speak English) and not in the proper mailbox which cannot contain the very large package after I notified and gave detailed instructions of a manner to serve my person to assure service is successful or received successfully with conformation.
The respondent's arguments contain many fallacies, mainly the cause and effect fallacy. THE CIVIL STATEMENT OF CLAIM(let us call it EXHIBIT A), does not strengthen the respondent's argument but weakens it; pursuant to the Director(BLESSING ANYANWU) at PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, at 2500 Cawthra Rd., Mississauga, the Applicant was being denied service at the same homeless shelter, and due process for trying to affect his legal rights by way of EXHIBIT A; the director(Mr. Blessings) was quite clear on the above point which he articulated many times and there was two other manager's at the said EMERGENCY SHELTER facility which witness this while they were being asked by the Applicant if their said action was legal, because of the revenge or punishment or vigilante justice dimension for exercising ones legal right . In addition to the intake clerks articulating in clear language that they were given instructions not to process or give me shelter at the same EMERGENCY SHELTER for unstated or written reasonable cause. After waiting outside for two days without food or water, the same EMERGENCY SHELTER called the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE (Officer 3424, 3470) to have THE APPLICANT removed from public property across the street from the same shelter, which they made a determination that they could not reasonable do what was being requested of them.
THE APPLICANT will state the functional PREMISES for the respondents here again. The respondents in their defense must show that the premises or impossible to be true or the arguments supporting the Applicant's PREMISES contain logical or legal fallacies which prevents the Applicant from reaching the conclusion he is trying to respectfully submit or articulate before the TRIBUNAL.”
[73] On or about July 10, 2013, the Applicant served and filed REQUISITION FOR EXTENSION OF RESPONSE TIME HRTO 2012-12585-I , which articulated the following in which Wayne Ferron requested “…January 2014 HEARING date…”;
“…Again, the applicant intents to serve, and file medical information
rellevant to the matter before the TRIBUNAL;
the Applicant is asking for December 2013 date for the HEARING
or a January 2014 HEARING date
{…}
the Applicant was being denied service at the same homeless shelter and du process for trying to affect his legal rights byway of EXHIBIT A; the director(Mr Blessings) was quite clear on the above point which he articulated many times and there was two other manager's at the said EMERGENCY SHELTER facility which witness this while they were being asked by the Applicant if their said action was legal, because of the…”
[74] On or about May 7, 2013, the Applicant served and filed NOTICE OF INTENSIONS HRTO 2012-12585-I , which articulated the following in which Wayne Ferron requested “…January 2014 HEARING date…”;
“…Applicant is asking for December 2013 date for the HEARING
or a January 2014 HEARING date, so he can accumulate enough funds to collect and serve his relevant medical information; I am a
human being with human worth and would like to be treated in a dignified manner…”
[75] NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed. The Applicant have requested a copy, if one exist, but so far there is no proof of the existence of one nor even one response to the same request.
[76] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[20]) for ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following on fairness and equity;
“20. ...one of the fundamental goals of the administration of the human rights system in Ontario is to “promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes” [RULE A3.1]. We further submit that it is a relevant factor mitigating against reactivation and in favour of dismissal.”
A3 INTERPRETATION
A3.1 The rules and procedures of the tribunal shall be liberally and purposively interpreted and applied to:
(a) promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes,
(b) allow parties to participate effectively in the process, whether or not they have a representative,
(c) ensure that procedures, orders and directions are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues in the proceeding.”
[77] Pursuant to Gurjit Singh Brar, a lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, in submission(at para[15, 17]) for ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following on fairness and equity;
“15. pursuant to s. 40 of the Human Rights Code(the “Code”), the Tribunal has the authority to dispose of Applications made under Part iv “by adopting the procedures and practices provided for in its rules or otherwise available to the Tribunal which, in its opinion, offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications”.
{...}
17. The Tribunal has promulgated specific rules with respect to proceeding with Applications that have been deferred. According to Rule 7.5, where an applicant wishes to proceed with an Application that was deferred pending completion of another legal proceeding, a request must be made in accordance with Rule 14.3 and 14.4, no later than 60 days after completion of the other proceeding.”
“Disclosure of information to Commission
38. Despite anything in theFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct, at the request of the Commission, the Tribunal shall disclose to the Commission copies of applications and responses filed with the Tribunal and may disclose to the Commission other documents in its custody or in its control. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Powers of Tribunal
39. The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exercise the powers conferred on it by or under this Act and to determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any application before it. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Disposition of applications
40. The Tribunal shall dispose of applications made under this Part by adopting the procedures and practices provided for in its rules or otherwise available to the Tribunal which, in its opinion, offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.”
GOOD FATE
[78] In the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF SALVATION ARMY’ S initial response (no response from the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL), Mr. BLESSING ANYANWU, ADMITTED TO REPRISAL and denial of goods and services with a justification of the same REPRISAL against Wayne Ferron the Applicant, in an EMAIL to the Lawyers of the Salvation Army, which runs contrary to the policy on SHELTER STANDERS, Ontario HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, and the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, while it would seem he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[79] Initially, the RESPONDENTS seem to try to paint a false picture of the PEEL REGIONAL HOMELESS SHELTER’s, care, control, total responsibility, and liability being given or delegated to the GOVERNING COUNSEL OF SALVATION ARMY for the same homeless shelter, the Applicant had to prove in his first filed legal documents that this was not the case, while it would seem to not be acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[80] John Gescher (john.gescher@peelregion.ca), the original lawyer for the REGION MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, failed to respond or reply to the Application(2012-12585-I), and was infact actively blocking or filtering the Applicant’s HRTO 2012-12585-I, LEGAL services byway of email, and causing them to be returned, while it would seem he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[81] The REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, did not make a reasonable legal reply or OFFICIAL RESPONSE until the year 2015, even though HRTO 2012-12585-I filed the same matter with the HRTO-REGISTRAR in September 2012, even though the respondents were being granted a request for delay or deferral without the service of a NOTICE OF INTENSION TO DEFER and without a response from the REGIONAL MUNICIPLE OF PEEL, while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[82] Blair Maccredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his last RESPONSE, admitted to Mr. Harry Boom discharging or evicting Wayne Ferron(Applicant) without written articulated notice in his submissions, without reasonable notice, and for the unlawful justification, of none ONTARIO WORKS FINANCIAL SUPPORT, which blatantly contradicts, and unlawfully disobeyed the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER (FILE.: 1106-04904), that was in full force at the time in question(according to Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA), in contravention Section 22.1 & 127(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[83] Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene Section 27(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[84] Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene Section 22.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[85] Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene Section 8. of the ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[86] Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene Section 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[87] Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY’S OWN POLICY, MANIFESTO, CODE OF CONDUCT, the HOLY BIBLE, and JESUS’S teachings, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[88] Blair Maccredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, falsely accused the Applicant (Wayne Ferron) of “MISREPRESENTION to the TRIBUNAL” in contravention of Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, without the disclosure of the FINAL ORDER CV 12-71600 to prove there allegations, even after being formally requested to do so by the Applicant; while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[89] On or about January 15, 2015, the Applicant sent the HRTO-REGISTRAR the following email;
“ATT Mr. Richard Hennessy YOUR ARE SLOWLY KILLING ME-NEW COMPLAINT-URGENT EMERGENCY TO OBTAIN MEDICATION
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Jan 15
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My life, death, or damage to my health is in the hands of THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL, in accordance with the policy and processing procedure of ONTARIO WORKS and the FEDERAL SOCIAL SERVICES TRIBUNAL(EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE).
tHE OTHER DAY, I SPOKE TO the FEDERAL SOCIAL SERVICES TRIBUNAL, to confirm
that my employment insurance was received. I was told that an appeal
takes 6 weeks to process, and I will be contacted then to confirm the
receipt of my application
On January 16, 2015 I SPOKE TO the FEDERAL SOCIAL SERVICES TRIBUNAL, to confirm that my employment insurance was received. I was told that an appeal takes 6 weeks to process, and I will be contacted then to confirm the
receipt of my application. Urgency would be ineffective here despite me labelling the matter as URGENT.
So, it would seem that all the responsibility for saving my life and restoring my life back to normal with normal access to social services without reprisals is the HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL and it alone caries the aforesaid burden.
I tried getting some Aspirin (acetylsalicylic acid or ASA) to thin my blood and reduce the chances of a stroke or heart attack, but dispensing this type of over the counter drug is not proper. I have no money because of the restriction of my person to access public goods and services; negative $150.00 is what I have in my Bank account.
But, HARM (GOVERNEMENT program for dispensing drugs to drug addicts by diminishing the role or dependency on drug dealers. The Government is in essence the new drug dealer), HARM-shops dispense drugs every day to make drug addicts high or feel nice while curving there appetite for Crack Cocaine or other drugs. I learned this fact from drug addicts themselves, one of whom had a $1400.00 habit per month for which Doctors were supply him with all the drugs he needed, but he wanted more so he was complaining. I investigate, no matter where I am forced to live.
Contrastly, I cannot get an Aspirin (acetylsalicylic acid or ASA) TO tHin my blood and save my life or prevent a stroke or organ damage. Not to mention,
to fill a $60.00 proscription to save my life and maintain my health and be a healthy an productive TAX PAYING human being.
Am not a human being, how far we have fallen?
4 Attachments
Preview attachment ei-2nd- letter to the Umpire for motion record.pdf
Preview attachment OW-DIRECTIVE-1101.pdf
Preview attachment AMENDED-EI-EXHIBIT X -FEDERAL SOCIAL TRIBUNAL APPEAL-GENERAL.pdf
Preview attachment Bundle 29.pdf
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[90] APPLICANT filed RETURN TO MOTION OR APPLICATION HRTO 2012-12585-I on or about 06 March 2015.
“TAKE NOTICE: that a Motion will be made before a single JuSTICE or the TRIBUNAL to RETURN back to APPLICATION(2012-12585-I), in addition to an oral submission with the calling of witnesses to assist the court, for HRTO FILE NO.: 2012-12585-I,
on a date and on a time to be chosen by the HUMAN RIGHTS-REGISTRAR, at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
655 Bay Street, 14th floor Toronto, ON. The motion is to be heard orally.
TAKE NOTICE: The HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION has establish a very effective barrier to entry in accessing relevant information disclosure for; HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I; to know the same stated cases and make informed decisions concerning the same cases, in accordance with NATURAL JUSTICE and PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION is quite aware that all my rights to PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES have been taken away or blocked, and as a direct result; I have no income. It is impossible for me to purchase a $0.50 stamp, so how could I possible the minimum cost of $5.00 application fee plus the search fee, when I am IMPECUNIOUS or INSOLVENT?”
[91] The SALVATION ARMY and ONTARIO-WORK, for the second time ASPER the IPC directions, the Applicant made a request for personal information collected or maintained at PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS (“THE HEAD”), in addition to the $5.00 search fee being paid inclusive in the $10.00 Canada Post money order being sent to PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS (“THE HEAD”). The CANADA POST
MONEY ORDER contain the following information:
CHECK SERIAL NO.: 11 466 978 57
SECURITY CODE.: 697 965 794
OFFICE NO.: 102 205
ONTARIO-WORKS (“THE HEAD”) at PEEL REGION
RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, and THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF TH SALVATION, failed to respond, and complete the
Aforementioned information request for personal information, and also failed to return the $5.00 search fee in contravention of Section 334, 322(1), and 380(1) the CRIMINAL CODE of CANADA.
[92] REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL) was filed on or about March 9, 2015, which states as followings;
“I Wayne Ferron, require the following;
1. any information obtained by the Commission in the course
of an investigation for HRTO FILE : 2012-1258-I ;
2. any information obtained by the Commission in the course
of an investigation for HRTO FILE : 2015-19792-I;
3. any information obtained by the Commission in the course
of an investigation for HRTO FILE : 2014-19681-I;
4. any information obtained by the Commission in the course
of an investigation for HRTO FILE : 2014-19680-I;
5. any information obtained by the Commission in the course
of an investigation for HRTO FILE : 2014-19377-I.”
“
RE: IPC REQUEST-HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I
REQUISITION FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE FOR THE FOLLOWING; HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I WITH RESPECT TO INVESTIGATIONS AND FINDING OF FACTS FOR THE ABOVE MATTERS (“ any information obtained by the Commission in the course of an investigation”) Attachments area Preview attachment HRTO-FREEDOMOFINFORMATIONREQUEST.pdf
Dear applicant, To make a request for information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, you must complete the attached form and follow the directions as outlined in the form.
From: Wayne Ferron [mailto:leegalpoet@gmail.com]
Attachments area Preview attachment 0 Notice - Fees for Processing FOI Requests General updated contact.pdf
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[93] REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL) was filed on or about March 9, 2015, and the HRTO REGISTRA, sent a response in which it asserted;
“Notice Regarding Fees and the Processing of Requests for Information made under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act General Freedom of Information (FOI) Requests
General FOI requests must be made in writing and must be accompanied by a $5.00 application fee made payable to the Minister of Finance (Ontario).
General requests should be made using the Tribunal’s FOI Access Request form (see attached).
A search request cannot be processed without payment of the $5.00 application fee.”
“RE: IPC REQUEST-HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I
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Wayne Ferron |
Mar 9
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Mar 13
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Dear applicant,
To make a request for information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, you must complete the attached form and follow the directions as outlined in the form.
Pursuant to Rule 1.12 of the HRTO's Rules of Procedure, all correspondence must be directed to the Registrar at hrto.registrar@ontario.ca, and copied to the other parties. Thank-you, Lina Prochilo |
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Case Processing Officer Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario |
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Social Justice Tribunals Ontario |
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Tribunaux de justice sociale Ontario |
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Providing fair and accessible dispute resolution |
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Pour une justice accessible et équitable |
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NOTICE: Confidential message which may be privileged. If received in error, please delete the message and advise me by return email. Thank you. AVIS: Message confidentiel dont le contenu peut être privilégié. Si reçu par erreur, veuillez supprimer ce message et aviser l'expéditeur par retour de courriel. Merci. |
From: Wayne Ferron [mailto:leegalpoet@gmail.com]
Sent: March-09-15 3:27 PM
To: HRTO-Registrar (MAG)
Subject: RE: IPC REQUEST-HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I
Attachments area
Preview attachment 0 Notice - Fees for Processing FOI Requests General updated contact.pdf
“
[94] REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL) was filed on or about March 20, 2015, which states as followings;
“attend. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COORDINATOR
I AM IMPECUNIOUS AND INSOLVENT SO WHERE AM i GOING TO GET THE MONEY TO GIVE TO YOU? Attachments area Preview attachment HRTO-FREEDOMOFINFORMATIONREQUEST.pdf
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[95] HRTO-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION sent the following in a letter a few days ago in regards to REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL) , which was in a state of “DEEM REFUSAL” and before the INFORMATION AND PRIVICY COMMISSION, and responded to by Kate franklin in the following email;
“FW: Response to your request for HRTO Information - PA15-260
Dear Mr. Ferron Please find a letter attached from Susan Benger of the Social Justice Tribunals Ontario. I see that there was a typo to your email address in her mailing to you (it was sent to leegalpoet@gmal.com instead of leegalpoet@gmail.com) so I presume you have not received her emails. You will see that she has responded to your request for records. Please let me know if there are any outstanding issues by replying to this email on or before June 19, 2015. Yours sincerely, Kate Franklin | Analyst Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario 2 Bloor Street East, Suite 1400 Toronto, ON M4W 1A8 Ph (416) 326-0768| Fax (416) 325-9188 TF 1-800-387-0073 | TTY (416) 325-7539 E Kate.Franklin@ipc.on.ca| Web http://www.ipc.on.ca CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail and attached material is intended for the use of the individual or institution to which it is addressed and may not be distributed, copied or disclosed to other unauthorized persons. This material may contain confidential or personal information that may be subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act or the Personal Health Information Protection Act. If you receive this transmission in error, please notify me immediately at the telephone number listed above, and do not print, copy, distribute or disclose it further. Thank you for your co-operation and assistance. From: Benger, Susan (MAG) [mailto:Susan.Benger@ontario.ca] I originally sent this message on Monday May 25, 2015. On Saturday May 30, 2015, I received notification that there were problems delivering this email. Since this is the only contact I have for you, I am re-sending to this email address. I have enclosed my response to your request for information related to your HRTO applications. As set out in my response, I apologize for not responding earlier Susan Benger Freedom of Information Coordinator Social Justice Tribunals Ontario Attachments area Preview attachment FerronHRTOresponse.pdf
the HRTO-TRIBUNAL HAS RULED AGAINST ALL THE MATTERS THAT THE SAID RECORD WOULD BE USED FOR. SO, HOW DO i TRAVEL BACK IN TIME? their HAS ALREADY BEEN A DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE BECAUSE i WAS DENIED THE USE OF THE RECORD FOR THE MATTERS WHICH WERE DISMISSED.
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[96] The denial of knowledge that there is no information to disclose, and there was no investigation for HRTO 2012-12585-I since September 2012, is this denying the Applicant relevant disclosure under a status of “DEEM REFUSAL,” that would enable the Applicant to know his case, and be fairly informed to empower him to give full answer to the TRIBUNAL; is in essence a denial of NATURAL JUSTIDE (first wing of natural justice).
[97] The Applicant, did not know how to REACTIVATE, until AN APPLICATION NOTICE, a REPLACEMENT EMAIL ON MAY 13, 2015, which contained a reprinted January 9, 2015 HRTO letter. The January 9, 2015 letter gave directions on how to reactivate a deferred Application.
[98] The Applicant was notified or directed to reactivate HRTO 2012-12585-I on or about the 9 January 2015; however, he did not know about Jan 9, 2015 directions. He had medical problems that need immediate attention, and still does!
CIVIL MATTER CV 12-71600
[99] The Conformation Letter for the Applicant’s REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY (2012-12585-i), was received on May 21, 2015.
[100] The CASE ASSESSMENT DIRECTION (2012-12585-i) was received on 13 May 2015, in the following EMAIL;
“
HRTO File Number: 2012-12585-I
Re: Ferron v. Peel Region HRTO File Number: 2012-12585-I Please find attached a Case Assessment Direction of the Tribunal in this matter, dated May 13, 2015. Please direct any questions or communications concerning this matter to the Registrar: hrto.registrar@ontario.ca Sincerely, Vincenzo Suppa Adjudicative Support Assistant Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Tel: 416-326-1312 | vincenzo.suppa@ontario.ca Social Justice Tribunals Ontario Tribunaux de justice sociale Ontario Providing fair and accessible dispute resolution Pour une justice accessible et équitable NOTICE: Confidential message which may be privileged. If received in error, please delete the message and advise me by return email. Thank you. AVIS: Message confidentiel dont le contenu peut être privilégié. Si reçu par erreur, veuillez supprimer ce message et aviser l'expéditeur par retour de courriel. Merci. Attachments area |
“
[101] A very large and significant number of the respondents in CIVIL MATTER CV 12-71600 has refused or failed to respond, even though they were served the STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600. Some of them are;
§ Dr. Jeffry Handler
§ Dr. Koczerginski
§ Dr. R Hood
§ Dr. Acharyya
§ Dr. Noorani
§ Mrs Hamilton (Nurse in charge)
§ Mandam Janie(nurse)
§ Et Al.
[102] Requested of RESPONDENTS, Ms. K. Kirkpatrick, and the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE-REGISTRAR, to disclose the final order for CV 12-71600 (Applicant’s Civil Matter.) All of the aforementioned has refused or failed to do so.
[103] BLG and Kathrine Kirkpatrick fraudulently procured a VEXACIOUS ORDER (CV 13-1060) for civil matter CV 13-1060, with false evidence and misleading methods while before the Honorable Justice Andrea, in addition to the Crown(Mrs. Krick) using the same VEXACIOUS ORDER(CV 13-1060), to defeat the course of justice(A NUMBER OF PRIVATE PROSECUTION) at the COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO, in contravention of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, and in contravention of PARAMOUNTCY or using PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION to defeat FEDERAL LEGISLATION, and to enable their clients continued unlawful immunity from the ENFORCEMENT & RULE OF LAW, byway of bypassing DUE PROCESS OF LAW with vicarious access to the PUBLIC PURSDE, while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[104] The SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE-CIVIL_REGISTRAR, has never notified the Applicant (Wayne Ferron) of a FINAL ORDER for CV 12-71600(civil matter), in contravention of Section 59.02 & 59.03 of the RULES OF CIVIL PRACTIC, Section 395. Of the FEDERAL COURT ACT
[105] As one direct example of the different treatment affecting his dignity, self-worth, life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness; the applicant was subjected of the distinction byway of discrimination or unequal treatment at the COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO while trying to affect and perfect a LEAVE OF APPEAL HEARING(C56817) for a PRIVATE PROSECUTION.
[106] The allege accuse(Ms. Joanne Stuart), works out of the same Toronto Region Office Office of Ministry of Attorney General, as Ms. Deborah Krick whom was Crown’s council in the same Appeal, and was at least a Professional colleague of the allege accuse Ms. Joanne Stuart, in representing the Attorney General of Ontario within the same public institution; so there is a public appearance of the aforementioned action being improper, and unfear regardless of whether this was or was-not the case.
[107] The Applicant(Private Prosecutor) just wants the improper sanitized public evidence back where it belongs, and before the review panel.
· PLEASE SEE JUSTICE PEPALL AUGUST 13, 2013 ENDORSEMENT AND THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE JURIANSZ SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 ENDORSEMENT
[108] Pursuant to Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106;
Inspection of files
26. (1) Where the necessary facilities are available, any person may, with supervision and without interfering with the business of the Court, inspect a Court file or annex
Removal of documents from file
(2) Nothing shall be removed from a Court file or annex except
(a) under an order of the Court;
(b) by an officer of the Registry acting in the course of his or her duties; or
(c) in accordance with rule 26.1.
Removal of files
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, no Court file or annex to a Court file shall be removed from the Registry by any person other than
(a) a judge, prothonotary or referee; or
(b) an officer of the Registry acting in the course of his or her duties.
SOR/2002-417, s. 3.
Definition
26.1 (1) In this rule, “appeal” includes an appeal of an order of a prothonotary, an application for leave to appeal and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Removal of exhibits from file
(2) Subject to subsection (4), exhibits put into evidence shall remain in the Court file either
(a) until the time for an appeal has expired, if no appeal has been taken, or
(b) until the appeal is disposed of, if an appeal has been taken.
SOR/2002-417, s. 4.
[109] Pursuant to RULE 59.02 of RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE;
ENDORSEMENT BY JUDGE OR OFFICER
59.02 (1) An endorsement of every order shall be made on the appeal book and compendium, record, notice of motion or notice of application by the court, judge or officer making it, unless the circumstances make it impractical to do so. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.02 (1); O. Reg. 19/03, s. 10.
(2) Where written reasons are delivered,
(a) in an appellate court, an endorsement is not required;
(b) in any other court, the endorsement may consist of a reference to the reasons,
and a copy of the reasons shall be filed in the court file. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.02 (2).
[110] Pursuant to RULE 59.03 of the RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE;
PREPARATION AND FORM OF ORDER
Preparation of Draft Formal Order
59.03 (1) Any party affected by an order may prepare a draft of the formal order and send it to all other parties represented at the hearing for approval of its form. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.03 (1);
[111] Pursuant to VIDÉOTRON LTÉE et al. and NESTAR COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al., 2003 FCA 56;
“[6] The authorities are clear that where an order or decision is not pronounced or delivered in public, the order or decision is not made until such time as the order or decision is entered by the
Registry or when the parties are notified of the decision.
{...}
Strong J., in concurring reasons, was also of the view that the time to appeal could not begin to run until the judgment had been entered. At page 218, he made the following remarks:
I do not recognize the handing by the judge to the registrar, not in open court but in his office or perhaps in the street, as a "pronouncing of a decision" within the terms of rule 269.”
[112] Pursuant to NIKE CANADA LTD. and NIKE INTERNATIONAL LTD. - and -JANE DOE and JOHN DOE et al., T-1636-99 on page 4;
“ORDER
UPON PLAINTIFFS" EX PARTE MOTION made on September 27, 1999, for
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Commencement and Term of Order
1. The terms of this Order shall become effective against each Defendant only from the commencement of the day on which it is served on that defendant and shall remain in effect for fourteen days thereafter, unless otherwise ordered by the Court...”
[113] Pursuant to VIDÉOTRON LTÉE et al. and NESTAR COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al., 2003 FCA 56;
“[8] I now turn to the decision of the Ontario Divisional Court in Fawkes et al. v. Swayzie (1899), Vol. XXXI O.R. 256, where the provision at issue, section 57 of the County Courts Act, R.S.O. c. 55, provided that an appeal had to be commenced within one month from the judgment or order complained of. The Divisional Court concluded that where a decision or order was not pronounced or delivered in public, it could not be held to have been made until such time as the parties were notified of it. At pages 259, 260 and 261, Armour C.J. stated:
... The theory of judicial procedure is that the cogent and binding effect of the order begins immediately from the time when the order is pronounced by the lips of the Judge, and if that could be done physically which legally is supposed to be done, and which one would desire to be done if it were possible, every order would be completed on the spot, written out by the judicial officer and in curid before the Court rises, and delivered to the parties. That is the unquestionable theory of judicial procedure, and in conformity with that theory the time when the order is "made," for the two words must be considered as equivalent and capable of being substituted the one for the other. The mere defining of the words of the Court by writing and reducing them into a form in which they can be evidence in a ministerial operation which, according to the true theory, succeeds the delivery of the order by the Judge, and must be in point of fact nothing in the world more than the physical embodiment on the spot by the Court of the words which the Judge has used."
[...]
I am of opinion that the principle of these decisions is entirely applicable to the case in judgment, and that the month mentioned in sec. 57 of the County Courts Act commences to run from the date of the judicial opinion or decision, oral or written, pronounced or delivered, and that the judgment or order founded upon it must be referred to that date.
If the judicial opinion or decision, oral or written, is not pronounced or delivered in open Court, then it cannot be said to be pronounced or delivered until the parties are notified of it.
[9] In Re Hache and Minister of Municipal Affairs (1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 186, the Appeal Division of the New Brunswick Supreme Court had to decide whether an appeal had been commenced within thirty days after the making of an Order by the Appeals Tribunal under the New Brunswick Assessment Act, s. 36 of which provided as follows:
Notwithstanding anything in any public or private Act, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from any order, decision or award of the Tribunal provided notice of such appeal is given to the other parties within thirty days after the making of the order or decision sought to be appealed from. [emphasis added]
At pages 193 and 194, after review of the relevant authorities, Hughes J.A. for the majority, made the following remarks:
The foregoing authorities satisfy me that the "making of the ... decision" referred to in s. 36 of the Assessment Act takes place when the decision is pronounced or delivered by the Appeals Tribunal at a hearing which by s. 30(11) is to be held in public or, if not so pronounced, when the parties have been notified of the decision.”
(VIDÉOTRON LTÉE et al. and NESTAR COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al., 2003 FCA 56 )
[114] John Gescher (john.gescher@peelregion.ca), the original lawyer for the REGION MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, failed to respond or reply to the Applicant and was infact actively blocking or filtering the Applicant’s HRTO 2012-12585-I, LEGAL services byway of email and causing them to be returned.
[115] The REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, did not make a reasonable legal reply or OFFICIAL RESPONSE until the year 2015, even though HRTO 2012-12585-I was filed with the HRTO-EGISTRAR in September 2012.
[116] Blair Maccredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his last RESPONSE, admitted to Mr. Harry Boom discharging or evicting Wayne Ferron(Applicant) without written articulated notice, without reasonable notice, and for the unlawful justification of no ONTARIO WORKS FINANCIAL SUPPORT, which blatantly contradicts, and unlawfully disobeys the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER (FILE.: 1106-04904) , that was in full force at the time in question, in contravention of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
1.) Patric O’Connor/Gurjit Brar(LSUD 42197E) (gurjit.brar@peelregion.ca), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in falsely accused the Applicant (Wayne Ferron) of “MISREPRESENTION to the TRIBUNAL” without the disclosure of FINAL ORDER CV 12-71600, even after being formally requested to do so by the Applicant.
PLEASE SEE June 15, 2015 INTERIM DECISION 2012-12585-I, concerning obtaining a copy of the same order which the ESPONDENTS has failed to disclose, but misleading use as a weapon to steel my HUMAN RIGHTS.
JOHN GESCHER(BLOCKING LAWFUL SERVICE)
[114] NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed. I have requested a copy if one exist, but so far there is no proof of the existence of one.
PLEASE SEE June 15, 2015 INTERIM DECISION 2012-12585-I, concerning an order for the disclosure or access to the NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER 2012-12585-I
[115] HRTO 2012-12585-I was DEFERED or DELAYED on 13 September 2013, at the request of the respondents
[116] The AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE FERRON AND EXHIBIT HOME_A…(2012-12585-I ET AL) AND form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544, was filed on or about November 12, 2014.
John Gescher, lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, refused and rejected the lawful and HRTO directed email legal service in the following way;
“ john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.
”
“RE: AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION, 2012-12585-I/2013-HRTO 1544
DEAR RESPONDENTS AND HRTO; HERE IS AN AMENDMENT TO THE APPLICATION.
john.gescher@peelregion.ca. <blair.mccreadie@dentons.com> IS NOT A VIABLE EMAIL ADDRESS; IT LOOKS MORE LIKE A TWITTER ACCOUNT OR AT LEAST IS IN THAT FORM.
HRTO-REGISTRAR, PLEASE GET MR. BLAIR MCCREADIE TO RECTIFY THE MATTER. THANK YOU. Blair McCreadie (LSUC NO. 43985S) DENTONS CANADA LLP 77 King St West SUITE 400 , Toronto, ON, M5K 0A1 TD NORTH TOWER, TORONTO-DOMINION CENTRE 416 863 4532
TANYA GALLOWAY LEGAL ASSISTANT (TO ANN C. DINNERT AND JOHN H. GESCHER) THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL 10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A and B, Brampton, ON L6T 4B9 Phone: 905-791-7800 EXT 4586 • Toll-free: 1-888-919-7800 •
2 Attachments Preview attachment amenment-application-2013 HRTO 1544.pdf
Preview attachment form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544.pdf
Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure: Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was: 550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.
----- Original message -----
{...} MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.152.5.67 with SMTP id q3mr11428503laq.73.1418325877700; Thu, 11 Dec 2014 11:24:37 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.114.3.74 with HTTP; Thu, 11 Dec 2014 11:24:35 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 14:24:35 -0500 Message-ID: <CAOBLrfOas5FZLs51LS+dMVDLPZvg0rFuW4V13jdJe61hsYZY1Q@mail.gmail.com> Subject: RE: AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION, 2012-12585-I/2013-HRTO 1544 From: Wayne Ferron <leegalpoet@gmail.com> To: john.gescher@peelregion.ca Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=089e013d173421bd5c0509f5bab9
DEAR RESPONDENTS AND HRTO; HERE IS AN AMENDMENT TO THE APPLICATION.
john.gescher@peelregion.ca. <blair.mccreadie@dentons.com>
*IS NOT A VIABLE EMAIL ADDRESS; IT LOOKS MORE LIKE A TWITTER ACCOUNT OR AT LEAST IS IN THAT FORM. HRTO-REGISTRAR, PLEASE GET MR. BLAIR MCCREADIE TO RECTIFY THE MATTER. THANK YOU*.
*Blair McCreadie* (LSUC NO. 43985S) *DENTONS CANADA LLP* 77 King St West SUITE 400 , Toronto, ON, M5K 0A1 TD NORTH TOWER, TORONTO-DOMINION CENTRE 416 863 4532
*TANYA GALLOWAY* *LEGAL ASSISTANT (TO ANN C. DINNERT AND JOHN H. GESCHER)* *THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL*” |
[117] The AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE FERRON AND EXHIBIT HOME_A…(2012-12585-I ET AL) AND CHANGE OF ADDRESS, was filed on or about December 12, 2014.
John Gescher, lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, refused and rejected the lawful and HRTO directed email legal service in the following way;
“Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.”
Inbox |
x |
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12/12/14
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Dear recipients,
here is a change of address.
My beloved daughter at Seneca College has until December 1, 2014 to pay residence fees; I cannot help her! Your unreasonable delay in 2012-12585-I/2013-HRTO 1544 has caused or contributed to this problem. In short your delay has put my childrens and my life, security, and pursuit of happiness in jeopardy.
Thank You
Attachments area
Preview attachment good-SCC-AFFIDAVIT-EXHIBIT HOME_A-2013 HRTO.pdf
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12/12/14
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Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.
----- Original message -----
{...}
Subject: RE: change of address, 2012-12585-I/2013-HRTO 1544
From: Wayne Ferron <leegalpoet@gmail.com>
To: hrto.registrar@ontario.ca, john.gescher@peelregion.ca,
blair.mccreadie@dentons.com, registry-greffe@scc-csc.ca,
LawCommission@lco-cdo.org, publicenquiries@ccla.org, mail@ccla.org
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=001a11c32e342cd646050a0a9bdb
Dear recipients,
here is a change of address.
My beloved daughter at Seneca College has until December 1, 2014 to pay
residence fees; I cannot help her! Your unreasonable delay in
2012-12585-I/2013-HRTO 1544 has caused or contributed to this problem. In
short your delay has put my childrens and my life, security, and pursuit of
happiness in jeopardy.
Thank You
“
[118] The RECQUISITION TO PEEL-HRTO-2012-12585-I, AND CHANGE OF ADDRESS, amenment-application-2013 HRTO 1544, Preview attachment good-SCC-AFFIDAVIT-EXHIBIT HOME_A-2013 HRTO, form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544, and AMENDED-2012-12585-I-Housing - Form 1 and 1B_0 (1) was filed on or about December 12, 2014.
John Gescher, lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, refused and rejected the lawful and HRTO directed email legal service in the following way;
“Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.”
Inbox |
x |
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12/23/14
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PLEASE FORWARD TO THE FOLLOWING
TANYA GALLOWAY
LEGAL ASSISTANT (TO ANN C. DINNERT AND JOHN H. GESCHER)
THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL
10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A and B,
Brampton, ON L6T 4B9
Phone: 905-791-7800 EXT 4586 •
Toll-free: 1-888-919-7800 •
E-mail:
Info@Peelregion.ca
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
ONTARIO WORKS COUNSELORS
David.Miller@peelregion.ca
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4 Attachments
Preview attachment RECQUISITION TO PEEL-HRTO-2012-12585-I.pdf
Preview attachment amenment-application-2013 HRTO 1544.pdf
Preview attachment good-SCC-AFFIDAVIT-EXHIBIT HOME_A-2013 HRTO.pdf
Preview attachment 2-form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544.pdf
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12/23/14
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Attachments area
Preview attachment AMENDED-2012-12585-I-Housing - Form 1 and 1B_0 (1).pdf
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12/23/14
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Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.
----- Original message -----
{...}
Subject: RE: CV 12-0716-00-MR. JOHN H. GESCHER is not receiving document for
PEEL REGION... matter; PLEASE FORWARD TO JOHN GESCHER OR ANN C. DINNERT OR
TANYA GALLOWAY
From: Wayne Ferron <leegalpoet@gmail.com>
To: john.gescher@peelregion.ca, David.Miller@peelregion.ca,
Gail.Williams@peelregion.ca
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=001a11c2a5c4aa3b1a050adfa6b3
PLEASE FORWARD TO THE FOLLOWING
TANYA GALLOWAY
LEGAL ASSISTANT (TO ANN C. DINNERT AND JOHN H. GESCHER)
*THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL*
10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A and B,
Brampton, ON L6T 4B9
Phone: 905-791-7800 EXT 4586 •
Toll-free: 1-888-919-7800 •
E-mail:
Info@Peelregion.ca
*john.gescher@peelregion.ca <john.gescher@peelregion.ca>*
ONTARIO WORKS COUNSELORS
David.Miller@peelregion.ca
Gail.Williams@peelregion.ca
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“
[119] The RECQUISITION TO PEEL-HRTO-2012-12585-I, amenment-application-2013 HRTO 1544, AFFIDAVIT-EXHIBIT HOME_A-2013 HRTO, and form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544, was filed on or about December 23, 2014.
John Gescher, lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, refused and rejected the lawful and HRTO directed email legal service in the following way;
“
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12/23/14
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|||
|
Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected..”
“RE: CV 12-0716-00-MR. JOHN H. GESCHER is not receiving document for PEEL REGION… matter; PLEASE FORWARD TO JOHN GESCHER OR ANN C. DINNERT OR TANYA GALLOWAY
Inbox |
x |
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12/23/14
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PLEASE FORWARD TO THE FOLLOWING
TANYA GALLOWAY
LEGAL ASSISTANT (TO ANN C. DINNERT AND JOHN H. GESCHER)
THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL
10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A and B,
Brampton, ON L6T 4B9
Phone: 905-791-7800 EXT 4586 •
Toll-free: 1-888-919-7800 •
E-mail:
ONTARIO WORKS COUNSELORS
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4 Attachments
Preview attachment RECQUISITION TO PEEL-HRTO-2012-12585-I.pdf
Preview attachment amenment-application-2013 HRTO 1544.pdf
Preview attachment good-SCC-AFFIDAVIT-EXHIBIT HOME_A-2013 HRTO.pdf
Preview attachment 2-form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544.pdf
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12/23/14
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Attachments area
Preview attachment AMENDED-2012-12585-I-Housing -–Form 1 and 1B_0 (1).pdf
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12/23/14
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Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.
----- Original message -----
{...}
Subject: RE: CV 12-0716-00-MR. JOHN H. GESCHER is not receiving document for
PEEL REGION... matter; PLEASE FORWARD TO JOHN GESCHER OR ANN C. DINNERT OR
TANYA GALLOWAY
From: Wayne Ferron <leegalpoet@gmail.com>
To: john.gescher@peelregion.ca, David.Miller@peelregion.ca,
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=001a11c2a5c4aa3b1a050adfa6b3
PLEASE FORWARD TO THE FOLLOWING
TANYA GALLOWAY
LEGAL ASSISTANT (TO ANN C. DINNERT AND JOHN H. GESCHER)
*THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL*
10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A and B,
Brampton, ON L6T 4B9
Phone: 905-791-7800 EXT 4586 •
Toll-free: 1-888-919-7800 •
E-mail:
*john.gescher@peelregion.ca <john.gescher@peelregion.ca>*
ONTARIO WORKS COUNSELORS
|
"
DISCLOSURE
[120] On March 9, 2015, the Applicant file his FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST(2014-19377-i)... with the HRTO- REGISTRAR;
“
RE: IPC REQUEST-HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I
Inbox |
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Wayne Ferron |
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Mar 9 |
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Mar 13 |
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Dear applicant,
To make a request for information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, you must complete the attached form and follow the directions as outlined in the form.
Pursuant to Rule 1.12 of the HRTO's Rules of Procedure, all correspondence must be directed to the Registrar at hrto.registrar@ontario.ca, and copied to the other parties.
Thank-you,
Lina Prochilo |
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Case Processing Officer Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Tel: 416-326-1312 | hrto.registrar@ontario.ca |
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Social Justice Tribunals Ontario |
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Tribunaux de justice sociale Ontario |
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Providing fair and accessible dispute resolution |
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Pour une justice accessible et équitable |
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NOTICE: Confidential message which may be privileged. If received in error, please delete the message and advise me by return email. Thank you. AVIS: Message confidentiel dont le contenu peut être privilégié. Si reçu par erreur, veuillez supprimer ce message et aviser l'expéditeur par retour de courriel. Merci. |
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From: Wayne Ferron [mailto:leegalpoet@gmail.com]
Sent: March-09-15 3:27 PM
To: HRTO-Registrar (MAG)
Subject: RE: IPC REQUEST-HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I
REQUISITION FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
FOR THE FOLLOWING;
HRTO FILE: 2012-1258-I, 2015-19792-I, 2014-19681-I, 2014-19680-I, 2014-19377-I
WITH RESPECT TO INVESTIGATIONS AND FINDING OF FACTS
FOR THE ABOVE MATTERS
(“ any information obtained by the Commission in the course of an investigation”)
Attachments area
Previewattachment 0 Notice - FeesforProcessingFOIRequestsGeneralupdatedcontact.pdf
“
PLEASE SEE June 15, 2015 INTERIM DECISION 2012-12585-I, concerning DISCLOSURE, ACCESS TO HRTO 2012-12585-I.
[121] On March 13, 2015, the HRTO- REGISTRAR sent the following response to the Applicant’s email after filing of FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST (HRTO 2014-19377-I ET AL);
“ |
Mar 13 |
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Dear applicant,
To make a request for information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, you must complete the attached form and follow the directions as outlined in the form.
Pursuant to Rule 1.12 of the HRTO's Rules of Procedure, all correspondence must be directed to the Registrar at hrto.registrar@ontario.ca, and copied to the other parties. Thank-you, Lina Prochilo |
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Case Processing Officer Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Tel: 416-326-1312 | hrto.registrar@ontario.ca |
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Social Justice Tribunals Ontario |
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Tribunaux de justice sociale Ontario |
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Providing fair and accessible dispute resolution |
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Pour une justice accessible et équitable |
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NOTICE: Confidential message which may be privileged. If received in error, please delete the message and advise me by return email. Thank you. AVIS: Message confidentiel dont le contenu peut être privilégié. Si reçu par erreur, veuillez supprimer ce message et aviser l'expéditeur par retour de courriel. Merci. “
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[122] On March 20, 2015, the Applicant sent to the HRTO- REGISTRAR, the following for HRTO 2014-19377-I;
“attend. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COORDINATOR
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Mar 20 |
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I AM IMPECUNIOUS AND INSOLVENT
SO WHERE AM i GOING TO GET THE MONEY TO GIVE TO YOU?
Attachments area
PreviewattachmentHRTO-FREEDOMOFINFORMATIONREQUEST.pdf
“
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HRTO ASSERTS DENIAL OF EVIDENCE
[123] On March 21, 2015, the Applicant sent to the HRTO- REGISTRAR, the following HRTO 2014-19377-I;
“CANNOT READ YOUR ATTACHMENT-Re: HRTO FILE: 2014-19377-I Wayne Ferron v. Toronto Metropolitan Police Services Division and Officer Green
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Mar 21 |
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YOU REQUESTED THAT i FILE MY DOCUMENT THIS WAY.
YOU ARE FULLY AWARE THAT i HAVE NO MONEY AND AM LIVING ON THE STREETS.
you HAVE PURPOSELY PLACED A BARRIER TO ENTRY, BECAUSE i PROVIDED YOU WITH PROOF OF THE DATES WHICH YOU DISPUTED.
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 4:37 PM, HRTO-Registrar (MAG) <hrto.registrar@ontario.ca> wrote:
Dear Mr. Ferron,
The HRTO is in receipt of your numerous e-mails with attachments dated February 17, February 18, March 6, March 7 and March 9, 2015. The e-mails contain hundreds of pages of attachments. Many of the e-mails are repetitive and contain duplicate attachments. It’s also unclear how many of the attachments relate to the above-noted matter.
Due to the large number of e-mails and pages of documents, these documents are not being placed on file.If you wish to file these documents with the HRTO, then you must provide hard copies. However, you are also reminded that you are not required to file all your documents/evidence at this stage of the proceeding, and you should only be providing information relevant to the issues outlined in the HRTO’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss dated February 5, 2015. Please keep this in mind when sending documents to the HRTO.
Attached to this e-mail is one of your e-mails which appears to contain your written submissions in response to the HRTO’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss. By return e-mail, please confirm that these are the submissions you intend to file in response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss. Send only one e-mail, simply confirming whether these are your final set of submissions. Once confirmation is received, the HRTO will print only the attached documents and place them on file.
Once again, you are reminded that the HRTO allows communication by e-mail which can be an efficient and effective method. However, e-mail can create challenges. Because it is easy to attach documents to an e-mail, parties sometimes attach unnecessary and large documents. As already indicated, please only attach documents to your e-mails which are relevant to any request you may be making or responding to. Restrict your e-mails to the HRTO as outlined above.
The HRTO strives to provide expeditious and accessible processes to help the parties resolve their dispute and that respect and reinforce the principles established in the Human Rights Code. Communications that are unduly lengthy, repetitive or disrespectful of any other participant or the Tribunal may be rejected. Persistent failure to comply with the HRTO’s rules for e-mail communications may result in an order or direction prohibiting the person from using that method of communication.
Please review the Practice Direction on Communicating with the HRTO which can be found at the following link:http://hrto.ca/hrto/?q=en/node/105.
Pursuant to Rule 1.12 of the HRTO's Rules of Procedure, all correspondence must be directed to the Registrar at hrto.registrar@ontario.ca, and copied to the other parties.
Thank-you,
Lina Prochilo |
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Case Processing Officer Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario Tel: 416-326-1312 | hrto.registrar@ontario.ca |
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Social Justice Tribunals Ontario |
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Tribunaux de justice sociale Ontario |
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Providing fair and accessible dispute resolution |
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Pour une justice accessible et équitable |
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NOTICE: Confidential message which may be privileged. If received in error, please delete the message and advise me by return email. Thank you. AVIS: Message confidentiel dont le contenu peut être privilégié. Si reçu par erreur, veuillez supprimer ce message et aviser l'expéditeur par retour de courriel. Merci. |
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“
LEGAL ARGUMENTS:
“Again, the applicant intents to serve, and file medical information relevant to the matter before the TRIBUNAL; the Applicant is asking for a January 2014 HEARING date, so he can accumulate enough funds to collect and serve his relevant medical information; I am a human being with human worth and would like to be treated in a dignified manner.”
(Applicant originally requested a hearing for January 2014)
A3 INTERPRETATION
A3.1 The rules and procedures of the tribunal shall be liberally and purposively interpreted and applied to:
(a) promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes,
(b) allow parties to participate effectively in the process, whether or not they have a representative,
(c) ensure that procedures, orders and directions are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues in the proceeding.
RULE 7
APPLICATION WITH REQUEST TO DEFER CONSIDERATION
7.1. An Applicant may file an Application under Rule 6.1 and, at the same time, ask the Tribunal to defer consideration of the Application in accordance with Rule 14 if there are other legal proceedings dealing with the subject matter of the Application.
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
7.3. Where an Application is filed with a request for a deferral, the Applicant must include the following additional information with the Form 1:
a)identifying information about the other legal proceeding dealing with
the subject matter of the Application; and
b) a copy of the document that commenced the other legal
proceeding.
7.4. The Tribunal will not defer consideration of an Application without first giving all the parties, and any affected persons or organizations identified in the Application or Response, an opportunity to make submissions on the request for deferral.
7.5. Where an Applicant wants the Tribunal to proceed with an Application that was deferred pending completion of another legal proceeding, the Applicant must make a request, in accordance with Rules 14.3 and 14.4, no later than 60 days after completion of the other proceeding.
RULE 14
DEFERRAL OF AN APPLICATION BY THE TRIBUNAL
14.1 The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative, at the request of an Applicant under Rule 7, or at the request of any party.
****14.2 Where the Tribunal intends to defer consideration of an Application under Rule 14.1, it will first give the parties,
any identified trade union or occupational or
professional organization and any identified affected persons, notice of its intention to consider deferral of the Application and an opportunity to make submissions.
14.3 Where a party wishes the Tribunal to proceed with an Application which has been deferred the request must be made in accordance with Rule 19.
***14.4 Where an Application was deferred pending the outcome of another legal proceeding, a request to proceed under Rule 14.3 must be filed no later than 60 days after the conclusion of the other proceeding, must set out the date the other
legal proceeding concluded and include a copy of the decision or order in the other proceeding, if any.
14.5 The Tribunal may, on its own motion, require a deferred Application to proceed in appropriate circumstances.
Human Rights Code
R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER H.19
Disclosure of information to Commission
38. Despite anything in the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, at the request of the Commission, the Tribunal shall disclose to the Commission copies of applications and responses filed with the Tribunal and may disclose to the Commission other documents in its custody or in its control. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Powers of Tribunal
39. The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exercise the powers conferred on it by or under this Act and to determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any application before it. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Disposition of applications
40. The Tribunal shall dispose of applications made under this Part by adopting the procedures and practices provided for in its rules or otherwise available to the Tribunal which, in its opinion, offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Interpretation of Part and rules
41. This Part and the Tribunal rules shall be liberally construed to permit the Tribunal to adopt practices and procedures, including alternatives to traditional adjudicative or adversarial procedures that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, will facilitate fair, just and expeditious resolutions of the merits of the matters before it. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Statutory Powers Procedure Act
42. (1) The provisions of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act apply to a proceeding before the Tribunal unless they conflict with a provision of this Act, the regulations or the Tribunal rules. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Conflict
(2) Despite section 32 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, this Act, the regulations and the Tribunal rules prevail over the provisions of that Act with which they conflict. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Tribunal rules
43. (1) The Tribunal may make rules governing the practice and procedure before it. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Required practices and procedures
(2) The rules shall ensure that the following requirements are met with respect to any proceeding before the Tribunal:
1. An application that is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall not be finally disposed of without affording the parties an opportunity to make oral submissions in accordance with the rules.
2. An application may not be finally disposed of without written reasons. 2006, c. 30, s.
Application by person
34. (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Transfer of inquiry to Commission
Deferral of application
45. The Tribunal may defer an application in accordance with the Tribunal rules. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Dismissal in accordance with rules
45.1 The Tribunal may dismiss an application, in whole or in part, in accordance with its rules if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the application. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Orders of Tribunal: applications under s. 34
45.2 (1) On an application under section 34, the Tribunal may make one or more of the following orders if the Tribunal determines that a party to the application has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the application:
1. An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
2. An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
3. An order directing any party to the application to do anything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the party ought to do to promote compliance with this Act. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
Orders under par. 3 of subs. (1)
(2) For greater certainty, an order under paragraph 3 of subsection (1),
(a) may direct a person to do anything with respect to future practices; and
(b) may be made even if no order under that paragraph was requested. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
PREMISE:
1.) Did the REGION OF PEEL disobey or contravene the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL Interim Assistance Order.: 1106-04904 for THE SOCIAL TRIBUNAL FILE.: 1106-04904 in the time interval [01 June 2011 to 30 November 2011]?
2.) Was the year of the incident with Mr. Harry Boom year 2011?
3.) Was the year of the incident with Mr. Blessing Anyananwu, Year 2012?
4.) Was the Year of the HUMAN RIGHTS INCIDENT (2012-12585-I) YEAR 2012;
5.) Are the two independent incidence concerning Mr. Harry Boom and Mr. Blessing Anyanwu the same or overlapping incidence?
6.) Did the RESPONDENTS mislead the HRTO tribunal?
7.) Did the respondents delay OR DEFERED HRTO 2012-12585-I, BYWAY OF A REQUEST FOR ORDER and by HRTO-RULE 7. On the basses of the two independent incidence concerning Mr. Harry Boom, and Mr. A Blessing are the same or overlapping incidence?
8.) Is there a CONTRAVENTION NATURAL JUSTICE?
9.) Is there CONTRAVENTION PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS?
10.) IS HRTO 2012-12585-I VOIDABLE?
11.) Did Agents THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, a RESPONDENT, contravene Section 127(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA?
12.) Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers for the THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL , contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT?
13.) Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravention of Rule A 7.1 of the HRTO RULES?
14.) Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene Section 8. of theHUMAN RIGHTS CODE?
15.) Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene Section 139 or SECTION 22.1 or Section 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA?
16.) Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT?
17.) Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene of Rule A 7.1 of the HRTO RULES?
18.) Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene Section 8. of theHUMAN RIGHTS CODE?
19.) Did the RESPONDENTS, act in “GOOD FATE!”
20.) Has the process for HRTO 2012-12585-I been fair?
21.) Did the RESPONDENTS violate legislation?
22.) “[6] The issues to be addressed at the hearing are as follows:
a. Should the Tribunal waive the requirement in Rule 14.4 that a request to reactivate a deferred Application be filed no later than 60 days after the other proceeding has concluded?
b. Whether the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the substance of it has been appropriately dealt with in another legal proceeding, in this case the civil suit(s) commenced by the applicant?”
[124] PREMISE (1)
Did the REGION OF PEEL disobey or contravene the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL Interim Assistance Order.: 1106-04904 for THE SOCIAL TRIBUNAL FILE.: 1106-04904 in the time interval [01 June 2011 to 30 November 2011]?
“EXHIBIT HOME_A-1st DAVID MILLER(OW SUPERVISOR)
I was released from the Hospital and I went directly to REGIONAL PEEL
HOMELESS SHELTER. I made no stop overs or detours; I was only given 1
ticket by the hospital despite the fact that Officer Pekeski(2261) stole my
personal belongings, which included my wallet, bus tickets and tokens,
necessary medication to prevent serious harm or death to my person, etc...
I gave my hospital release papers upon request to the intake clerk at the
REGION OF PEEL HOMELESS SHELTURE. The shelter will not admit you
without the aforesaid being done, it is enforced policy.
I spoke to ONTARIO WORKS_workers on more than one occasions. No one is
allowed to stay at the REGION OF PEEL SHELTER without speaking to
ONTARIO WORKS CASE WORKERS and disclosing hospital release papers to
staff. This is the said Homeless Shelter's enforced policy
Then I was evicted from the REGION OF PEEL HOMELESS SHELTER after
two weeks without reasonable cause(no eviction notice) or prior warning
during a schedule meeting to assess or establish my daughter's and my
financial needs to obtain a reasonable size and type of apartment.
The meeting was schedule for 1:00 pm with an ONTARIO WORKS CASE WORKER and Mr.
Harry Boom; I had to wait all day for the required meeting for financial
assessment only to be evicted without reasonable notice or reasonable cause in
violation of the SHELTER AGREEMENT and my HUMAN RIGHTS. In addition
to no financial/shelter needs assessment for my beloved daughter and I being
affected”
PLEASE SEE THE FOLLOWING EXHIBITS IN FILED DOCUMENT EXHIBIT HOME_A;
EXHIBIT HOME_A-2nd DAVID MILLER(OW SUPERVISOR),
EXHIBIT HOME_A-2nd DAVID MILLER(OW SUPERVISOR),
EXHIBIT HOME_A-2nd GAIL WILLIAMS(5-622B)
APPEAL SPECIALIST EXHIBIT HOME_A-EVICTION NOTICE,
REGION OF PEEL (NICOLE ARBOUR) AUGUST 15, 2011 EVICTION NOTICE AT HOMELESS SHELTER,
EXHIBIT HOME_A-1st DAVID MILLER(OW SUPERVISOR), and
EXHIBIT HOME_A-PEEL ACCESS TO HOUSING.
[125] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[8]) in his submission matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following while jumping from the year 2011(Mr. Harry Boom and Civil matter CV 12-2012-i), to the HRTO matter 2012-12585-I(BLESSING ANYANWU and denial of homeless services), without making any factual statement about the cause of Action of the HUMANRIGHTS MATTER(2012-12585-I), except for;
“On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application.”
TAKE NOTICE: Causes of Actions and statements of facts ends in July 2012 in the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), and AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600),
While HRTO 2012-12585-I Cause of Action starts on September 1, 2012, below is to Blair McCreadie assertions;
“7. The Salvation Army served a Statement of Defence in response to the Action on November 14, 2012. The Salvation Army defended against the Applicant’s claim in the Action on the basis that the Amended Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
9. On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application…”
[126] Since, the above EXHIBITS discloses a copy of the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL Interim Assistance Order.: 1106-04904, the enforced decisions of ONTARIO WORKS, and EMAIL correspondence with ONTARIO WORKS can be combined with Mr. Blair McCreadie assertions in his submissions along with the dates on the artifacts in the EXHIBITS, to show without any reasonable doubt that THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL did indeed contravene THE SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER.: 1106-04904.
[127] Therefore, the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, violated THE SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER.: 1106-04904.
[128] Pursuant to the Applicant’s STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600;
“ORDERED TO VACATE PEEL REGIONAL SHELTER:
[446] The Plaintiff allege that, on Tuesday the 12th of September 2011, he waited all
morning and all afternoon for his 1:00 P.M. appointment with Ontario-Works and the
SALVATION ARMY jointed co-counselors. The Ontario-Works councilor's name, he still
does-not know, and the Salvation Armyʼs counselor was Mr. Harry Boom, whom made
a determination or ruling in violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, in regards to equal services or uniformity in services among all Canadians.
[447] The Plaintiff allege that, even though he informed Mr. Harry Boom of the violation
of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT. Contrastly, no one informed the Applicant
about establishing housing, operation budget, if he had secured accommodation or had
the common decency to give him written notification and reasonable time to vacate the
shelter; the Plaintiff was simple thrown out or an oral demand was made for him to
vacate the shelter the next day in no uncertain terms, on more than one occasion
without reasonable notification to the Applicant/tenant.
[448] The Plaintiff allege that, on Tuesday the 12th of September 2011, at or about 3:30 P.M. the ONTARIO-WORKS and THE SALVATION ARMY made a determination or ruling in violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, in regards to equal services or uniformity in services among all Canadians.
[449] The Plaintiff further allege that, the Salvation Army and Ontario-Works made a determination vicariously through Mr. Harry Boom(case worker), in violation of Article 2. Of the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT of CIVIL an POLITICAL RIGHTS. Canada is a signatory to the International Convention of the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Article 2 of the International Convention mandates that all state parties;
“undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and with out delay a
policy of elimination racial discrimination in all its forms...”
The aforementioned is a promise by the signature states made to the international
community and its citizens to enforce and protect HUMAN RIGHS and human dignity.”
[129] Thus, the REGION OF PEEL disobey or contravene the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL Interim Assistance Order.: 1106-04904 for THE SOCIAL TRIBUNAL FILE.: 1106-04904 in the time interval [01 June 2011 to 30 November 2011].
[130] Hence, PREMISE (1) is proved.
[131] PREMISE (2)
Was the year of the incident with Mr. Harry Boom year 2011?
[132] Pursuant to the Applicant’s STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600;
“ORDERED TO VACATE PEEL REGIONAL SHELTER:
[446] The Plaintiff allege that, on Tuesday the 12th of September 2011, he waited all
morning and all afternoon for his 1:00 P.M. appointment with Ontario-Works and the
SALVATION ARMY jointed co-counselors. The Ontario-Works councilor's name, he still
does-not know, and the Salvation Armyʼs counselor was Mr. Harry Boom, whom made
a determination or ruling in violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, in regards to equal services or uniformity in services among all Canadians.
[447] The Plaintiff allege that, even though he informed Mr. Harry Boom of the violation
of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT. Contrastly, no one informed the Applicant
about establishing housing, operation budget, if he had secured accommodation or had
the common decency to give him written notification and reasonable time to vacate the
shelter; the Plaintiff was simple thrown out or an oral demand was made for him to
vacate the shelter the next day in no uncertain terms, on more than one occasion
without reasonable notification to the Applicant/tenant.
[448] The Plaintiff allege that, on Tuesday the 12th of September 2011, at or about 3:30 P.M. the ONTARIO-WORKS and THE SALVATION ARMY made a determination or ruling in violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, in regards to equal services or uniformity in services among all Canadians.
[449] The Plaintiff further allege that, the Salvation Army and Ontario-Works made a determination vicariously through Mr. Harry Boom(case worker), in violation of Article 2. Of the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT of CIVIL an POLITICAL RIGHTS. Canada is a signatory to the International Convention of the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Article 2 of the International Convention mandates that all state parties;
“undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and with out delay a
policy of elimination racial discrimination in all its forms...”
The aforementioned is a promise by the signature states made to the international
community and its citizens to enforce and protect HUMAN RIGHS and human dignity.”
PLEASE SEE AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600, PARA[388] to PARA[482] FOR THE COMPLETE CAUSE OF ACTION OR CLAIM CONCERNING THE REGION OF PEEL AND ITS HOMELESS SHELTER.
PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT
[133] Pursuant to EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT , and its description;
“EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT
THE REGION OF PEEL POLICE SERVICES and WILLIAM OSLO
HEALTH SYSTEM affected a 14 DAY FALSE IMPRISOMENT of my
person without access to a lawyer or a fair impartial hearing to justify
my detention after being assaulted a number of times by different
Police Officers, and trying to file an information or charges against
one of the said Police Officers ( Pekeski with bage# 2261).
TAKE NOTICE: Dr. Handler saw me for less than 1 minute!!
Dr. Handler’s FORM 42 articulates; “This is to inform you that Dr. Jeffry Handler
examined you on 26/08/2011 and has made an application for you to have a
psychiatric assessment.
The physician has certi"ed that...he has reasonable cause to believe that you
have:
behaved or behaving violently towards another person or have caused or are
causing another person to fear bodily harm from you; or
shown or are showing a lack of competence to care for yourself and that you are
suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in:
serious bodily harm to yourself;
serious bodily harm to another person; or
serious physical impairment of you....”
____________________________________________________________
August 26, 2011 at about 5:00 a.m.
Dr. Handler’s FORM 42
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
(Pursuant to S. 38.1, S. 15 and”
[134] Since, the exhibits above establish the year 2011, and there is no evidence to the contrary for the above, it fellows that the occurrence with Mr. Harry Boom was in the year 2011.
[135] Thus, the year of the incident with Mr. Harry Boom year 2011.
[136] Hence, PREMISE (2) is proven.
[137] PREMISE (3)
Was the year of the incident with Mr. Blessing Anyananwu, Year 2012?
PLEASE SEE THE AMENDED FORM 1 FOR HRTO 2012-
12585-I
[138] Pursuant to the Applicant in his FACTUM, under the sub title of OVERVIEW;
“APPLICANT ACCOUNT OF DENIAL OF GOOD AND SERVICES
[13] On September 1, 2012 I became homeless.
[14] On September 1, 2012 I went to 2500 Cawthra Rd in the Region of Peel, in the City of Mississauga at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, for help AT ABOUT 11:00 P.M..
[15] On September 1, 2012 at about 11:00 P.M., it was boldly asserted to my person in clear and distinct language that I was “restricted” and to “leave” the premises, without the process of an intake assessment.
{…}
[21] On September 5, 2012 at about 11:00 a.m., at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, I was advised in clear direct language by the Manager( The director, Mr. Blessings) that I (Wayne Ferron) was restricted from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER for a pending action against the REGION for HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION of Section 1. Of the Act.
[22] I informed him that I was only suing for $1.00 and for the good of the public; Furthermore, the legal action was on principal of improving the fair treatment of homeless individuals, or maybe I was the only person being discriminated against?
[23] I was promptly shown the door even though I advise the 3 Managers present with a qualification of uncertainty that the action being taken against my person may not be legal, for you cannot hold one's legal rights hostage, to discriminate against a person within the context of equal, and fair services to all Canadians. “
PLEASE SEE OVERVIEW FROM APPLICANT’S FACTUM, STARTING AT PARA[8] TO PARA[34] FOR APPLICANT’S ACCOUNT OF CAUSE OF ACTION
[139] Since, there is no evidence to the contrary, and no challenge to the time period of the cause of action given in FORM 1, PARA[446] TO PARA[482] in the Applicant’s AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600 under the subtitle “ORDERED TO VACATE PEEL REGIONAL SHELTER:”, it fellows that the time period of HRTO 2012-12585-I is in the year 2012.
[140] Thus, the year of the incident with Mr. Blessing Anyananwu, Year 2012?
[125] Hence PREMISE (3) IS proven.
[141] PREMISE (4)
Was the Year of the HUMAN RIGHTS INCIDENT (2012-12585-I) YEAR 2012?
PLEASE SEE THE SUBTITLE OVERVIEW IN APPLICANT’S FACTUM, STARTING AT PARA[8] TO PARA[34]
[142] Pursuant to the findings for PREMISE (3), and Applicant’s account in his FACTUM starting at PARA[8], it fellows that HRTO 2012-12585-I cause of action occurred in year 2012
[143] Thus, the Year of the HUMAN RIGHTS INCIDENT (2012-12585-I) YEAR 2012.
[144] Hence PREMISE (4) IS proven.
[145] PREMISE (5)
Are the two independent incidence concerning Mr. Harry Boom and Mr. Blessing Anyanwu the same or overlapping incidence?
[146] Hypotecally speaking, if x murders y in year n
Then x murders y’s sister in year (n+1)
Then x murders y’s brother in year (n+2)
Are the three murders one in the same murder?
Are the factual evidence of the three murders the same or overlapping?
[147] The answer to the above is self-evident, there are three separate murders, for three separate events, occurring in three different time periods, and all having the same murder.
[148] If the latest occurrence of x murdering y’s brother in year (n+2) is before the court, then the murder of y in year n, y’s sister in year (n+1) are relevant in the sense of showing history and improving the context to the resolution of the matter before the court.
[149] Likewise, logically HRTO 2012-12585-I and CV 12-71600 both have a Section 1. Violation of the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, committed by the same violators, but at different time periods. One Section 1. Violation for the cause of action was in the year 2011, and the other Section 1. Cause of action violation was in the year 2012. Similar claims, based on different, distinct factual events, and occurring at different time periods, make the matters independent and not dependent on each other.
[150] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[8]) in his submission matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following while jumping from the year 2011(Mr. Harry Boom and Civil matter CV 12-2012-i), to the HRTO matter 2012-12585-I(BLESSING ANYANWU and denial of homeless services), without making any factual statement about the cause of Action of the HUMANRIGHTS MATTER(2012-12585-I), except for;
“On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application.”
TAKE NOTICE: Causes of Actions and statements of facts ends in July 2012 in the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), and AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600),
While HRTO 2012-12585-I Cause of Action starts on September 1, 2012, below is to Blair McCreadie assertions;
“1. The Governing Council of the Salvation Army in Canada(“The Salvation Army”) respectfully requests that the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the “Tribunal”) deny the Applicant’s request to re-activate his Application and issue a Decision to dismiss the Application…
b) In any event, the final decision in the civil action that is “inter-related” to this Application has already appropriately dealt with the merits of this Application and, therefore, the Tribunal should immediately dismiss the Application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code (Ontario) (the “Code”). It would be an abuse of this Tribunal’s process to permit the Applicant to re-activate his Application.
{…}
THIS APPLICATION AND THE “INTER-RELATED” CIVIL ACTION
5. Prior to commencing this Application, the Applicant commenced a civil action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, bearing Court File No. CV-12-0716-00 (the “Action”)…Amended Statement of Claim, issued on August 21, 2012 include, inter alia, that the Applicant was asked to leave the Cawthra Road Shelter (the “Shelter”) on or about September 12, 2011 in breach of his human rights.
{…}
7. The Salvation Army served a Statement of Defence in response to the Action on November 14, 2012. The Salvation Army defended against the Applicant’s claim in the Action on the basis that the Amended Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
9. On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application…”
PLEASE SEE HRTO 2012-12585-I FORM 1 AND RELATED MATERIAL FILED WITH THE HRTO-REGISTRA to confirm that the CAUSE OF ACTION for HRTO 2012-12585-I, starts on SEPTEMBER 1, 2012, the present proceeding was filed immediately after the CAUSE OF ACTION.
TAKE NOTICE: By the RESPONDENT own assertion, “Amended Statement of Claim, issued on August 21, 2012.”
[151] The Respondents cleverly hide the truth of the matter to mislead the TRIBUNAL and obtain there requested delay or deferring of HRTO 2012-12585-I.
[152] Pursuant to the Applicant’s STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600;
“ORDERED TO VACATE PEEL REGIONAL SHELTER:
[446] The Plaintiff allege that, on Tuesday the 12th of September 2011, he waited all
morning and all afternoon for his 1:00 P.M. appointment with Ontario-Works and the
SALVATION ARMY jointed co-counselors. The Ontario-Works councilor's name, he still
does-not know, and the Salvation Armyʼs counselor was Mr. Harry Boom, whom made
a determination or ruling in violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, in regards to equal services or uniformity in services among all Canadians.
[447] The Plaintiff allege that, even though he informed Mr. Harry Boom of the violation
of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT. Contrastly, no one informed the Applicant
about establishing housing, operation budget, if he had secured accommodation or had
the common decency to give him written notification and reasonable time to vacate the
shelter; the Plaintiff was simple thrown out or an oral demand was made for him to
vacate the shelter the next day in no uncertain terms, on more than one occasion
without reasonable notification to the Applicant/tenant.
[448] The Plaintiff allege that, on Tuesday the 12th of September 2011, at or about 3:30 P.M. the ONTARIO-WORKS and THE SALVATION ARMY made a determination or ruling in violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, in regards to equal services or uniformity in services among all Canadians.
[449] The Plaintiff further allege that, the Salvation Army and Ontario-Works made a determination vicariously through Mr. Harry Boom(case worker), in violation of Article 2. Of the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT of CIVIL an POLITICAL RIGHTS. Canada is a signatory to the International Convention of the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Article 2 of the International Convention mandates that all state parties;
“undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and with out delay a
policy of elimination racial discrimination in all its forms...”
The aforementioned is a promise by the signature states made to the international
community and its citizens to enforce and protect HUMAN RIGHS and human dignity.”
PLEASE SEE AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600, PARA[388] to PARA[482] FOR THE COMPLETE CAUSE OF ACTION OR CLAIM CONCERNING THE REGION OF PEEL AND ITS HOMELESS SHELTER.
[153] Pursuant to the Applicant in his FACTUM, under the sub title of OVERVIEW;
“APPLICANT ACCOUNT OF DENIAL OF GOOD AND SERVICES
[13] On September 1, 2012 I became homeless.
[14] On September 1, 2012 I went to 2500 Cawthra Rd in the Region of Peel, in the City of Mississauga at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, for help AT ABOUT 11:00 P.M..
[15] On September 1, 2012 at about 11:00 P.M., it was boldly asserted to my person in clear and distinct language that I was “restricted” and to “leave” the premises, without the process of an intake assessment.
{…}
[21] On September 5, 2012 at about 11:00 a.m., at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, I was advised in clear direct language by the Manager( The director, Mr. Blessings) that I (Wayne Ferron) was restricted from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER for a pending action against the REGION for HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION of Section 1. Of the Act.
[22] I informed him that I was only suing for $1.00 and for the good of the public; Furthermore, the legal action was on principal of improving the fair treatment of homeless individuals, or maybe I was the only person being discriminated against?
[23] I was promptly shown the door even though I advise the 3 Managers present with a qualification of uncertainty that the action being taken against my person may not be legal, for you cannot hold one's legal rights hostage, to discriminate against a person within the context of equal, and fair services to all Canadians. “
PLEASE SEE OVERVIEW FROM APPLICANT’S FACTUM, STARTING AT PARA[8] TO PARA[34] FOR APPLICANT’S ACCOUNT OF CAUSE OF ACTION
PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT
[154] Pursuant to EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT , and its description;
“EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT
THE REGION OF PEEL POLICE SERVICES and WILLIAM OSLO
HEALTH SYSTEM affected a 14 DAY FALSE IMPRISOMENT of my
person without access to a lawyer or a fair impartial hearing to justify
my detention after being assaulted a number of times by different
Police Officers, and trying to file an information or charges against
one of the said Police Officers ( Pekeski with bage# 2261).
TAKE NOTICE: Dr. Handler saw me for less than 1 minute!!
Dr. Handler’s FORM 42 articulates; “This is to inform you that Dr. Jeffry Handler
examined you on 26/08/2011 and has made an application for you to have a
psychiatric assessment.
The physician has certi"ed that...he has reasonable cause to believe that you
have:
behaved or behaving violently towards another person or have caused or are
causing another person to fear bodily harm from you; or
shown or are showing a lack of competence to care for yourself and that you are
suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in:
serious bodily harm to yourself;
serious bodily harm to another person; or
serious physical impairment of you....”
____________________________________________________________
August 26, 2011 at about 5:00 a.m.
Dr. Handler’s FORM 42
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
(Pursuant to S. 38.1, S. 15 and”
[155] In accordance with the findings of PREMISE(2), PREMISE(3), PREMISE(4), AMMENDED-AMMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600, EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT, RULE 7.2, Section 34(11) of the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, and CASE LAW(Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.), it fellows that the two legal proceedings (CV 12-71600 and HRTO 2012-212585-I) in question are different, because the time period of the cause of actions are different, and the cause of action themselves are independent, distinct, and different; different people, different time, different events, different facts, same organizations, same location, similar human rights violations.
RULE 7.2
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210
Repealed
34 [Repealed 2002-62-17.]
“Deferral
[2] The Application noted a pending grievance. On March 1, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer under Rule 14.2 of its Rules of Procedure, as it appears that the applicant had filed a grievance dealing with the subject-matter of the Application. The applicant’s Union (United Steelworkers Local 7135) was given notice of the application as an affected organization. The parties and the Union were invited to make written submissions on why the Application should, or should not be deferred.
{…}
[4] The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Code s.45; Rule 14.1). he initial consideration for the Tribunal in deciding whether or not to defer consideration of an Application is whether the same facts and issues are being raised before another decision-maker with the authority to deal with issues arising under the Code”
(Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.)
[156] Thus, the two independent incidence concerning Mr. Harry Boom and Mr. Blessing Anyanwu are not the same or overlapping incidences.
[157] Hence PREMISE (5) is proven.
[158] PREMISE (6)
Did the RESPONDENTS mislead the HRTO tribunal?
[159] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at PARA[8]) in his submission matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following while jumping from the year 2011(Mr. Harry Boom and Civil matter CV 12-2012-i), to the HRTO matter 2012-12585-I(BLESSING ANYANWU and denial of homeless services), without making any factual statement about the cause of Action of the HUMANRIGHTS MATTER(2012-12585-I), except for;
“On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application.”
TAKE NOTICE: Causes of Actions and statements of facts ends in July 2012 in the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), and AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600),
While HRTO 2012-12585-I Cause of Action starts on September 1, 2012, below is to Blair McCreadie assertions;
“
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
”
[160] On or about July 13th, 2011 the SOCIAL BENEFIT TRIBUNAL, made an INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER (1106-04904) in the following manner;
“...The Tribunal directs that the Administrator, Social Services Dept Region
of Peel, pay interim assistance to the above noted appellant effective
June 01, 2011 to November 30, 2011...”
[161] On or about August 2nd, 2011 Ontario-Works (Region of Peel), again redundantly terminated financial assistance to which the Applicant was not in receipt of, and in contravention of SOCIAL BENEFIT TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904), and Section 127(1), 22.1 or 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while the same order was in full force byway of Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA . Jane Anderspn-Renton(Manager), articulated the aforesaid in the following manner;
“Your current financial assistance has been suspended because: you
cannot receive financial assistance if you reside in an institution that provide
for your basic needs and shelter. Your financial assistance will stop
as of August 2nd, 2011 because you are living in an institution.”
[162] On or about August 15th, 2011 Nicole Arbour/Rudo Chiyangwa, served on the Applicant a notification letter to leave the , PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, with no mention of any financial discontinuation or wanting of assessment documents because she already received all the necessary documentation needed for ONTARIO-WORKS assessment, and while she was fully briefed on the Applicant’s need to perfect his COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO appeal hearing(C51190) schedule to be heard on September 7th, 2011; furthermore he recently finished notifying the same court of his new address and contact information, which is an official requirement by the criminal judicial process. They articulated their aforesaid notification in the following manner;
“...It has come to our attention that your stay has exceeded the 2
week period our shelter is mandated for; your original intake date was
July 7th, 2011. Although we would like to continue supporting you in this
time of transition you need to have secured accommodations no later than
August 22, 2011. If you are unable to secure accommodations by, we will
be happy to assist you in securing a bed at a shelter outside of Peel
Region...”
[163] On or about September 2nd, 2011 Ontario-Works (Region of Peel) again, redundantly terminated financial assistance to which the Applicant was not in receipt of, and in contravention of SOCIAL BENEFIT TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904), and Section 127(1), 22.1 or 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while the same order was in full force byway of Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA. Ontario-Works (Region of Peel), the SALVATION ARMY, and 2500 Cawthra Road, PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, was aware and well informed that the Plaintiff was unlawfully imprisoned at the WILLIAM OSLER HEALTH SYSTEM, BRAMPTON CIVIC HOSPITAL, Mental Intensive Care Unit. Suzanne Finn (Manager AT Ontario-Works), again articulated the redundant termination of financial assistant in the following manner;
“...This letter is to notify you of the suspension of the financial assistance
you receive from the Ontario Works program(OW). Your current
financial assistance has been suspended because: we have requested
Participation Requirements, Chequing/Saving Accounts and Rent
information and you have not provided it. This information is need to determine if you are [still] eligible for Ontario Works and to make sure that
you get the right amount of financial assistance.
You have not given use the information that we need. Your financial assistance
will stop as of September 2nd, 2011...”
PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT HOME_A-2nd DAVID MILLER(OW SUPERVISOR) ON PAGE 188 & 189, TO VIEW A COPY OF THE SAME ORDER
[164] By comparison, Blair McCreadie or the RESPONDENT assertion contradicts the the SOCIAL BENEFIT TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904), in addition to providing evidence that the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL was disobeying or violating the same COURT ORDER. The same court order was disclosed to the REGIONAL MUNICIPAL OF PEEL on more than one occasion by the Applicant.
[165] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[20]) for another similar matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following on fairness and equity, that was sent at least two notices of incomplete application;
“20. ...one of the fundamental goals of the administration of the human rights system in Ontario is to “promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes” [RULE A3.1]. We further submit that it is a relevant factor mitigating against reactivation and in favour of dismissal.”
[166] Pursuant to Gurjit Singh Brar, a lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, in his submission(at PARA[15] & PARA[17]) for another similar matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following on fairness and equity that was sent at least two notices of incomplete application;
“15. pursuant to s. 40 of the Human Rights Code(the “Code”), the Tribunal has the authority to dispose of Applications made under Part iv “by adopting the procedures and practices provided for in its rules or otherwise available to the Tribunal which, in its opinion, offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications”.
[167] In accordance with the stated evidence above, and the RESPONDENTS are in a master slave business relationship, where THE GOVERNING COUNSEL OF THE SALVATION ARMY is the subordinate, misrepresented facts to mislead the TRIBUNAL, and possible cover up the crime of the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL disobeying a court order was in full force IN contravention of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA and Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, which asserts the felling;
“Relationship to the Administration of Justice
“Relationship to the Administration of Justice
4.01 The Lawyer as Advocate
(2) When acting as an advocate, a lawyer shall
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal conduct,
(f) knowingly misstate the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the substance of an argument, or the provisions of a statue or like authority,
(g) knowingly assert as true a fact when its truth cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence or as a matter of which notice may be taken by the tribunal,
(h) deliberately refrain from informing the tribunal of any binding authority that at the lawyer considers to be directly on point and that has not been mentioned by an opponent,
(I) dissuade a witness from giving evidence or advise a witness to be absent,
(j) knowingly permit a witness or party to be presented in a false or misleading way or to impersonate another,
(K) needlessly abuse, hector, or harass a witness,...”
[168] Therefore, the RESPONDENTS should have known are ought to have known that they were action in contravention of Section 127(1), 22.1 or 22.2 the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, when challenging, and blatantly contravening the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER.: 1106-04904 in the year 2011, and thereafter misleading the HRTO TRIBUNAL in contravention of Section 4.01 of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, and in contravention of Section 137 and 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
“Relationship to the Administration of Justice
4.01 The Lawyer as Advocate
(2) When acting as an advocate, a lawyer shall
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal conduct,”
Fabricating evidence
137. Every one who, with intent to mislead, fabricates anything with intent that it shall be used as evidence in a judicial proceeding, existing or proposed, by any means other than perjury or incitement to perjury is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 125.
Offences relating to affidavits
138. Every one who
(a) signs a writing that purports to be an affidavit or statutory declaration and to have been sworn or declared before him when the writing was not so sworn or declared or when he knows that he has no authority to administer the oath or declaration,
(b) uses or offers for use any writing purporting to be an affidavit or statutory declaration that he knows was not sworn or declared, as the case may be, by the affiant or declarant or before a person authorized in that behalf, or
(c) signs as affiant or declarant a writing that purports to be an affidavit or statutory declaration and to have been sworn or declared by him, as the case may be, when the writing was not so sworn or declared,
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 126.
Perjury
131. (1) Subject to subsection (3), every one commits perjury who, with intent to mislead, makes before a person who is authorized by law to permit it to be made before him a false statement under oath or solemn affirmation, by affidavit, solemn declaration or deposition or orally, knowing that the statement is false.
i. Effect of judicial acts
3.1 Unless otherwise provided or ordered, anything done by a court, justice or judge is effective from the moment it is done, whether or not it is reduced to writing.
2002, c. 13, s. 2.
Disobeying order of court
127. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
22. (1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offense and that other person is afterwards a party to that offense, the person who counseled is a party to that offense, notwithstanding that the offense was committed in a way different from that which was counseled.
(2) Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an offense is a party to every offense that the other commits in consequence of the counseling that the person who counselled knew or ought to have known was likely to be committed in consequence of the counselling.
(3) For the purposes of this Act, “counsel” includes procure, solicit or incite.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 22;
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 7.
22.1 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove negligence, an organization is a party to the offence if
(a) acting within the scope of their authority
(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that representative would have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s activities that is relevant to the offence departs — or the senior officers, collectively, depart — markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being a party to the offence.
2003, c. 21, s. 2.
22.2 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault — other than negligence — an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in part to benefit the organization, one of its senior officers
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the organization so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the offence; or
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to the offence.
2003, c. 21, s. 2.
23. (1) An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who, knowing that a person has been a party to the offence, receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of enabling that person to escape.
(2) [Repealed, 2000, c. 12, s. 92]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 23;
2000, c. 12, s. 92.
23.1 For greater certainty, sections 21 to 23 apply in respect of an accused notwithstanding the fact that the person whom the accused aids or abets, counsels or procures or receives, comforts or assists cannot be convicted of the offence.
R.S., 1985, c. 24 (2nd Supp.), s. 45.
24. (1) Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do anything for the purpose of carrying out the intention is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence whether or not it was possible under the circumstances to commit the offence.
(2) The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 24.
[169] Thus, the RESPONDENTS mislead the HRTO tribunal.
[170] Hence, PREMISE (6) is proven.
[171] PREMISE (7)
Did the respondents delay OR DEFERED HRTO 2012-12585-I, BYWAY OF A REQUEST FOR ORDER and by HRTO-RULE 7. On the basses of the two independent incidence concerning Mr. Harry Boom, and Mr. A Blessing are the same or overlapping incidence?
[172] In accordance with the HRTO 2012-12585-I file, it should be clear that the RESPONDENTS requested, and argued for a delay or deferring of HRTO 2012-12585-I in accordance with RULE 4.1.
[173] Thus, the respondents delay OR DEFERED HRTO 2012-12585-I, BYWAY OF A REQUEST FOR ORDER and by HRTO-RULE 7. On the basses of the two independent incidence concerning Mr. Harry Boom, and Mr. A Blessing are the same or overlapping incidence.
[174] Hence, PREMISE (7) is proven.
[175] PREMISE (8)
Is there a CONTRAVENTION NATURAL JUSTICE?
[176] NATURAL JUSTICE - NOTICE
Pursuant to ADMINISTRATION LAW by David J. Mullan;
“One of the bedrock principle of natural justice or procedural fairness is that affected individuals have timely notice of what is at stake in sufficient detail to enable them to participate effectively in the decision making process. This principle is not only the basis of common law jurisprudence in this domain but it also is manifest in statutory provisions such as section 8 of the Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act. It provides:”
(ADMINISTRATION LAW - David J. Mullan; page 238)
[177] NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed as far as the Applicant know!
[178] HRTO 2012-12585-I was DEFERED or DELAYED on 13 September 2013, at the request of the RESPONDENTS with the added benefit of not giving a full response, THE REGION OF PEEL GAVE4 NO RESPONSE. A letter from the HRTO-REGISTRA, states as fellows;
“
HRTO FILE: 2012-12585-I
|
Re: Wayne Ferron v. The Regional Municipality of Peel and the Governing Council of Salvation Army in Canada
Subject: DEFFERRED APPLICATION – Advise of Status
On September 13, 2013 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) issued Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1544 deferring this Application pending the completion of a civil matter, pursuant to Rule 14 of its Rules of Procedure.
{…}
Sincerely,
Richard Hennessy
Registrar
cc. John Gescher (via e-mail)
Blair McCreadie”
[179] Again, NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed as far as the Applicant know. The Applicant have requested a copy, if one exist, but so far there is no proof of the existence of one. So naturally the Applicant requested of the TRIBUNAL, within the spirit of fairness and equity to have a copy disclose.
[180] Pursuant to the Applicant’s AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I;
“[0] …to make an order directing HRTO-REGISTRAR to disclose "NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER(2012-12585-i)", all of the RESPONDENTS LETTERS to HRTO-REGISTRAR, and HRTO written ruling on decision to DELAY OR DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I at the request of the RESPONDENT.”
[181] Pursuant to the Honorable Adjudicator David Muir, June 15, 2015 INTERIM DECISION;
“THE Request is denied. The Tribunal Rule 23 provides as follows:...”
[182] It is clear that the honourable Adjudicator rejected the Applicant’s AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I, and made the following judgment in his INTERIM DECISION at PARA[5] AND PARA[6];
“[5] On May 21, 2015 the applicant FILED a REQUEST for Interim Remedy (Form 16). It appears that the Request was delivered to the respondents and a number of other individuals but the Tribunal advised the respondents unless directed to do so. Subsequently the applicant filed a number of “amended” Requests but it is not how these are in substance any different than the one filed on May 21, 2015.
[183] The Request is denied…”
[184] The Applicant’s main and most import request from the AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I are;
“[0] to make an order directing HRTO-REGISTRAR to disclose "NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER(2012-12585-i)", all of the RESPONDENTS LETTERS to HRTO-REGISTRAR, and HRTO written ruling on decision to DELAY OR DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I at the request of the RESPONDENT.
Disclosure of information to Commission
38. Despite anything in the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, at the request of the Commission, the Tribunal shall disclose to the Commission copies of applications and responses filed with the Tribunal and may disclose to the Commission other documents in its custody or in its control. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
{…}
[1] Pursuant to Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106;
Inspection of files
26. (1) Where the necessary facilities are available, any person may, with supervision and without interfering with the business of the Court, inspect a Court file or annex
[5] to enable me to travel to BRAMPTON COURTHOUSE, and serve the registrar of the same court with a REQUISITION for two certified copy of the final order for the civil matter CV-12-71600(need return bus fare and cost of certified copies), since the same court has failed to notify the Applicant of the final court order in question, the same court has failed to disclosed to the Applicant the same final court order in question, and the same court has refused to send the Applicant the same final court order in question.
[6] Pursuant to the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106;
393. The Court may deliver reasons for judgment
(a) orally from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing of a proceeding; or
(b) after having reserved judgment at the conclusion of a hearing, by depositing in the Registry written reasons, signed by the judge or prothonotary who delivered them.
394. (1) Where the Court gives reasons, it may direct one of the parties to prepare for endorsement a draft order to implement the Court's conclusion, approved as to form and content by the other parties or, where the parties cannot agree on the form and content of the order, to bring a motion for judgment in accordance with rule 369.
(2) On the return of a motion under subsection (1), the Court shall settle the terms of and pronounce the judgment, which shall be endorsed in writing and signed by the presiding judge or prothonotary.
395. (1) Subject to subsection 36(3), the Administrator shall send without delay a copy of every order made and of any reasons given other than in open court to all parties
(a) by registered mail;
(b) by electronic means, including facsimile and electronic mail; or
(c) by any other means, as directed by the Chief Justice, likely to bring the order and any reasons to the attention of the party.
(2) If an order and any reasons are transmitted by electronic means, the Administrator shall confirm receipt by the party and place proof of that receipt on the Court file.
SOR/2010-177, s. 6.
{…}
[10] to allow the Applicant to EXAMINE HRTO file HRTO 12-12585-I and make relevant photo copies without cost;
{…}
[10] to allow the Applicant to EXAMINE HRTO file HRTO 12-12585-I and make relevant photo copies without cost;
{…}
[14] to direct REGION OF PEEL and the SALVATION ARMY to disclose to my person all my personal information collected at the PEEL REGIONAL HOMELESS SHELTER so I may know the matter to the full extent and be able to answer the honourable court’s question;
[15] to direct REGION OF PEEL and the SALVATION ARMY to return the Applicant’s monies in the form of a personal check and a CANADA POST MONEY ORDER, as payment for search fees for services never rendered or responded to, in more than one request for my personal information collected at the PEEL REGIONAL HOMELESS SHELTER;
“
[185] HRTO 2012-12585-I was DEFERED or DELAYED on 13 September 2013, at the request of the respondents with the added benefit of the RESPONDENTS not giving a full response. Pursuant to the HUMAN RIGHTS EMAIL;
“
HRTO FILE: 2012-12585-I
|
Re: Wayne Ferron v. The Regional Municipality of Peel and the Governing Council of Salvation Army in Canada
Subject: DEFFERRED APPLICATION – Advise of Status
On September 13, 2013 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) issued Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1544 deferring this Application pending the completion of a civil matter, pursuant to Rule 14 of its Rules of Procedure.
{…}
Sincerely,
Richard Hennessy
Registrar
cc. John Gescher (via e-mail)
Blair McCreadie”
[186] TAKE NOTICE: That the civil matter being spoken about is by HRTO is CV 12-71600.
[187] TAKE NOTICE: That in accordance with CASE LAW, and the HRTO FAIR AND EQUAL process of HUMAN RIGHTS matter, there is supposed to be a NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I served on the relevant parties, before a matter is deferred.
[188] Pursuant to HONOURABLE TRIBUNAL’s CASE ASSESSMENT ORDER;
“[6] The issues to be addressed at the hearing are as follows:
a. Should the Tribunal waive the requirement in Rule 14.4 that a request to reactivate a deferred Application be filed no later than 60 days after the other proceeding has concluded?
b. Whether the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the substance of it has been appropriately dealt with in another legal proceeding, in this case the civil suit(s) commenced by the applicant?”
[189] It from the PREMISE and assumed assumption for a fair hearing on the issues above, that the legal issues before the honorable HRTO-TRIBUNAL are heavily reliant on the FINAL ORDER OF THE CIVIL MATTER (CV 12-2012-I) and the NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I, which is derived from the proper process of deferring a matter at HRTO. Yet, the Applicant, the public and the HRTO court are being denied these necessary pieces of EXIHIBITS to assist the honorable court in its just decisions in contravention of NATURAL JUSTICE and PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS.
[190] Pursuant to Rule 7.4;
RULE 7.4
7.4. The Tribunal will not defer consideration of an Application without first giving all the parties, and any affected persons or organizations identified in the Application or Response, an opportunity to make submissions on the request for deferral.
[191] Pursuant to Rule 14;
RULE 14
DEFERRAL OF AN APPLICATION BY THE TRIBUNAL
14.1 The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative, at the request of an Applicant under Rule 7, or at the request of any party.
14.2 Where the Tribunal intends to defer consideration of an Application under Rule 14.1, it will first give the parties,
any identified trade union or occupational or
professional organization and any identified affected persons, notice of its intention to consider deferral of the Application and an opportunity to make submissions.
[192] Pursuant to Rule 7.2;
RULE 7.2
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
[193] Pursuant to Section 34(11) of the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE;
Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210
Repealed
34 [Repealed 2002-62-17.]
[194] Pursuant Samuel v. Waterloo Regional District School Board;
“[2] On December 15, 2010, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer under section 45 of the Code and Rule 14.2 of its Rules of Procedure, as it appeared that the applicant had filed a grievance dealing with the subject-matter of the Application. The Custodial and Maintenance Association was notified as an organization that might be affected by the Application.”
(Samuel v. Waterloo Regional District School Board, 2011 HRTO 498 (CanLII))
[195] Pursuant Oram v. Abitibi Consolidated Company of Canada;
“[8] A further Case Assessment Direction dated February 15, 2012 (“the February CAD”) was issued to the parties. In it, the Tribunal stated that in the circumstances of the case, it seemed appropriate for the Tribunal to defer this proceeding until the Claims Adjudication Officer resolved the applicant’s dispute. It noted that pursuant to Rule 14.2 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, where the Tribunal intends to defer, it is required to first give the parties notice of its intention to defer and give them an opportunity to make submissions. …”
( Oram v. Abitibi Consolidated Company of Canada)
[196] Pursuant Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.;
“Deferral
[2] The Application noted a pending grievance. On March 1, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer under Rule 14.2 of its Rules of Procedure, as it appears that the applicant had filed a grievance dealing with the subject-matter of the Application. The applicant’s Union (United Steelworkers Local 7135) was given notice of the application as an affected organization. The parties and the Union were invited to make written submissions on why the Application should, or should not be deferred.
{…}
[4] The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Code s.45; Rule 14.1). he initial consideration for the Tribunal in deciding whether or not to defer consideration of an Application is whether the same facts and issues are being raised before another decision-maker with the authority to deal with issues arising under the Code”
(Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.)
[197] Pursuant Laba v. Windsor (City);
“DEFERRAL
[13] Section 45 of the Code confirms the Tribunal’s authority to defer consideration of an application. Under Rule 14.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party. Where the Tribunal intends to defer consideration of an application, it will first give the parties, any identified trade union or occupational or professional organization and any identified affected persons, notice of its intention to consider deferral and an opportunity to make submissions (Rule 14.2).
[14] The Tribunal will generally defer an application where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and issues. However, the Tribunal must also consider, in light of the particular circumstances of each case, whether deferral is the most fair, just and expeditious way of proceeding with the application. “
(Laba v. Windsor (City), 2009 HRTO 382)
[198] Pursuant to ADMINISTRATION LAW by David J. Mullan;
NATURAL JUSTICE
HEAR THE OTHER SIDE(AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM):
“The rules of procedural fairness or natural justice are divided
into two separate categories. the first category comprises the decision maker provide adequate opportunities for those affected to present their case and respond to the evidence and arguments being advanced by other participants or in the knowledge or possession of the decision maker. The Latin term for this is ”audi alteram partem,” though its admonition to hear or listen to the other side is {...} The second limb of the rules covers the requirement that decision makers be independent and unbiased. Here too, there is and underinclusive Latin term:
“nemo judex in sua propria causa debet esse” - no one should be a judge in her or his own cause.”
(ADMINISTRATION LAW - David J. Mullan; page 232)
· Thus there is a denial of the first limb of NATURAL JUSTICE.
[199] NATURAL JUSTICE - TIME
Pursuant to ADMINISTRATION LAW by David J. Mullan;
“One of the bedrock principle of natural justice or procedural fairness is that affected individuals have timely notice of what is at stake in sufficient detail to enable them to participate effectively in the decision making process. This principle is not only the basis of common law jurisprudence in this domain but it also is manifest in statutory provisions such as section 8 of the Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act. It provides:”
(ADMINISTRATION LAW - David J. Mullan; page 238)
[200] On September 20, 2012, the HRTO- REGISTRAR was sent HUMAN RIGHTS MATTER HRTO 2012-12585-I, concerning the service at REGION OF PEEL HOMELESS SHELTER.
[201] On April 12, 2013 THE GOVERNING COUNSEL OF THE SALVATION ARMY served and filed a letter seeking an extension of time to response to HRTO 2012-12585-I , ARTICULATED THE FOLLOWING;
“Attention: Richard Hennessy, Registrar
Dear Mr. hennessy:
Re: Wayne Ferron v. Salavation Army
HRTO File Number 2012-12585-I
I am in-house legal counsel for the above-named respondent.
The Salvation Army’s response is due on April12, 2013. I have been unable to obtain definitive instructions from my client in time to meet the above deadline. Kindly note that The Salvation Army is exploring the possibility of settling this matter.
In light of the above, I ask that the Tribunal provide The Salvation Army with a two week extension to provide it’s response.
(Legal Counsel, Elena Constantin, April 12, 2013 The Salvation Army Letter)
[202] The RESPONDENT delayed or requested that the HRTO TRIBUNAL DISMISS or DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I in accordance with Rule 14.1, which is presented below;
RULE 14
DEFERRAL OF AN APPLICATION BY THE TRIBUNAL
14.1 The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative, at the request of an Applicant under Rule 7, or at the request of any party.
[203] Pursuant to the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL;
“
17. The Tribunal has promulgated specific rules with respect to proceeding with Applications that have been deferred. According to Rule 7.5, where an applicant wishes to proceed with an Application that was deferred pending completion of another legal proceeding, a request must be made in accordance with Rule 14.3 and 14.4, no later than 60 days after completion of the other proceeding.
{…}
18. In our respectful submission, the applicant has not met the requirement of Rules 7.5, 14.3 and 14.4. The applicant’s civil action concluded on July 3, 2014 when the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed his application for leave to appeal. The applicant’s request for reactivating the Application was made on March 21, 2015, greatly in excess of the 60 day time period. This, in our submission, is sufficient to dispose of the applicant’s request and dismiss the Application.
20. But, in our submission, the Tribunal ought to consider the fact that on October 17, 2014 the applicant misrepresented the status of his civil proceeding…”
[204] Pursuant to the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY;
“1. The Governing Council of the Salvation Army in Canada(“The Salvation Army”) respectfully requests that the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario(the “Tribunal”) deny the Applicant’s request to re-activate his Application and issue a Decision to dismiss the Application on the basis that:
(a) The Applicant’s request to re-activate the Application was not filed within the 60-days…
(b) In any event, the final decision in the civil action that is “inter-related” to this Application has already appropriately dealt with the merits of this Application…
{…}
5. Prior to commencing this Application, the Applicant commenced a civil action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, bearing Court File No. CV-12-0716-00(the “Action”)…
{…}
7. The Salvation Army served a Statement of Defence in response to the Action on November 14, 2012. The Salvation Army defended against the Applicant’s claim in the Action on the basis that the Amended Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
9. On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application…
{…}
24. As set out in paragraphs 12 and 13 above, The Salvation Army states that the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Court of Appeal have reviewed the merits …”
RULE 14
DEFERRAL OF AN APPLICATION BY THE TRIBUNAL
14.1 The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative, at the request of an Applicant under Rule 7, or at the request of any party.
[205] Pursuant Rule 7.5 does not apply because the RESPONDENTS REQUESTED THE DELAY OR DEFERIAL HRTO 2012-12585-I. But Rule 14.4 should be used , since the matter was deferred in accordance with Rule 14.1 at the request of the RESPONDENTS.
[206] On or about June 30, 2013, the Applicant served and filed RESPONSE to RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS HRTO 2012-12585-I , which articulated the following in which Wayne Ferron requested “…January 2014 HEARING date…”;
“TAKE NOTICE: The Applicant has not been given an official response from the RESPONDENING parties, nor has he been properly served with official documents which has been filed with the TRIBUNAL, nor has he been instructed how, and where to serve the RESPONDENTS additional documents; 2500 Cawthra Employees has threaten to throw rece
The Applicant respectfully requntly filed legal documents by the Applicant into the garbage.
est 4 weeks to file a proper response, to documentations and argument of the RESPONDENTS, he was never properly served in accordance with civilized practice of law. Moreover, the Applicant notified all parties officially in accordance with the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and Canadian civilized practice of law.
Again, the applicant intents to serve, and file medical information relevant to the matter before the TRIBUNAL; the Applicant is asking for a January 2014 HEARING date, so he can accumulate enough funds to collect and serve his relevant medical information; I am a human being with human worth and would like to be treated in a dignified manner.
Pursuant to the documentation served on my person at the wrong address (neighborhood which I have no dealings with and does not speak English) and not in the proper mailbox which cannot contain the very large package after I notified and gave detailed instructions of a manner to serve my person to assure service is successful or received successfully with conformation.
The respondent's arguments contain many fallacies, mainly the cause and effect fallacy. THE CIVIL STATEMENT OF CLAIM(let us call it EXHIBIT A), does not strengthen the respondent's argument but weakens it; pursuant to the Director(BLESSING ANYANWU) at PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, at 2500 Cawthra Rd., Mississauga, the Applicant was being denied service at the same homeless shelter, and due process for trying to affect his legal rights by way of EXHIBIT A; the director(Mr. Blessings) was quite clear on the above point which he articulated many times and there was two other manager's at the said EMERGENCY SHELTER facility which witness this while they were being asked by the Applicant if their said action was legal, because of the revenge or punishment or vigilante justice dimension for exercising ones legal right . In addition to the intake clerks articulating in clear language that they were given instructions not to process or give me shelter at the same EMERGENCY SHELTER for unstated or written reasonable cause. After waiting outside for two days without food or water, the same EMERGENCY SHELTER called the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE (Officer 3424, 3470) to have THE APPLICANT removed from public property across the street from the same shelter, which they made a determination that they could not reasonable do what was being requested of them.
THE APPLICANT will state the functional PREMISES for the respondents here again. The respondents in their defense must show that the premises or impossible to be true or the arguments supporting the Applicant's PREMISES contain logical or legal fallacies which prevents the Applicant from reaching the conclusion he is trying to respectfully submit or articulate before the TRIBUNAL.”
PLEASE SEE APENDIX A
[207] On or about July 10, 2013, the Applicant served and filed REQUISITION FOR EXTENSION OF RESPONSE TIME HRTO 2012-12585-I , which articulated the following in which Wayne Ferron requested “…January 2014 HEARING date…”;
“…Again, the applicant intents to serve, and file medical information
rellevant to the matter before the TRIBUNAL;
the Applicant is asking for December 2013 date for the HEARING
or a January 2014 HEARING date
{…}
the Applicant was being denied service at the same homeless shelter and du process for trying to affect his legal rights byway of EXHIBIT A; the director(Mr Blessings) was quite clear on the above point which he articulated many times and there was two other manager's at the said EMERGENCY SHELTER facility which witness this while they were being asked by the Applicant if their said action was legal, because of the…”
[208] On or about May 7, 2013, the Applicant served and filed NOTICE OF INTENSIONS HRTO 2012-12585-I , which articulated the following in which Wayne Ferron requested “…January 2014 HEARING date…”;
“…Applicant is asking for December 2013 date for the HEARING
or a January 2014 HEARING date, so he can accumulate enough funds to collect and serve his relevant medical information; I am a
human being with human worth and would like to be treated in a dignified manner…”
[209] Since, the Applicant pleaded for a January 2014 Hearing of HRTO 2012-12585-I, and the findings of PREMISE (7), in addition to the failure to serve the APPLICANT A NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER in a timely manner, it follows that the first limb of NATURAL JUSTICE has been violated.
[210] Pursuant to ADMINISTRATION LAW by David J. Mullan;
NATURAL JUSTICE
HEAR THE OTHER SIDE(AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM):
“The rules of procedural fairness or natural justice are divided
into two separate categories. the first category comprises the decision maker provide adequate opportunities for those affected to present their case and respond to the evidence and arguments being advanced by other participants or in the knowledge or possession of the decision maker. The Latin term for this is ”audi alteram partem,” though its admonition to hear or listen to the other side is {...} The second limb of the rules covers the requirement that decision makers be independent and unbiased. Here too, there is and underinclusive Latin term:
“nemo judex in sua propria causa debet esse” - no one should be a judge in her or his own cause.”
(ADMINISTRATION LAW - David J. Mullan; page 232)
· Therefore, there is a denial of the first limb of NATURAL JUSTICE.
[211] Thus, there is a CONTRAVENTION NATURAL JUSTICE.
[212] Hence, PREMISE(8) is proven.
[213] PREMISE(9)
Is there CONTRAVENTION PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS?
[214] The following are RULES from CIVIL PROCEDURE of how, and the assumptions that must be made to properly defeat a claim in a vacuum or by way of a summary dismissal;
PROPERTIES of MOTION TO STRIKE IN A VACCUME
1) ASSUMPTION FOR STRIKING:
(i) STATEMENT OF CLAIM is true
(ii) RULE 19.02 - defendant is deemed to admit allegations in STATEMENT OF CLAIM.
2) CONSTRAINTS or SCOPE FOR STRIKING:
(i) RULE 21.02(1) - ...on a question of Law Raised by Pleading
(ii) RULE 21.02(2)(a)&(b) - ...no evidence is admissible on motion
(iii) RULE 21.02(1) - ...motion to strike shall be made promptly
[215] Pursuant to Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., the following scope or set of binding constraints are established by case law, some of which are the following;
“The complexity or novelty of the question that the plaintiff
wishes to bring to trial should not act as a bar to that trial taking
place.
(ii) Supreme Court of Canada
While this Court has had a somewhat limited opportunity to
consider how the rules regarding the striking out of a statement
of claim are to be applied, it has nonetheless consistently upheld
the "plain and obvious" test. Justice Estey, speaking for the
Court in Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, stated at p. 740:
As I have said, all the facts pleaded in the statement of
claim must be deemed to have been proven. {...}
The law then would appear to be clear. The facts pleaded are
to be taken as proved. "
(Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 page 23)
[216] Pursuant to Kassian v. The Attorney General of Canada;
“Burden of Proof
[46] All parties confirm that the test outlined in Connerty v. Coles, 2012 ONSC 5218, at para. 9, regarding the burden of proof on a summary judgment motion, has not been altered by the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Hryniak. The test outlined in Connerty confirms that the burden of proof on a summary judgment motion must be considered in two steps:
1. First, the party who seeks summary dismissal must “move with supporting affidavit material or other evidence.” The moving party bears the evidentiary burden with respect to proof of showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.
2. It is only after the moving party has discharged its evidentiary burden of proving that there is no genuine issue which requires a trial for its resolution, that the burden shifts to the responding party to prove that its claim has a real chance of success based upon other evidence or specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.”
(PARA[46], Kassian v. The Attorney General of Canada, 2014 ONSC 844)
[217] Pursuant to Frederick E. Gibson in Toledo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration);
“[5] The issue of the impact of an incomplete transcript on the interests of an Applicant has often been before this Court in immigration judicial reviews in recent years. [1] Typical of the reasoning of my colleagues in the cited authorities are the following comments of Justice Layden-Stevenson in the Randhawa matter, to the following effect:
Despite the capable and articulate arguments and submissions of counsel for the respondent, the applicant has persuaded me that the board's credibility findings with respect to the witnesses in question were fundamental to the decision. I am mindful of the comments of Evans J., as then was, in Hassan v. Canada ... that given the nature of a vacation hearing, an individual is entitled to the clearest assurance that the board has given full and fair consideration to the evidence.
[citations omitted]
[6] Although the hearing that is here under review was not a "vacation hearing", I am satisfied that the implications of the Convention refugee hearing here before the Court equally
entitle an individual such as the Applicant to the clearest assurance that the RPD has given full and fair consideration to his evidence.
{…}
[8] Unfortunately, the "entire ruling" is not on the record. I am satisfied that, in the absence of the "entire ruling", this Court is substantially disadvantaged in ensuring a full and fair hearing, not only in the interests of the Applicant, but also in the interests of the presiding member himself.”
(Frederick E. Gibson in Toledo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1572)
[218] Pursuant to ONTARIO CIVIL PRACTICE;
“…the Ontario Court of Appeal has made it clear in numerous cases that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plenary trial remains the mode for the resolution of disputes and Rule 20 does not represent court reform, or the reform of the adversary system, in disguise{...}
A motion judge ought not lose sight of her or his narrow role in determining whether a genuine factual issue exist, and must be careful not to assume the role of a trial judge by adjudicating any genuine factual issues which do exist. The motions judge ought never assess credibility, weight the evidence, or find the facts, all of which are functions reserved to the trial judge. However, an issue of fact must relate to material fact; otherwise it cannot give rise to a “genuine issue for trial.” Moreover, merely raising an issue of credibility will not be an answer to a motion for summary judgment; the issue of credibility must be material and genuine:...“
(page 543, ONTARIO CIVIL PRACTICE 2009, THOMSON CARSWELL)
[219] Pursuant to Le Dain J. for the Supreme Court of Canada in Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution;
“Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton's observations in Dyson, supra, at pp. 418-19, are particularly instructive:
Now it is unquestionable that, both under the inherent power of the Court and also under a specific rule to that effect made under the Judicature Act, the Court has a right to stop an action at this stage if it is wantonly brought without the shadow of an excuse, so that to permit the action to go through its ordinary stages up to trial would be to allow the defendant to be vexed under the form of legal process when there could not at any stage be any doubt that the action was baseless. But from this to the summary dismissal of actions because the judge in chambers does not think they will be successful in the end lies a wide region, and the Courts have properly considered that this power of arresting an action and deciding it without trial is one to be very sparingly used, and rarely, if ever, excepting in cases where the action is an abuse of legal procedure. They have laid down again and again that this process is not intended to take the place of the old demurrer by which the defendant challenged the validity of the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law. Differences of law, just as differences of fact, are normally to be decided by trial after hearing in Court, and not to be refused a hearing in Court by an order of the judge in chambers. Nothing more clearly indicates this to be the intention of the rule than the fact that the plaintiff has no appeal as of right from the decision of the judge at chambers in the case of such an order as this. So far as the rules are concerned an action may be stopped by this procedure without the question of its justifiability ever being brought before a Court. To my mind it is evident that our judicial system would never permit a plaintiff to be "driven from the judgment seat" in this way without any Court having considered his right to be heard, excepting in cases where the cause of action was obviously and almost incontestably bad. [Emphasis added.]”
(Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 page 16&17)
l Since NATURAL JUSTICE is a fundamental property of PROCEDURAL, it logically follows that given that NATURAL JUSTICE violated in PREMISE(8), then PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS is also contravene.
[219] Thus, there CONTRAVENTION PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS.
[220] Hence, PREMISE(9) has been proven.
[221] PREMISE(10)
IS HRTO 2012-12585-I VOIDABLE?
[222] Pursuant to Ridge v Baldwin;
“In all the cases where the Courts have held that the principles of natural justice have been flouted I can find none where the language does not indicate the opinion held that the decision impugned was void. It is true that the distinction between void and voidable is not drawn explicitly in the cases, but the language used shows that where there is a want of jurisdiction as opposed to a failure to follow a procedural requirement the result is a nullity. This was, indeed, decided by the Court ofExchequer in Wood v. Woad (1879)”
(Ridge v Baldwin (No 1) [1963] UKHL 2 (14 March 1963); page 24, at 42)
[223] Pursuant to ADMINISTRATION LAW by David J. Mullan;
DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE RENDERS A DECISION VOID:
“The denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a
decision invalid, whether or not it may appear to a reviewing
court that thee hearing would likely have resulted in a different decision. The right to a fair hearing must be regarded as an independent, unqualified right which finds its essential justification in the sense of procedural justice which any person affected by an administrative decision is entitled to have. It is not for the court to deny that right and sense of justice on the basis of speculation as to what the result might have been had there been a hearing. Indeed, in most instances, for the reviewing court to even speculate as to the outcome would be to compound the denial of procedural
fairness.”
(ADMINISTRATION LAW - David J. Mullan; page 227-22)
[224] Pursuant to R. v. Dwyer and Lauzon at the COURT OF APPEAL;
“Conclusion
[68] With the benefit of a full argument which, unfortunately, was not presented to the learned trial Judge, we have concluded that the trial was a complete nullity, as the Judge had no jurisdiction to try the accused without a jury in the circumstances. While this conclusion may appear unduly technical, it is necessary to secure the appellants’ fundamental right not to be deprived of their liberty except by due process of law. In the result therefore, we would allow the appeal, quash the convictions and order a new trial.”
(Ontario Court of Appeals, R. v. Dwyer and Lauzon, Date: 1978-05-02)
BILL OF RIGHTS
[225] Pursuant to the BILL OF RIGHTS, one's rights cannot be taken away without a fair hearing to plea one's cause or defend against the said action, which amounts to a denial of PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS and NATURAL JUSTICE; the BILL OF RIGHTS articulates as follows;
Section1.
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law;
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the law;
Section 2.
2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations;
[226] Pursuant to Singh v. Rainbow Circle Co-operative Inc.;
“[15] In this case, there is no question that the applicant failed to file a request to reactivate the Application within the time limit specified in Rule 14.4. Accordingly, the issue to be determined is whether the Tribunal ought to exercise its discretion under the Rules to extend the applicable time limit or to waive the strict application of the Rule, so as to allow the applicant to request reactivation of the Application in March 2014.
[16] In deciding whether it would be fair, just and expeditious to extend the time limit in this case, I must consider both the time limit in Rule 14.4 in the context of the overall scheme of the Code and Rules, as well as the reasons for the applicant’s request to extend it. The 60-day limit represents an attempt by the Tribunal to incorporate the values of fairness, justice and expeditiousness into this step of the proceedings and to balance those factors by acknowledging that parties will need a reasonable, but finite, amount of time to make a decision about reactivation. A request to extend the timeline must, therefore, be supported by some explanation. See Hudson v. Kingston (City),2013 HRTO 2006 (CanLII).
[17] In my view, the applicant has provided some explanation for her delay. She was obtaining medical treatment from September 2013 to March 2014. She was hospitalized during the 60-day period following the Divisional Court decision on September 18, 2013, from October 28 to November 5, 2013. It was not until the Tribunal’s request for a status report on February 11, 2014 that the respondents requested a dismissal of the Application on February 19, 2014 for the applicant’s failure to request reactivation within the 60-day time period. In these circumstances, I exercise my discretion to waive strict compliance with the 60-day time period and reactivate the Application.
order
[18] The Application is reactivated.
[19] The respondents are directed to advise the Tribunal whether they are willing to proceed to mediation by April 25, 2014.
Dated at Toronto, this 11th day of April, 2014.”
(FAIRNESS-RULE A3.1: Singh v. Rainbow Circle Co-operative Inc., 2014 HRTO 528)
[227] Pursuant to Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board;
“[1] Section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), gives this Tribunal the authority to dismiss all or part of an application where the substance of the application has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding. In this Interim Decision, we re-examine this Tribunal’s approach to the interpretation and application of s. 45.1 when an applicant previously filed a public complaint about the conduct of a police officer under the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, as amended (the “PSA”).
[2] In Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, the Supreme Court held in an analogous situation, applying the common law doctrine of issue estoppel, that it would be unfair to preclude a public complainant from pursuing a subsequent civil claim because of the findings in the Ontario police officer discipline process. In our view, the appropriate interpretation of s. 45.1 does not permit the dismissal of a human rights application when this would lead to unfairness, given the nature of the other process and the difference in the issues at stake in that process. In light of the guidance of the Court about the unfairness that would result from dismissing a human rights application based on previous police disciplinary proceedings, these Applications must proceed.”
(PARA[1] TO [2], Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board 2013hrto1298-1)
[228] Pursuant to Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board;
“[191] The fact that there has been no disciplinary hearing in these cases also raises an aspect of fairness at issue in this case that was not at issue in Penner. Because in these cases there has been no disciplinary hearing, the effect of a dismissal by this Tribunal at this stage would be that applications alleging a breach of the Code would get no hearing at all. A dismissal without a hearing by this Tribunal on the basis solely of a decision made pursuant to a “gatekeeping” function (see Wall v. Independent Police Review Director, 2013 ONSC 3312, at para. 8) would be manifestly at odds with the intentions of the Legislature in creating the “direct access” system under the Code, as well as obviously unfair.
[192] I agree with my colleagues that s. 45.1 cannot and should not be interpreted to bar a Code application where do to so would result in an affront to basic principles of fairness. In addition, it appears to me that the use of the term “appropriately” in s. 45.1 of the Code calls for an assessment of the conclusion (result and remedy) in the other proceeding against the applicable provisions of the Code, and in light of the legislative intent behind the Code. In the circumstances of these cases, the substance of the Applications cannot be found to have been “appropriately dealt with”.
DISPOSITION
[193] In respect of all three Applications before us, I would exercise my discretion under s. 45.1 of the Code, for all of the reasons noted above, to refuse the respondents’ Requests to Dismiss these Applications, and to allow them to proceed in the Tribunal’s process. I agree with the terms of the Order as set out in the Decision of my colleagues.
(PARA[191] TO [193], Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board 2013hrto1298-1)
l Therefore, the aforesaid arguments for HRTO 2012-12585-I, is voidable or renders any decision a nullity except to go back to first instants, in accordance with established case law and the legal notion of NATURAL JUSTICE, that is transcendental with respect to jurisdiction and different courts.
[229] Thus, HRTO 2012-12585-I VOIDABLE.
[230] Hence, PREMISE (10) is proven.
[231] PREMISE(11)
Did Agents of THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, a RESPONDENT, contravene Section 127(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA?
[232] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at PARA[8]) in his submission matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following while jumping from the year 2011(Mr. Harry Boom and Civil matter CV 12-2012-i), to the HRTO matter 2012-12585-I(BLESSING ANYANWU and denial of homeless services), without making any factual statement about the cause of Action of the HUMANRIGHTS MATTER(2012-12585-I), except for;
“On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application.”
TAKE NOTICE: Causes of Actions and statements of facts ends in July 2012 in the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), and AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600),
While HRTO 2012-12585-I Cause of Action starts on September 1, 2012, below is to Blair McCreadie assertions;
“1. The Governing Council of the Salvation Army in Canada(“The Salvation Army”)…
{…}
THIS APPLICATION AND THE “INTER-RELATED” CIVIL ACTION
5. Prior to commencing this Application, the Applicant commenced a civil action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, bearing Court File No. CV-12-0716-00 (the “Action”)…Amended Statement of Claim, issued on August 21, 2012 include, inter alia, that the Applicant was asked to leave the Cawthra Road Shelter (the “Shelter”) on or about September 12, 2011 in breach of his human rights.
{…}
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
9. On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application…”
”
[233] On or about July 13th, 2011 the SOCIAL BENEFIT TRIBUNAL, made an INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER (1106-04904) in the following manner;
“...The Tribunal directs that the Administrator, Social Services Dept Region
of Peel, pay interim assistance to the above noted appellant effective
June 01, 2011 to November 30, 2011...”
[234] On or about August 2nd, 2011 Ontario-Works (Region of Peel), again redundantly terminated financial assistance to which the Applicant was not in receipt of, and in contravention of SOCIAL BENEFIT TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904), and Section 127(1), 22.1 or 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while the same order was in full force byway of Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA . Jane Anderspn-Renton(Manager), articulated the aforesaid in the following manner;
“Your current financial assistance has been suspended because: you
cannot receive financial assistance if you reside in an institution that provide
for your basic needs and shelter. Your financial assistance will stop
as of August 2nd, 2011 because you are living in an institution.”
[235] On or about August 15th, 2011 Nicole Arbour/Rudo Chiyangwa, served on the Applicant a notification letter to leave the , PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, with no mention of any financial discontinuation or wanting of assessment documents because she already received all the necessary documentation needed for ONTARIO-WORKS assessment, and while she was fully briefed on the Applicant’s need to perfect his COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO appeal hearing(C51190) schedule to be heard on September 7th, 2011; furthermore he recently finished notifying the same court of his new address and contact information, which is an official requirement by the criminal judicial process. They articulated their aforesaid notification in the following manner;
“...It has come to our attention that your stay has exceeded the 2
week period our shelter is mandated for; your original intake date was
July 7th, 2011. Although we would like to continue supporting you in this
time of transition you need to have secured accommodations no later than
August 22, 2011. If you are unable to secure accommodations by, we will
be happy to assist you in securing a bed at a shelter outside of Peel
Region...”
[236] On or about September 2nd, 2011 Ontario-Works (Region of Peel) again, redundantly terminated financial assistance to which the Applicant was not in receipt of, and in contravention of SOCIAL BENEFIT TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904), and Section 127(1), 22.1 or 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while the same order was in full force byway of Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA. Ontario-Works (Region of Peel), the SALVATION ARMY, and 2500 Cawthra Road, PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, was aware and well informed that the Plaintiff was unlawfully imprisoned at the WILLIAM OSLER HEALTH SYSTEM, BRAMPTON CIVIC HOSPITAL, Mental Intensive Care Unit. Suzanne Finn (Manager AT Ontario-Works), again articulated the redundant termination of financial assistant in the following manner;
“...This letter is to notify you of the suspension of the financial assistance
you receive from the Ontario Works program(OW). Your current
financial assistance has been suspended because: we have requested
Participation Requirements, Chequing/Saving Accounts and Rent
information and you have not provided it. This information is need to determine if you are [still] eligible for Ontario Works and to make sure that
you get the right amount of financial assistance.
You have not given use the information that we need. Your financial assistance
will stop as of September 2nd, 2011...”
PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT HOME_A-2nd DAVID MILLER(OW SUPERVISOR) ON PAGE 188 & 189, TO VIEW A COPY OF THE SAME ORDER
PLEASE SEE VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
[237] By comparison, Blair McCreadie or the RESPONDENT assertion contradicts the the SOCIAL BENEFIT TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904), in addition to providing evidence that the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL was actively disobeying or violating the same COURT ORDER which was in full force byway of Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA. The same court order was disclosed to the REGIONAL MUNICIPAL OF PEEL on more than one occasions by the Applicant.
[238] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at PARA[8]) in his submission matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following;
“
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
”
PLEASE SEE PARA[8] OF GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY’S SUBMISSIONS.
[239] have known that they were action in contravention of Section 127(1), 22.1 or 22.2 the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, when challenging, and blatantly contravening the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER.: 1106-04904 in the year 2011, and thereafter misleading the HRTO TRIBUNAL in contravention of Section 4.01 of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, and in contravention of Section 137 and 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
Fabricating evidence
137. Every one who, with intent to mislead, fabricates anything with intent that it shall be used as evidence in a judicial proceeding, existing or proposed, by any means other than perjury or incitement to perjury is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 125.
Offences relating to affidavits
138. Every one who
(a) signs a writing that purports to be an affidavit or statutory declaration and to have been sworn or declared before him when the writing was not so sworn or declared or when he knows that he has no authority to administer the oath or declaration,
(b) uses or offers for use any writing purporting to be an affidavit or statutory declaration that he knows was not sworn or declared, as the case may be, by the affiant or declarant or before a person authorized in that behalf, or
(c) signs as affiant or declarant a writing that purports to be an affidavit or statutory declaration and to have been sworn or declared by him, as the case may be, when the writing was not so sworn or declared,
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 126.
Perjury
131. (1) Subject to subsection (3), every one commits perjury who, with intent to mislead, makes before a person who is authorized by law to permit it to be made before him a false statement under oath or solemn affirmation, by affidavit, solemn declaration or deposition or orally, knowing that the statement is false.
ii. Effect of judicial acts
3.1 Unless otherwise provided or ordered, anything done by a court, justice or judge is effective from the moment it is done, whether or not it is reduced to writing.
2002, c. 13, s. 2.
Disobeying order of court
127. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
22. (1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offense and that other person is afterwards a party to that offense, the person who counseled is a party to that offense, notwithstanding that the offense was committed in a way different from that which was counseled.
Idem
(2) Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an offense is a party to every offense that the other commits in consequence of the counseling that the person who counselled knew or ought to have known was likely to be committed in consequence of the counselling.
Definition of “counsel”
(3) For the purposes of this Act, “counsel” includes procure, solicit or incite.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 22;
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 7.
22.1 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove negligence, an organization is a party to the offence if
(a) acting within the scope of their authority
(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that representative would have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s activities that is relevant to the offence departs — or the senior officers, collectively, depart — markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being a party to the offence.
2003, c. 21, s. 2.
22.2 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault — other than negligence — an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in part to benefit the organization, one of its senior officers
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the organization so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the offence; or
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to the offence.
2003, c. 21, s. 2.
23. (1) An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who, knowing that a person has been a party to the offence, receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of enabling that person to escape.
(2) [Repealed, 2000, c. 12, s. 92]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 23;
2000, c. 12, s. 92.
23.1 For greater certainty, sections 21 to 23 apply in respect of an accused notwithstanding the fact that the person whom the accused aids or abets, counsels or procures or receives, comforts or assists cannot be convicted of the offence.
R.S., 1985, c. 24 (2nd Supp.), s. 45.
24. (1) Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do anything for the purpose of carrying out the intention is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence whether or not it was possible under the circumstances to commit the offence.
(2) The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 24.
[240] It fellows that THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, may also be in contravention of Section 22.1 or 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, BECAUSE, at least one of its Agents(Managers) is in contravention of Section 127(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
[241] Since Jane Anderspn-Renton(Manager) and Suzanne Finn(Manager) are Agents of THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, and were violating Section 127(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA when it was in full force in accordance with Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, it fellows that there was at least one violation of Section 127(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
[242] Thus, Agents of THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, a RESPONDENT, contravene Section 127(1) of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
[243] Hence, PREMISE(11) is proven.
[244] PREMISE (12)
Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers for THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL , contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT?
[245] To show that PREMISE (12) is true, one only need to show that at least one of the above stated lawyers contravene Article 4.01 of the PERFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT.
[246] The above stated REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL lawyers gave no real submissions or offered any factual evidence. The same RESPONDENT did not even respond when the Applicant begged them to respond. They chose to commit an act of omission, and hide behind THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY with the hope of them deflecting or absorbing the allege contravention of HUMAN RIGHTS. Even now there basic response is o dismiss the matter with no insightful factual evidence even though they are the “GATE KEEPER” of all the facts and information HRTO 2012-12585-I on. But an act of omission is also a violation of Article 4.01 of the PERFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT or a silent admission of guilt.
[247] JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers for THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL , the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, should have known or ought to have known that disobeying a court order that was in full force in contravention of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, and to withhold or omit to inform the TRIBUNAL of events surrounding the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL ASSISTANCE ORDER.: 1106-04904, was a violation of Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, which asserts the felling;
“Relationship to the Administration of Justice
4.01 The Lawyer as Advocate
(2) When acting as an advocate, a lawyer shall
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal conduct,
{..}
(h) deliberately refrain from informing the tribunal of any binding authority that at the lawyer considers to be directly on point and that has not been mentioned by an opponent,
{…}
(j) knowingly permit a witness or party to be presented in a false or misleading way or to impersonate another,
(K) needlessly abuse, hector, or harass a witness,...”
[248] Therefore, JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers for THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL , should have known are ought to have known that Agents of THE REGIONAL OF PEEL actions were in contravention of Section 127(1), 22.1 or 22.2 the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, when Jane Anderspn-Renton(Manager) and Suzanne Finn(Manager) challenged, and blatantly contravened the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER.: 1106-04904 in the year 2011, and thereafter misleading the HRTO TRIBUNAL in contravention of Section 4.01 of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, and in contravention of Section 127(1) and 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
“Relationship to the Administration of Justice
4.01 The Lawyer as Advocate
(2) When acting as an advocate, a lawyer shall
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal conduct,”
Fabricating evidence
137. Every one who, with intent to mislead, fabricates anything with intent that it shall be used as evidence in a judicial proceeding, existing or proposed, by any means other than perjury or incitement to perjury is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 125.
Offences relating to affidavits
138. Every one who
(a) signs a writing that purports to be an affidavit or statutory declaration and to have been sworn or declared before him when the writing was not so sworn or declared or when he knows that he has no authority to administer the oath or declaration,
(b) uses or offers for use any writing purporting to be an affidavit or statutory declaration that he knows was not sworn or declared, as the case may be, by the affiant or declarant or before a person authorized in that behalf, or
(c) signs as affiant or declarant a writing that purports to be an affidavit or statutory declaration and to have been sworn or declared by him, as the case may be, when the writing was not so sworn or declared,
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 126.
Perjury
131. (1) Subject to subsection (3), every one commits perjury who, with intent to mislead, makes before a person who is authorized by law to permit it to be made before him a false statement under oath or solemn affirmation, by affidavit, solemn declaration or deposition or orally, knowing that the statement is false.
iii. Effect of judicial acts
3.1 Unless otherwise provided or ordered, anything done by a court, justice or judge is effective from the moment it is done, whether or not it is reduced to writing.
2002, c. 13, s. 2.
Disobeying order of court
127. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
22. (1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offense and that other person is afterwards a party to that offense, the person who counseled is a party to that offense, notwithstanding that the offense was committed in a way different from that which was counseled.
Idem
(2) Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an offense is a party to every offense that the other commits in consequence of the counseling that the person who counselled knew or ought to have known was likely to be committed in consequence of the counselling.
Definition of “counsel”
(3) For the purposes of this Act, “counsel” includes procure, solicit or incite.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 22;
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 7.
22.1 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove negligence, an organization is a party to the offence if
(a) acting within the scope of their authority
(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that representative would have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s activities that is relevant to the offence departs — or the senior officers, collectively, depart — markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being a party to the offence.
2003, c. 21, s. 2.
22.2 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault — other than negligence — an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in part to benefit the organization, one of its senior officers
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the organization so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the offence; or
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to the offence.
2003, c. 21, s. 2.
23. (1) An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who, knowing that a person has been a party to the offence, receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of enabling that person to escape.
(2) [Repealed, 2000, c. 12, s. 92]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 23;
2000, c. 12, s. 92.
23.1 For greater certainty, sections 21 to 23 apply in respect of an accused notwithstanding the fact that the person whom the accused aids or abets, counsels or procures or receives, comforts or assists cannot be convicted of the offence.
R.S., 1985, c. 24 (2nd Supp.), s. 45.
24. (1) Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do anything for the purpose of carrying out the intention is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence whether or not it was possible under the circumstances to commit the offence.
(2) The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 24.
[249] Pursuant to the above argument, the findings of PREMISE(6), PREMISE (11) and THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, that at least one of the lawyers in charge of the REGION OF PEEL’S legal business MISLEAD the TRIBUNAL byway of an act of omission.
[250] Therefore, JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers for THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL , MISLEAD the TRIBUNAL byway of an act of omission.
[251] Thus, JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers for THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL , contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT.
[252] Hence, PREMISE (12) is proven.
[253] PREMISE (13)
Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene Rule A 7.1 of the HRTO RULES?
[254] Since, the finding of PREMISE(13) is true, it fellows that it seems like;
JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL tried to influence the course of justice.
[255] THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL acting in conjunction with it’s business subordinate THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene or assisted in contravening Section 322(1), 334, 380(1), 22.1, or 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA byway of not returning the $10.00 CANADA POST MONEY ORDER(Serial No.: 11 466 978 57 ), and the $5.00 personal check payment for services not rendered or responded to, after the Applicant exercised his “colour of right” over the same quantum of money on many occasion, and the INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER: 1106-04904 was in full force in accordance with Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE of CANADA, while it would seem that both the RESPONDENTS were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
Theft
322. (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent
(a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it, of the thing or of his property or interest in it;
(b) to pledge it or deposit it as security;
(c) to part with it under a condition with respect to its return that the person who parts with it may be unable to perform; or
(d) to deal with it in such a manner that it cannot be restored in the condition in which it was at the time it was taken or converted.
Punishment for theft
334. Except where otherwise provided by law, every one who commits theft
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, where the property stolen is a testamentary instrument or the value of what is stolen exceeds five thousand dollars; or
(b) is guilty
(i) of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or
(ii) of an offence punishable on summary conviction,
where the value of what is stolen does not exceed five thousand dollars.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 334;
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 43;
1994, c. 44, s. 20
380. (1) Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security or any service,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars; or
(b) is guilty
(i) of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or
(ii) of an offence punishable on summary conviction,
where the value of the subject-matter of the offence does not exceed five thousand dollars.
[256] Blair Maccredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his last RESPONSE or SUBMISSIONS, admitted to Mr. Harry Boom discharging or evicting Wayne Ferron(Applicant) without written articulated notice in his submissions, without reasonable notice, and for the unlawful justification, of no ONTARIO WORKS FINANCIAL SUPPORT, which blatantly contradicts, and unlawfully disobeyed the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER (FILE.: 1106-04904) , that was in full force(Section 3.1 C.C.C.) at the time in question, in contravention Section 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
PLEASE SEE “SHORT ESSENTIAL FACTS” , a sub heading in this FACTUM.
[257] John Gescher (john.gescher@peelregion.ca), the original lawyer for the REGION MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, failed to respond or reply to the Application(2012-12585-I), and was infact actively blocking or filtering the Applicant’s HRTO 2012-12585-I, LEGAL services byway of email, and causing them to be returned, while it would seem he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[258] The AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE FERRON AND EXHIBIT HOME_A…(2012-12585-I ET AL) AND form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544, was filed on or about November 12, 2014.
John Gescher, lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, refused and rejected the lawful and HRTO directed email legal service in the following way;
“ john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.
”
[259] The AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE FERRON AND EXHIBIT HOME_A…(2012-12585-I ET AL) AND CHANGE OF ADDRESS, was filed on or about December 12, 2014.
John Gescher, lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, refused and rejected the lawful and HRTO directed email legal service in the following way;
“Subject: RE: change of address, 2012-12585-I/2013-HRTO 1544
From: Wayne Ferron <leegalpoet@gmail.com>
To: hrto.registrar@ontario.ca, john.gescher@peelregion.ca,
blair.mccreadie@dentons.com, registry-greffe@scc-csc.ca,
LawCommission@lco-cdo.org, publicenquiries@ccla.org, mail@ccla.org
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=001a11c32e342cd646050a0a9bdb
Dear recipients,
here is a change of address.
My beloved daughter at Seneca College has until December 1, 2014 to pay residence fees; I cannot help her! Your unreasonable delay in 2012-12585-I/2013-HRTO 1544 has caused or contributed to this problem. In short your delay has put my childrens and my life, security, and pursuit of happiness in jeopardy.
Thank You
{…}
Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.”
[260] The RECQUISITION TO PEEL-HRTO-2012-12585-I, AND CHANGE OF ADDRESS, amenment-application-2013 HRTO 1544, Preview attachment good-SCC-AFFIDAVIT-EXHIBIT HOME_A-2013 HRTO, form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544, and AMENDED-2012-12585-I-Housing - Form 1 and 1B_0 (1) was filed on or about December 12, 2014.
John Gescher, lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, refused and rejected the lawful and HRTO directed email legal service in the following way;
“Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected.”
[261] The RECQUISITION TO PEEL-HRTO-2012-12585-I, amenment-application-2013 HRTO 1544, AFFIDAVIT-EXHIBIT HOME_A-2013 HRTO, and form 1-amenment-2013 hrto 1544, was filed on or about December 23, 2014.
John Gescher, lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, refused and rejected the lawful and HRTO directed email legal service in the following way;
“
Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently:
john.gescher@peelregion.ca
Technical details of permanent failure:
Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the server for the recipient domain peelregion.ca by mx2.peelregion.ca. [198.96.114.162].
The error that the other server returned was:
550 #5.1.0 Address rejected..”
PLEASE SEE PARA[116] TO PARA[119] IN THIS FACTUM.
[262] In accordance with the above argument and the finding of PREMISE(12), JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers for THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL , caused HRTO RULES to be violated byway of trying to defeat the course of justice.
[263] Pursuant to HRTO RULE A7.1;
RULE A7.1 All persons participating in proceedings before or communicating with the tribunal must act in good faith and in a manner that is courteous and respectful of the tribunal and other participants in the proceeding.
[264] Thus, JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY, lawyers THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene of Rule A 7.1 of the HRTO RULES.
[265] Hence, PREMISE (13) is proven.
[266] PREMISE (14)
Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene Section 8. of the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE?
[267] In accordance with the findings of PREMISE (13), it fellows that JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, violated the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE.
[268] Thus, JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene Section 8. of the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE.
[269] Hence, PREMISE (14) is proven.
[270] PREMISE (15)
Did JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL
, contravene Section 139 or SECTION 22.1 or Section 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA?
[271] It fellows from the findings of, PREMISE (11), PREMISE (12), PREMISE (13), and PREMISE (14) that JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL
, violated Section 139 or SECTION 22.1 or Section 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
Obstructing justice
139. (1) Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice in a judicial proceeding,
(2) Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner other than a manner described in subsection (1) to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 127;
R.S., c. 2(2nd Supp.), s. 3;
1972, c. 13, s. 8.
Disobeying order of court
127. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
22. (1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offense and that other person is afterwards a party to that offense, the person who counseled is a party to that offense, notwithstanding that the offense was committed in a way different from that which was counseled.
Idem
(2) Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an offense is a party to every offense that the other commits in consequence of the counseling that the person who counselled knew or ought to have known was likely to be committed in consequence of the counselling.
Definition of “counsel”
(3) For the purposes of this Act, “counsel” includes procure, solicit or incite.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 22;
R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 7.
22.1 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove negligence, an organization is a party to the offence if
(a) acting within the scope of their authority
(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that representative would have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s activities that is relevant to the offence departs — or the senior officers, collectively, depart — markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being a party to the offence.
2003, c. 21, s. 2.
22.2 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault — other than negligence — an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in part to benefit the organization, one of its senior officers
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the organization so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the offence; or
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to the offence.
2003, c. 21, s. 2.
23. (1) An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who, knowing that a person has been a party to the offence, receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of enabling that person to escape.
(2) [Repealed, 2000, c. 12, s. 92]
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 23;
2000, c. 12, s. 92.
23.1 For greater certainty, sections 21 to 23 apply in respect of an accused notwithstanding the fact that the person whom the accused aids or abets, counsels or procures or receives, comforts or assists cannot be convicted of the offence.
R.S., 1985, c. 24 (2nd Supp.), s. 45.
24. (1) Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do anything for the purpose of carrying out the intention is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence whether or not it was possible under the circumstances to commit the offence.
(2) The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law.
R.S., c. C-34, s. 24.
[272] Thus, JOHN H. GESCHER or ANN C. DINNERT or TANYA GALLOWAY or THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, contravene Section 139 or SECTION 22.1 or Section 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
[273] Hence, PREMISE (15) is proven.
[274] PREMISE (16)
Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT?
PLEASE SEE “SHORT ESSENTIAL FACTS”, A SUB HEADING IN THIS FACTUM STARTING ON PAGE 3.
PLEASE SEE THE AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600 PARA[388] TO PARA[482], BOTH RESPONDENTS SUMMATIONS, APPENDIX A IN THIS FACTUM.
TAKE NOTICE: That Mr. Blessing Anyanwu already admitted in a email to Blair McCreadie, to denying the Applicant goods and services because of his legal proceeding or proceedings. I WOULD LIKE FOR THAT EMAIL TO BE DISCLOSED, SINCE THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY HAS ALREADY REFERED TO IT AS EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MATTER.
[275] It fellows from the findings of, PREMISE (1), PREMISE (2), PREMISE (3), PREMISE (4), PREMISE (5), PREMISE (6), PREMISE (7), PREMISE (8), PREMISE (9), PREMISE (10), and PREMISE (11) that Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, violated Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, which states;
“Relationship to the Administration of Justice
4.01 The Lawyer as Advocate
(2) When acting as an advocate, a lawyer shall
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal conduct,
(f) knowingly misstate the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the substance of an argument, or the provisions of a statue or like authority,
(g) knowingly assert as true a fact when its truth cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence or as a matter of which notice may be taken by the tribunal,
(h) deliberately refrain from informing the tribunal of any binding authority that at the lawyer considers to be directly on point and that has not been mentioned by an opponent,
(I) dissuade a witness from giving evidence or advise a witness to be absent,
(j) knowingly permit a witness or party to be presented in a false or misleading way or to impersonate another,
(K) needlessly abuse, hector, or harass a witness,...”
[276] Thus, Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT.
[277] Hence, PREMISE (16) is proven.
[278] PREMISE (17)
Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene of Rule A 7.1 of the HRTO RULES?
[279] In accordance with the findings of PREMISE (16), it fellows that Blair McCreadie, caused the contravention of HRTO Rule A 7.1, which asserts;
RULE A7.1 All persons participating in proceedings before or communicating with the tribunal must act in good faith and in a manner that is courteous and respectful of the tribunal and other participants in the proceeding.
[280] Thus, Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene of Rule A 7.1 of the HRTO RULES?
[281] Hence, PREMISE (17)
[282] PREMISE (18)
Did Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene Section 8. of theHUMAN RIGHTS CODE?
PLEASE SEE THE PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT (4.01)
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “SUMMERY OF FACTS”
[283] It fellows from the findings of, PREMISE (1), PREMISE (2), PREMISE (3), PREMISE (4), PREMISE (5), PREMISE (6), PREMISE (7), PREMISE (8), PREMISE (9), PREMISE (10), PREMISE (11), PREMISE (16) and PREMISE (17) that Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, violated Section 8 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, which states;
Reprisals
8. Every person has a right to claim and enforce his or her rights under this Act, to institute and participate in proceedings under this Act and to refuse to infringe a right of another person under this Act, without reprisal or threat of reprisal for so doing. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 8.
Infringement prohibited
9. No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under this Part. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 9.
PLEASE STOP TRYING TO TAKE MY RIGHT AWAY, ALL I WANT IS DUE PROCESS!!!
[284] Thus, Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY and a RESPONDENT, contravene Section 8. of the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE.
[285] Hence, PREMISE (18) is proven.
[286] PREMISE (19)
Did the RESPONDENTS, act in “GOOD FATE!”?
PLEASE SEE THE PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT (4.01)
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “SUMMERY OF FACTS” IN THIS FACTUM
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “SHORT ESSENTIAL FACTS” IN THIS FACTUM
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “APPENDIX A” IN THIS FACTUM
[287] It fellows from the findings of, PREMISE (1), PREMISE (2), PREMISE (3), PREMISE (4), PREMISE (5), PREMISE (6), PREMISE (7), PREMISE (8), PREMISE (9), PREMISE (10), PREMISE (11), PREMISE (16) and PREMISE (17) that there has been a violation of PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS.
[288] Therefore negative or no, the RESPONDENTS, did not act in “GOOD FATE!”.
[289] Thus, the negation of the PREMISE (19) is proven true.
[290] PREMISE (20)
Has the process for HRTO 2012-12585-I been fair?
PLEASE SEE THE PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT (4.01)
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “SUMMERY OF FACTS” IN THIS FACTUM
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “SHORT ESSENTIAL FACTS” IN THIS FACTUM
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “APPENDIX A” IN THIS FACTUM
[291] It fellows from the findings of PREMISE (16) and PREMISE (17) that the RESPONDENTS are in violation of HRTO RULE A7.1.
[292] It fellows from the findings of PREMISE (8) and PREMISE (9) that the RESPONDENTS has caused a violation of PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
[293] Thus, the process for HRTO 2012-12585-I is not fair?.
[294] PREMISE (21)
Did the RESPONDENTS violate legislation?
PLEASE SEE THE PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT (4.01)
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “SUMMERY OF FACTS” IN THIS FACTUM
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “SHORT ESSENTIAL FACTS” IN THIS FACTUM
PLEASE SEE THE SUB HEADING “APPENDIX A” IN THIS FACTUM
[295] It fellows from the findings of PREMISE (1) to PREMISE (20), that the RESPONDENTS are in violation of legislation.
[296] Pursuant to Singh v. Rainbow Circle Co-operative Inc.;
“[15] In this case, there is no question that the applicant failed to file a request to reactivate the Application within the time limit specified in Rule 14.4. Accordingly, the issue to be determined is whether the Tribunal ought to exercise its discretion under the Rules to extend the applicable time limit or to waive the strict application of the Rule, so as to allow the applicant to request reactivation of the Application in March 2014.
[16] In deciding whether it would be fair, just and expeditious to extend the time limit in this case, I must consider both the time limit in Rule 14.4 in the context of the overall scheme of the Code and Rules, as well as the reasons for the applicant’s request to extend it. The 60-day limit represents an attempt by the Tribunal to incorporate the values of fairness, justice and expeditiousness into this step of the proceedings and to balance those factors by acknowledging that parties will need a reasonable, but finite, amount of time to make a decision about reactivation. A request to extend the timeline must, therefore, be supported by some explanation. See Hudson v. Kingston (City),2013 HRTO 2006 (CanLII).
[17] In my view, the applicant has provided some explanation for her delay. She was obtaining medical treatment from September 2013 to March 2014. She was hospitalized during the 60-day period following the Divisional Court decision on September 18, 2013, from October 28 to November 5, 2013. It was not until the Tribunal’s request for a status report on February 11, 2014 that the respondents requested a dismissal of the Application on February 19, 2014 for the applicant’s failure to request reactivation within the 60-day time period. In these circumstances, I exercise my discretion to waive strict compliance with the 60-day time period and reactivate the Application.
order
[18] The Application is reactivated.
[19] The respondents are directed to advise the Tribunal whether they are willing to proceed to mediation by April 25, 2014.
Dated at Toronto, this 11th day of April, 2014.”
(FAIRNESS-RULE A3.1: Singh v. Rainbow Circle Co-operative Inc., 2014 HRTO 528)
[297] Pursuant to Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board;
“[1] Section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), gives this Tribunal the authority to dismiss all or part of an application where the substance of the application has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding. In this Interim Decision, we re-examine this Tribunal’s approach to the interpretation and application of s. 45.1 when an applicant previously filed a public complaint about the conduct of a police officer under the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, as amended (the “PSA”).
[2] In Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, the Supreme Court held in an analogous situation, applying the common law doctrine of issue estoppel, that it would be unfair to preclude a public complainant from pursuing a subsequent civil claim because of the findings in the Ontario police officer discipline process. In our view, the appropriate interpretation of s. 45.1 does not permit the dismissal of a human rights application when this would lead to unfairness, given the nature of the other process and the difference in the issues at stake in that process. In light of the guidance of the Court about the unfairness that would result from dismissing a human rights application based on previous police disciplinary proceedings, these Applications must proceed.”
(PARA[1] TO [2], Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board 2013hrto1298-1)
[298] Pursuant to Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board;
“[191] The fact that there has been no disciplinary hearing in these cases also raises an aspect of fairness at issue in this case that was not at issue in Penner. Because in these cases there has been no disciplinary hearing, the effect of a dismissal by this Tribunal at this stage would be that applications alleging a breach of the Code would get no hearing at all. A dismissal without a hearing by this Tribunal on the basis solely of a decision made pursuant to a “gatekeeping” function (see Wall v. Independent Police Review Director, 2013 ONSC 3312, at para. 8) would be manifestly at odds with the intentions of the Legislature in creating the “direct access” system under the Code, as well as obviously unfair.
[192] I agree with my colleagues that s. 45.1 cannot and should not be interpreted to bar a Code application where do to so would result in an affront to basic principles of fairness. In addition, it appears to me that the use of the term “appropriately” in s. 45.1 of the Code calls for an assessment of the conclusion (result and remedy) in the other proceeding against the applicable provisions of the Code, and in light of the legislative intent behind the Code. In the circumstances of these cases, the substance of the Applications cannot be found to have been “appropriately dealt with”.
DISPOSITION
[193] In respect of all three Applications before us, I would exercise my discretion under s. 45.1 of the Code, for all of the reasons noted above, to refuse the respondents’ Requests to Dismiss these Applications, and to allow them to proceed in the Tribunal’s process. I agree with the terms of the Order as set out in the Decision of my colleagues.
(PARA[191] TO [193], Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board 2013hrto1298-1)
[299] PREMISE (22)
“[6] The issues to be addressed at the hearing are as follows:
a. Should the Tribunal waive the requirement in Rule 14.4 that a request to reactivate a deferred Application be filed no later than 60 days after the other proceeding has concluded?
b. Whether the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the substance of it has been appropriately dealt with in another legal proceeding, in this case the civil suit(s) commenced by the applicant?”
[300] PREMISE (22) a.
“[6] The issues to be addressed at the hearing are as follows:
a. Should the Tribunal waive the requirement in Rule 14.4 that a request to reactivate a deferred Application be filed no later than 60 days after the other proceeding has concluded?”
[301] First and foremost it should be clear that the RESPONDENTS requested the delay or deferring of HRTO 2012-12585-I.
[302] SECONDLY, if a reason is need why the Applicant did not show due diligence in activating the matter on time for FINAL COURT ORDER CV 12-71600, which the originating court did not disclose and refuse to disclose when the Applicant requested disclosure, and the RESPONDENTS failed to serve and file FINAL COURT ORDER CV 12-71600, the most essential piece of evidence the RESPONDENTS are relying on for the matter to be dismissed.
[303] Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, falsely accused the Applicant (Wayne Ferron) of “MISREPRESENTION to the TRIBUNAL” in contravention of Article 4.01 of the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, without the disclosure of the FINAL ORDER CV 12-71600 to prove there allegations, even after being formally requested to do so by the Applicant; Mr. Blair MacCredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, while it would seem that he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[304] NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed. I have requested a copy if one exist, but so far there is no proof of the existence of one.
[305] HRTO 2012-12585-I was DEFERED or DELAYED on 13 September 2013, at the request of the RESPONDENTS with the added benefit of not giving a full response, THE REGION OF PEEL GAVE4 NO RESPONSE. A letter from the HRTO-REGISTRA, states as fellows;
“
HRTO FILE: 2012-12585-I
|
Re: Wayne Ferron v. The Regional Municipality of Peel and the Governing Council of Salvation Army in Canada
Subject: DEFFERRED APPLICATION – Advise of Status
On September 13, 2013 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) issued Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1544 deferring this Application pending the completion of a civil matter, pursuant to Rule 14 of its Rules of Procedure.
{…}
Sincerely,
Richard Hennessy
Registrar
cc. John Gescher (via e-mail)
Blair McCreadie”
[306] Again, NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed as far as the Applicant know. The Applicant have requested a copy, if one exist, but so far there is no proof of the existence of one. So naturally the Applicant requested of the TRIBUNAL, within the spirit of fairness and equity to have a copy disclose.
RULE 14
DEFERRAL OF AN APPLICATION BY THE TRIBUNAL
14.1 The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative, at the request of an Applicant under Rule 7, or at the request of any party.
****14.2 Where the Tribunal intends to defer consideration of an Application under Rule 14.1, it will first give the parties,
any identified trade union or occupational or
professional organization and any identified affected persons, notice of its intention to consider deferral of the Application and an opportunity to make submissions.
14.3 Where a party wishes the Tribunal to proceed with an Application which has been deferred the request must be made in accordance with Rule 19.
***14.4 Where an Application was deferred pending the outcome of another legal proceeding, a request to proceed under Rule 14.3 must be filed no later than 60 days after the conclusion of the other proceeding, must set out the date the other
legal proceeding concluded and include a copy of the decision or order in the other proceeding, if any.
14.5 The Tribunal may, on its own motion, require a deferred Application to proceed in appropriate circumstances.
[307] Pursuant to the Applicant’s AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I;
“[0] …to make an order directing HRTO-REGISTRAR to disclose "NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER(2012-12585-i)", all of the RESPONDENTS LETTERS to HRTO-REGISTRAR, and HRTO written ruling on decision to DELAY OR DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I at the request of the RESPONDENT.”
[308] Pursuant to the Honorable Adjudicator David Muir, June 15, 2015 INTERIM DECISION;
“THE Request is denied. The Tribunal Rule 23 provides as follows:...”
[309] It is clear that the honourable Adjudicator rejected the Applicant’s AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I, and made the following judgment in his INTERIM DECISION at PARA[5] AND PARA[6];
“[5] On May 21, 2015 the applicant FILED a REQUEST for Interim Remedy (Form 16). It appears that the Request was delivered to the respondents and a number of other individuals but the Tribunal advised the respondents unless directed to do so. Subsequently the applicant filed a number of “amended” Requests but it is not how these are in substance any different than the one filed on May 21, 2015.
[310] The Request is denied…”
[311] The Applicant’s main and most import request from the AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I are;
“[0] to make an order directing HRTO-REGISTRAR to disclose "NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER(2012-12585-i)", all of the RESPONDENTS LETTERS to HRTO-REGISTRAR, and HRTO written ruling on decision to DELAY OR DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I at the request of the RESPONDENT.
Disclosure of information to Commission
38. Despite anything in the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, at the request of the Commission, the Tribunal shall disclose to the Commission copies of applications and responses filed with the Tribunal and may disclose to the Commission other documents in its custody or in its control. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
RULE 7.2
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210
Repealed
34 [Repealed 2002-62-17.]
“Deferral
[2] The Application noted a pending grievance. On March 1, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer under Rule 14.2 of its Rules of Procedure, as it appears that the applicant had filed a grievance dealing with the subject-matter of the Application. The applicant’s Union (United Steelworkers Local 7135) was given notice of the application as an affected organization. The parties and the Union were invited to make written submissions on why the Application should, or should not be deferred.
{…}
[4] The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Code s.45; Rule 14.1). he initial consideration for the Tribunal in deciding whether or not to defer consideration of an Application is whether the same facts and issues are being raised before another decision-maker with the authority to deal with issues arising under the Code”
(Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.)
RULE 7
APPLICATION WITH REQUEST TO DEFER CONSIDERATION
7.1. An Applicant may file an Application under Rule 6.1 and, at the same time, ask the Tribunal to defer consideration of the Application in accordance with Rule 14 if there are other legal proceedings dealing with the subject matter of the Application.
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
7.4. The Tribunal will not defer consideration of an Application without first giving all the parties, and any affected persons or organizations identified in the Application or Response, an opportunity to make submissions on the request for deferral.
[312] Pursuant to Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106;
Inspection of files
26. (1) Where the necessary facilities are available, any person may, with supervision and without interfering with the business of the Court, inspect a Court file or annex
Removal of documents from file
(2) Nothing shall be removed from a Court file or annex except
(a) under an order of the Court;
(b) by an officer of the Registry acting in the course of his or her duties; or
(c) in accordance with rule 26.1.
Removal of files
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, no Court file or annex to a Court file shall be removed from the Registry by any person other than
(a) a judge, prothonotary or referee; or
(b) an officer of the Registry acting in the course of his or her duties.
SOR/2002-417, s. 3.
Definition
26.1 (1) In this rule, “appeal” includes an appeal of an order of a prothonotary, an application for leave to appeal and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Removal of exhibits from file
(2) Subject to subsection (4), exhibits put into evidence shall remain in the Court file either
(a) until the time for an appeal has expired, if no appeal has been taken, or
(b) until the appeal is disposed of, if an appeal has been taken.
SOR/2002-417, s. 4.
[313] Pursuant to the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106;
Reasons
393. The Court may deliver reasons for judgment
(a) orally from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing of a proceeding; or
(b) after having reserved judgment at the conclusion of a hearing, by depositing in the Registry written reasons, signed by the judge or prothonotary who delivered them.
Drafting of order
394. (1) Where the Court gives reasons, it may direct one of the parties to prepare for endorsement a draft order to implement the Court's conclusion, approved as to form and content by the other parties or, where the parties cannot agree on the form and content of the order, to bring a motion for judgment in accordance with rule 369.
Pronouncement of judgment
(2) On the return of a motion under subsection (1), the Court shall settle the terms of and pronounce the judgment, which shall be endorsed in writing and signed by the presiding judge or prothonotary.
Copies to be sent
395. (1) Subject to subsection 36(3), the Administrator shall send without delay a copy of every order made and of any reasons given other than in open court to all parties
(a) by registered mail;
(b) by electronic means, including facsimile and electronic mail; or
(c) by any other means, as directed by the Chief Justice, likely to bring the order and any reasons to the attention of the party.
Proof of receipt
(2) If an order and any reasons are transmitted by electronic means, the Administrator shall confirm receipt by the party and place proof of that receipt on the Court file.
SOR/2010-177, s. 6.
[314] Pursuant to RULE 59.02 of RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE;
ENDORSEMENT BY JUDGE OR OFFICER
59.02 (1) An endorsement of every order shall be made on the appeal book and compendium, record, notice of motion or notice of application by the court, judge or officer making it, unless the circumstances make it impractical to do so. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.02 (1); O. Reg. 19/03, s. 10.
(2) Where written reasons are delivered,
(a) in an appellate court, an endorsement is not required;
(b) in any other court, the endorsement may consist of a reference to the reasons,
and a copy of the reasons shall be filed in the court file. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.02 (2).
[315] Pursuant to RULE 59.03 of the RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE;
PREPARATION AND FORM OF ORDER
Preparation of Draft Formal Order
59.03 (1) Any party affected by an order may prepare a draft of the formal order and send it to all other parties represented at the hearing for approval of its form. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.03 (1);
[316] Lawyers are required by the RULE 4.01(2)(e) on page 53 and page 54 of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT which directs as follows;
“Relationship to the Administration of Justice
4.01 The Lawyer as Advocate
(2) When acting as an advocate, a lawyer shall
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal conduct...”
[317] Pursuant to VIDÉOTRON LTÉE et al. and NESTAR COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al., 2003 FCA 56;
“[6] The authorities are clear that where an order or decision is not pronounced or delivered in public, the order or decision is not made until such time as the order or decision is entered by the
Registry or when the parties are notified of the decision.
{...}
Strong J., in concurring reasons, was also of the view that the time to appeal could not begin to run until the judgment had been entered. At page 218, he made the following remarks:
I do not recognize the handing by the judge to the registrar, not in open court but in his office or perhaps in the street, as a "pronouncing of a decision" within the terms of rule 269.”
[318] Pursuant to NIKE CANADA LTD. and NIKE INTERNATIONAL LTD. - and - JANE DOE and JOHN DOE et al., T-1636-99 on page 4;
“ORDER
UPON PLAINTIFFS" EX PARTE MOTION made on September 27, 1999, for
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Commencement and Term of Order
1. The terms of this Order shall become effective against each Defendant only from the commencement of the day on which it is served on that defendant and shall remain in effect for fourteen days thereafter, unless otherwise ordered by the Court...”
[319] The Applicant’s served and filed AFFIDAVIT of Wayne FERRON (complainant)and EXHIBIT HOME_A and EXHIBIT HOME_A. It document some of the reasons why I have been unable to deal with the HRTO, civil matter, and SUPREME COURT MATTERS.
PLEASE SEE AFFIDAVIT of Wayne FERRON (complainant)and EXHIBIT HOME_A and EXHIBIT HOME_A.
[320] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[8]) in his submission matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following while jumping from the year 2011(Mr. Harry Boom and Civil matter CV 12-2012-i), to the HRTO matter 2012-12585-I(BLESSING ANYANWU and denial of homeless services), without making any factual statement about the cause of Action of the HUMANRIGHTS MATTER(2012-12585-I), except for;
“On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application.”
[321] TAKE NOTICE: Causes of Actions and statements of facts ends in July 2012 in the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), and AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600),
While HRTO 2012-12585-I Cause of Action starts on September 1, 2012, below is to Blair McCreadie assertions;
“1. The Governing Council of the Salvation Army in Canada(“The Salvation Army”) respectfully requests that the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the “Tribunal”) deny the Applicant’s request to re-activate his Application and issue a Decision to dismiss the Application…
b) In any event, the final decision in the civil action that is “inter-related” to this Application has already appropriately dealt with the merits of this Application and, therefore, the Tribunal should immediately dismiss the Application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code (Ontario) (the “Code”). It would be an abuse of this Tribunal’s process to permit the Applicant to re-activate his Application.
{…}
THIS APPLICATION AND THE “INTER-RELATED” CIVIL ACTION
5. Prior to commencing this Application, the Applicant commenced a civil action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, bearing Court File No. CV-12-0716-00 (the “Action”)…Amended Statement of Claim, issued on August 21, 2012 include, inter alia, that the Applicant was asked to leave the Cawthra Road Shelter (the “Shelter”) on or about September 12, 2011 in breach of his human rights.
{…}
7. The Salvation Army served a Statement of Defence in response to the Action on November 14, 2012. The Salvation Army defended against the Applicant’s claim in the Action on the basis that the Amended Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
9. On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application…”
PLEASE SEE HRTO 2012-12585-I FORM 1 AND RELATED MATERIAL FILED WITH THE HRTO-REGISTRA to confirm that the CAUSE OF ACTION for HRTO 2012-12585-I, starts on SEPTEMBER 1, 2012, the present proceeding was filed immediately after the CAUSE OF ACTION.
TAKE NOTICE: By the RESPONDENT own assertion, “Amended Statement of Claim, issued on August 21, 2012.”
[322] The Respondents cleverly hide the truth of the matter to mislead the TRIBUNAL and obtain there requested delay or deferring of HRTO 2012-12585-I.
[323] Pursuant to the Applicant’s STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600;
“ORDERED TO VACATE PEEL REGIONAL SHELTER:
[446] The Plaintiff allege that, on Tuesday the 12th of September 2011, he waited all
morning and all afternoon for his 1:00 P.M. appointment with Ontario-Works and the
SALVATION ARMY jointed co-counselors. The Ontario-Works councilor's name, he still
does-not know, and the Salvation Armyʼs counselor was Mr. Harry Boom, whom made
a determination or ruling in violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, in regards to equal services or uniformity in services among all Canadians.
[447] The Plaintiff allege that, even though he informed Mr. Harry Boom of the violation
of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT. Contrastly, no one informed the Applicant
about establishing housing, operation budget, if he had secured accommodation or had
the common decency to give him written notification and reasonable time to vacate the
shelter; the Plaintiff was simple thrown out or an oral demand was made for him to
vacate the shelter the next day in no uncertain terms, on more than one occasion
without reasonable notification to the Applicant/tenant.
[448] The Plaintiff allege that, on Tuesday the 12th of September 2011, at or about 3:30 P.M. the ONTARIO-WORKS and THE SALVATION ARMY made a determination or ruling in violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, in regards to equal services or uniformity in services among all Canadians.
[449] The Plaintiff further allege that, the Salvation Army and Ontario-Works made a determination vicariously through Mr. Harry Boom(case worker), in violation of Article 2. Of the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT of CIVIL an POLITICAL RIGHTS. Canada is a signatory to the International Convention of the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Article 2 of the International Convention mandates that all state parties;
“undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and with out delay a
policy of elimination racial discrimination in all its forms...”
The aforementioned is a promise by the signature states made to the international
community and its citizens to enforce and protect HUMAN RIGHS and human dignity.”
PLEASE SEE AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600, PARA[388] to PARA[482] FOR THE COMPLETE CAUSE OF ACTION OR CLAIM CONCERNING THE REGION OF PEEL AND ITS HOMELESS SHELTER.
[324] Pursuant to the Applicant in his FACTUM, under the sub title of OVERVIEW;
“APPLICANT ACCOUNT OF DENIAL OF GOOD AND SERVICES
[13] On September 1, 2012 I became homeless.
[14] On September 1, 2012 I went to 2500 Cawthra Rd in the Region of Peel, in the City of Mississauga at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, for help AT ABOUT 11:00 P.M..
[15] On September 1, 2012 at about 11:00 P.M., it was boldly asserted to my person in clear and distinct language that I was “restricted” and to “leave” the premises, without the process of an intake assessment.
{…}
[21] On September 5, 2012 at about 11:00 a.m., at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, I was advised in clear direct language by the Manager( The director, Mr. Blessings) that I (Wayne Ferron) was restricted from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER for a pending action against the REGION for HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION of Section 1. Of the Act.
[22] I informed him that I was only suing for $1.00 and for the good of the public; Furthermore, the legal action was on principal of improving the fair treatment of homeless individuals, or maybe I was the only person being discriminated against?
[23] I was promptly shown the door even though I advise the 3 Managers present with a qualification of uncertainty that the action being taken against my person may not be legal, for you cannot hold one's legal rights hostage, to discriminate against a person within the context of equal, and fair services to all Canadians. “
PLEASE SEE OVERVIEW FROM APPLICANT’S FACTUM, STARTING AT PARA[8] TO PARA[34] FOR APPLICANT’S ACCOUNT OF CAUSE OF ACTION
PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT
[325] Pursuant to EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT , and its description;
“EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT
THE REGION OF PEEL POLICE SERVICES and WILLIAM OSLO
HEALTH SYSTEM affected a 14 DAY FALSE IMPRISOMENT of my
person without access to a lawyer or a fair impartial hearing to justify
my detention after being assaulted a number of times by different
Police Officers, and trying to file an information or charges against
one of the said Police Officers ( Pekeski with bage# 2261).
TAKE NOTICE: Dr. Handler saw me for less than 1 minute!!
Dr. Handler’s FORM 42 articulates; “This is to inform you that Dr. Jeffry Handler
examined you on 26/08/2011 and has made an application for you to have a
psychiatric assessment.
The physician has certi"ed that...he has reasonable cause to believe that you
have:
behaved or behaving violently towards another person or have caused or are
causing another person to fear bodily harm from you; or
shown or are showing a lack of competence to care for yourself and that you are
suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in:
serious bodily harm to yourself;
serious bodily harm to another person; or
serious physical impairment of you....”
____________________________________________________________
August 26, 2011 at about 5:00 a.m.
Dr. Handler’s FORM 42
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
(Pursuant to S. 38.1, S. 15 and”
[326] In accordance with the findings of PREMISE(2), PREMISE(3), PREMISE(4), AMMENDED-AMMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600, EXHIBIT HOME_A-FALSE IMPRISOMENT, RULE 7.2, Section 34(11) of the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, and CASE LAW(Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.), it fellows that the two legal proceedings (CV 12-71600 and HRTO 2012-212585-I) in question are different, because the time period of the cause of actions are different, and the cause of action themselves are independent, distinct, and different; different people, different time, different events, different facts, same organizations, same location, similar human rights violations.
RULE 7.2
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210
Repealed
34 [Repealed 2002-62-17.]
“Deferral
[2] The Application noted a pending grievance. On March 1, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer under Rule 14.2 of its Rules of Procedure, as it appears that the applicant had filed a grievance dealing with the subject-matter of the Application. The applicant’s Union (United Steelworkers Local 7135) was given notice of the application as an affected organization. The parties and the Union were invited to make written submissions on why the Application should, or should not be deferred.
{…}
[4] The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Code s.45; Rule 14.1). he initial consideration for the Tribunal in deciding whether or not to defer consideration of an Application is whether the same facts and issues are being raised before another decision-maker with the authority to deal with issues arising under the Code”
(Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.)
[327] In accordance with the above argument;
“same facts and issues are being raised before another decision-maker”,
but the facts are different, the cause of action is different, and the time period is different, therefore the HRTO 2012-12585-i does not conform to RULE 14.1 for deferral or delay.
The HRTO 2012-12585-i does not conform to RULE 14.1 for deferral or delay.
[328] There is no , NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER, as is required by the HRTO RULES
14.2 Where the Tribunal intends to defer consideration of an Application under Rule 14.1, it will first give the parties,
any identified trade union or occupational or
professional organization and any identified affected persons, notice of its intention to consider deferral of the Application and an opportunity to make submissions
[329] The Section 34. in the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, used to determine a matter for deferral is under appeal;
RULE 7.2
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210
Repealed
34 [Repealed 2002-62-17.]
[330] As it stand, there is no FINAL ORDER FOR CV 2012-12585-I, or none has been served and filed, even though the Applicant has relentlessly search and requested the elusive CV 2012-12585-I FINAL ORDER issued by the original court, but failed and refused to disclose to the Applicant.
[331] In accordance with the federal court rules, excepted judicial practice or policy, and case law, a FINAL COURT ORDER would come into effect upon the moment the party is served the same court order. The final order for CV 12-71600 (Applicant’s Civil Matter.), has not been served, so it is impossible to start counting the days for REACTIVATION OF HRTO 2012-12585-I.
[332] For the above reasons, it is impossible to apply PREMISE (22) a. to HRTO 2012-12585-I matter, because the assumptions which guarantee a fair and equitable process are violated and make it impossible for a just resolution of the matter.
[333] Thus, with the given conditions stated above and in PREMISE(1) TO PREMISE(21) it is impossible to make a determination for the following statement;
“[6] The issues to be addressed at the hearing are as follows:
a. Should the Tribunal waive the requirement in Rule 14.4 that a request to reactivate a deferred Application be filed no later than 60 days after the other proceeding has concluded?”
[334] Hence, is
PREMISE (22) a. is indeterminate.
[335] PREMISE (22) b.
“b. Whether the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the substance of it has been appropriately dealt with in another legal proceeding, in this case the civil suit(s) commenced by the applicant?”
[336] The Applicant’s served and filed AFFIDAVIT of Wayne FERRON (complainant)and EXHIBIT HOME_A and EXHIBIT HOME_A. It document some of the reasons why I have been unable to deal with the HRTO, civil matter, and SUPREME COURT MATTERS.
[337] NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed. I have requested a copy if one exist, but so far there is no proof of the existence of one.
[338] HRTO 2012-12585-I was DEFERED or DELAYED on 13 September 2013, at the request of the respondents a full response.
[339] APPLICANT filed RETURN TO MOTION OR APPLICATION HRTO 2012-12585-I on or about 06 March 2015.
[340] REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL) was filed on or about March 9, 2015.
[341] The IPC APPEAL FOR “DEEM REFUSE” REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL), was on or about May 9, 2015, and again on May 14, 2015.
[342] The CASE ASSESSMENT DIRECTION (2012-12585-i) was received on or about 13 May 2015.
[343] The Conformation Letter for the Applicant’s REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY (2012-12585-i), was received on May 21, 2015.
[344] The Applicant, did not know how to REACTIVATE, until AN APPLICATION NOTICE, a REPLACEMENT EMAIL ON MAY 13, 2015, which contained a reprinted January 9, 2015 HRTO letter. The January 9, 2015 letter gave directions on how to reactivate a deferred Application.
[345] The Applicant was notified or directed to reactivate HRTO 2012-12585-I on or about the 9 January 2015; however, he did not know about Jan 9, 2015 directions. He had medical problems that need immediate attention, and still does!
[346] A very large and significant number of the respondents in CIVIL MATTER CV 12-71600 has refused or failed to respond, even though they were served the STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600.
[347] Requisitions to RESPONDENTS and other related entities such as; Ms. K. Kirkpatrick, and the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE-REGISTRAR, to disclose the final order for CV 12-71600 (Applicant’s Civil Matter.) All of the aforementioned entities has refused or failed to do so.
[348] BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP(“BLG”) lawyer or employee Kathrine Kirkpatrick, fraudulently procured a VEXACIOUS ORDER (CV 13-1060) for civil matter CV 13-1060 in contravention of Section 137, 22.1, 22.2 & 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, with false evidence and misleading methods while before the Honorable Justice Andrea. Not only did the COURT OF APPEAL-REGISTRAR failed or refuse to schedule MOTION FOR DIRECTION(C56817) to remedy missing exhibits from file C56817, determine status of incomplete TRANSCRIPS(C56817), and remedy MS. Deborah Krick’s(Assistance Attorney General), improper removal of court file C56817 from the COURT OF APPEAL-RECORDS without a Court Order, lawful cause or reasonable justification. Furthermore, the COURT OF APPEAL-REGISTRAR failed or refuse to schedule MOTION FOR DIRECTION(C56817) to remedy missing exhibits from file C56817, determine status of incomplete TRANSCRIPS(C56817), and remedy MS. Krick improper removal of court file C56817 from the COURT OF APPEAL-RECORDS without a court order. On the 13th of August 2013, Assistant Crown Attorney Deborah Krick whom has carriage, and control of matter M42322, admitted in open court to having possession of COURT OF APPEAL file C56817.
[349] In the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF SALVATION ARMY’ S initial response (no response from the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL), Mr. BLESSING ANYANWU, ADMITTED TO REPRISAL and denial of goods and services with a justification of the same REPRISAL against Wayne Ferron the Applicant, in an EMAIL to the Lawyers of the Salvation Army, which runs contrary to the policy on SHELTER STANDERS, Ontario HUMAN RIGHTS CODE, and the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, while it would seem he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[350] John Gescher (john.gescher@peelregion.ca), the original lawyer for the REGION MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, failed to respond or reply to the Application(2012-12585-I), and was infact actively blocking or filtering the Applicant’s HRTO 2012-12585-I, LEGAL services byway of email, and causing them to be returned, while it would seem he was not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[351] The REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, did not make a reasonable legal reply or OFFICIAL RESPONSE until the year 2015, even though HRTO 2012-12585-I was filed with the HRTO-REGISTRAR in September 2012, even though the respondents were being granted a request for delay or deferral without the service of a NOTICE OF INTENSION TO DEFER, and without a response from the REGIONAL MUNICIPLE OF PEEL, while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[352] Blair Maccredie (blair.mccreadie@dentons.com), lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his last RESPONSE, admitted to Mr. Harry Boom discharging or evicting Wayne Ferron(Applicant) without written articulated notice in his submissions, without reasonable notice, and for the unlawful justification, of no ONTARIO WORKS FINANCIAL SUPPORT, which blatantly contradicts, and unlawfully disobeyed the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER (FILE.: 1106-04904) , that was in full force(Section 3.1 C.C.C.) at the time in question, in contravention Section 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, while it would seem they were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[353] THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL acting in conjunction with it’s business subordinate THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene or assisted in contravening Section 127(1), Section 22.1, and Section 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA when INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER: 1106-04904 was in full force in accordance with Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE of CANADA, while it would seem that both the RESPONDENTS were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[354] THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL acting in conjunction with it’s business subordinate THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, contravene or assisted in contravening Section 322(1), 334, 380(1), 22.1, and 22.2 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA byway of not returning the $10.00 CANADA POST MONEY ORDER(Serial No.: 11 466 978 57 ), and the $5.00 personal check payment for services not rendered or responded to, after the Applicant exercised his “colour of right” over the same quantum of money on many occasion, and the INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER: 1106-04904 was in full force in accordance with Section 3.1 of the CRIMINAL CODE of CANADA, while it would seem that both the RESPONDENTS were not acting in “GOOD FATE!”
[355] The SALVATION ARMY and ONTARIO-WORK, for the second time ASPER the IPC directions, I made a request
for personal information collected or maintained at PEEL REGION
RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS (“THE HEAD”), in addition
to the $5.00 search fee being paid inclusive in the $10.00 Canada
-Post money order being sent to PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL
EMERGENCY SHELTERS (“THE HEAD”). The CANADA POST
MONEY ORDER contain the following information:
CHECK SERIAL NO.: 11 466 978 57
SECURITY CODE.: 697 965 794
OFFICE NO.: 102 205
ONTARIO-WORKS (“THE HEAD”) at PEEL REGION
RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, and THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF TH SALVATION, failed to respond, and complete the
Aforementioned information request for personal information, and also failed to return the $5.00 search fee in contravention of Section. 334, 322(1), 22.1, 22.2 and 380(1) the Criminal Code of Canada.
[356] REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL) was filed on or about March 9, 2015.
[357] The IPC APPEAL FOR “DEEM REFUSE” REQUISTION FOR DISCLOUSER…(2012-12585-I ET AL), was on or about May 9, 2015, and again on May 14, 2015.
[358] The CASE ASSESSMENT DIRECTION (2012-12585-i) was received on 29 May 2015.
[359] The Conformation Letter for the Applicant’s REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY (2012-12585-i), was received on May 21, 2015.
[360] The Applicant, did not know how to REACTIVATE, until AN APPLICATION NOTICE, a REPLACEMENT EMAIL ON MAY 13, 2015, which contained a reprinted January 9, 2015 HRTO letter. The January 9, 2015 letter gave directions on how to reactivate a deferred Application.
[361] The Applicant was notified or directed to reactivate HRTO 2012-12585-I on or about the 9 January 2015; however, he did not know about Jan 9, 2015 directions. He had medical problems that need immediate attention, and still does!
[362] A very large and significant number of the respondents in CIVIL MATTER CV 12-71600 has refused or failed to respond, even though they were served the STATEMENT OF CLAIM CV 12-71600.
[363] Requisitions to RESPONDENTS and other related entities such as; Ms. K. Kirkpatrick, and the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE-REGISTRAR, to disclose the final order for CV 12-71600 (Applicant’s Civil Matter.) All of the aforementioned entities has refused or failed to do so.
[364] BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP(“BLG”) lawyer or employee Kathrine Kirkpatrick, fraudulently procured a VEXACIOUS ORDER (CV 13-1060) for civil matter CV 13-1060 in contravention of Section 137, 22.1, 22.2 & 131 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, with false evidence and misleading methods while before the Honorable Justice Andrea. Not only did the COURT OF APPEAL-REGISTRAR failed or refuse to schedule MOTION FOR DIRECTION(C56817) to remedy missing exhibits from file C56817, determine status of incomplete TRANSCRIPS(C56817), and remedy MS. Deborah Krick’s(Assistance Attorney General), improper removal of court file C56817 from the COURT OF APPEAL-RECORDS without a Court Order, lawful cause or reasonable justification. Furthermore, the COURT OF APPEAL-REGISTRAR failed or refuse to schedule MOTION FOR DIRECTION(C56817) to remedy missing exhibits from file C56817, determine status of incomplete TRANSCRIPS(C56817), and remedy MS. Krick improper removal of court file C56817 from the COURT OF APPEAL-RECORDS without a court order. On the 13th of August 2013, Assistant Crown Attorney Deborah Krick whom has carriage, and control of matter M42322, admitted in open court to having possession of COURT OF APPEAL file C56817.
[365] NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed as far as the Applicant know!
[366] HRTO 2012-12585-I was DEFERED or DELAYED on 13 September 2013, at the request of the RESPONDENTS with the added benefit of not giving a full response, THE REGION OF PEEL GAVE4 NO RESPONSE. A letter from the HRTO-REGISTRA, states as fellows;
“
HRTO FILE: 2012-12585-I
|
Re: Wayne Ferron v. The Regional Municipality of Peel and the Governing Council of Salvation Army in Canada
Subject: DEFFERRED APPLICATION – Advise of Status
On September 13, 2013 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) issued Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1544 deferring this Application pending the completion of a civil matter, pursuant to Rule 14 of its Rules of Procedure.
{…}
Sincerely,
Richard Hennessy
Registrar
cc. John Gescher (via e-mail)
Blair McCreadie”
[367] Again, NO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER was served nor filed as far as the Applicant know. The Applicant have requested a copy, if one exist, but so far there is no proof of the existence of one. So naturally the Applicant requested of the TRIBUNAL, within the spirit of fairness and equity to have a copy disclose.
RULE 14
DEFERRAL OF AN APPLICATION BY THE TRIBUNAL
14.1 The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative, at the request of an Applicant under Rule 7, or at the request of any party.
****14.2 Where the Tribunal intends to defer consideration of an Application under Rule 14.1, it will first give the parties,
any identified trade union or occupational or
professional organization and any identified affected persons, notice of its intention to consider deferral of the Application and an opportunity to make submissions.
14.3 Where a party wishes the Tribunal to proceed with an Application which has been deferred the request must be made in accordance with Rule 19.
***14.4 Where an Application was deferred pending the outcome of another legal proceeding, a request to proceed under Rule 14.3 must be filed no later than 60 days after the conclusion of the other proceeding, must set out the date the other
legal proceeding concluded and include a copy of the decision or order in the other proceeding, if any.
14.5 The Tribunal may, on its own motion, require a deferred Application to proceed in appropriate circumstances.
[368] Pursuant to the Applicant’s AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I;
“[0] …to make an order directing HRTO-REGISTRAR to disclose "NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER(2012-12585-i)", all of the RESPONDENTS LETTERS to HRTO-REGISTRAR, and HRTO written ruling on decision to DELAY OR DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I at the request of the RESPONDENT.”
[369] Pursuant to the Honorable Adjudicator David Muir, June 15, 2015 INTERIM DECISION;
“THE Request is denied. The Tribunal Rule 23 provides as follows:...”
[370] It is clear that the honourable Adjudicator rejected the Applicant’s AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I, and made the following judgment in his INTERIM DECISION at PARA[5] AND PARA[6];
“[5] On May 21, 2015 the applicant FILED a REQUEST for Interim Remedy (Form 16). It appears that the Request was delivered to the respondents and a number of other individuals but the Tribunal advised the respondents unless directed to do so. Subsequently the applicant filed a number of “amended” Requests but it is not how these are in substance any different than the one filed on May 21, 2015.
[371] The Request is denied…”
[372] The Applicant’s main and most import request from the AMENDED REQUEST FOR INTERIM REMEDY-RULE 23(FORM 16) HRO 2012-12585-I are;
“[0] to make an order directing HRTO-REGISTRAR to disclose "NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER(2012-12585-i)", all of the RESPONDENTS LETTERS to HRTO-REGISTRAR, and HRTO written ruling on decision to DELAY OR DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I at the request of the RESPONDENT.
Disclosure of information to Commission
38. Despite anything in the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, at the request of the Commission, the Tribunal shall disclose to the Commission copies of applications and responses filed with the Tribunal and may disclose to the Commission other documents in its custody or in its control. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.
RULE 7.2
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210
Repealed
34 [Repealed 2002-62-17.]
“Deferral
[2] The Application noted a pending grievance. On March 1, 2012, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer under Rule 14.2 of its Rules of Procedure, as it appears that the applicant had filed a grievance dealing with the subject-matter of the Application. The applicant’s Union (United Steelworkers Local 7135) was given notice of the application as an affected organization. The parties and the Union were invited to make written submissions on why the Application should, or should not be deferred.
{…}
[4] The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Code s.45; Rule 14.1). he initial consideration for the Tribunal in deciding whether or not to defer consideration of an Application is whether the same facts and issues are being raised before another decision-maker with the authority to deal with issues arising under the Code”
(Chivers v. National Steel Car Ltd.)
RULE 7
APPLICATION WITH REQUEST TO DEFER CONSIDERATION
7.1. An Applicant may file an Application under Rule 6.1 and, at the same time, ask the Tribunal to defer consideration of the Application in accordance with Rule 14 if there are other legal proceedings dealing with the subject matter of the Application.
7.2. A request for deferral will only be considered by the Tribunal where the other legal proceeding does not fall within the scope of s. 34(11) of the Code.
7.4. The Tribunal will not defer consideration of an Application without first giving all the parties, and any affected persons or organizations identified in the Application or Response, an opportunity to make submissions on the request for deferral.
[373] Since, a just determination cannot be arrived at for
PREMISE (22) a., because of the violation of its assumptions to insure that the process is procedurally fair, it fellows that .
[374] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[8]) in his submission matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following while jumping from the year 2011(Mr. Harry Boom and Civil matter CV 12-2012-i), to the HRTO matter 2012-12585-I(BLESSING ANYANWU and denial of homeless services), without making any factual statement about the cause of Action of the HUMANRIGHTS MATTER(2012-12585-I), except for;
“On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application.”
[375] TAKE NOTICE: Causes of Actions and statements of facts ends in July 2012 in the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), and AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600),
While HRTO 2012-12585-I Cause of Action starts on September 1, 2012, below is to Blair McCreadie assertions;
“7. The Salvation Army served a Statement of Defence in response to the Action on November 14, 2012. The Salvation Army defended against the Applicant’s claim in the Action on the basis that the Amended Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
9. On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application…”
[376] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[20]) for another similar matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following on fairness and equity, that was sent at least two notices of incomplete application;
“20. ...one of the fundamental goals of the administration of the human rights system in Ontario is to “promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes” [RULE A3.1]. We further submit that it is a relevant factor mitigating against reactivation and in favour of dismissal.”
A3 INTERPRETATION
A3.1 The rules and procedures of the tribunal shall be liberally and purposively interpreted and applied to:
(a) promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes,
(b) allow parties to participate effectively in the process, whether or not they have a representative,
(c) ensure that procedures, orders and directions are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues in the proceeding.”
[377] Pursuant to Gurjit Singh Brar, a lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, in his submission(at para[15, 17]) for another similar matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following on fairness and equity that was sent at least two notices of incomplete application;
“15. pursuant to s. 40 of the Human Rights Code(the “Code”), the Tribunal has the authority to dispose of Applications made under Part iv “by adopting the procedures and practices provided for in its rules or otherwise available to the Tribunal which, in its opinion, offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications”.
“
40. The Tribunal shall dispose of applications made under this Part by adopting the procedures and practices provided for in its rules or otherwise available to the Tribunal which, in its opinion, Disposition of applications offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.”
“The HRTO strives to provide expeditious and accessible processes to help the parties resolve their dispute and that respect and reinforce the principles established in the Human Rights Code.” (FROM HRTO EMAILS)
[378] In accordance with the findings of PREMISE (22) a.,
it fellows that PREMISE (22) b. cannot be enabled, because it relies on the assumption of PREMISE (22) a., being true for a just, fair, and equal determination of HRTO 2012-12585-I, in addition to PREMISE (22) b. being dependent on the outcome of PREMISE (22) a.
Therefore, section 45.1 of the CODE cannot be used to dismiss HRTO 2012-585-I, BECAUSE THE REQUIRED CONDICTION FOR procedural fair proceeding has not been fulfilled.
Thus,
“b. Whether the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the substance of it has been appropriately dealt with in another legal proceeding, in this case the civil suit(s) commenced by the applicant?”
does not meet the conditions or fulfill the assumptions for a procedurally fair proceeding.
[379] Hence, PREMISE (22) b. does not conform to the HRTO standard or fulfill the initial conditions to enable Section 45.1 of the HUMAN RIGHTS CODE.
“b. Whether the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the substance of it has been appropriately dealt with in another legal proceeding, in this case the civil suit(s) commenced by the applicant?”
[380] PREMISE (22)
“[6] The issues to be addressed at the hearing are as follows:
a. Should the Tribunal waive the requirement in Rule 14.4 that a request to reactivate a deferred Application be filed no later than 60 days after the other proceeding has concluded?
b. Whether the Application should be dismissed pursuant to section 45.1 of the Code because the substance of it has been appropriately dealt with in another legal proceeding, in this case the civil suit(s) commenced by the applicant?”
[381] The Applicant’s served and filed AFFIDAVIT of Wayne FERRON (complainant)and EXHIBIT HOME_A and EXHIBIT HOME_A. It document some of the reasons why I have been unable to deal with the HRTO, civil matter, and SUPREME COURT MATTERS.
PLEASE SEE AFFIDAVIT of Wayne FERRON (complainant)and EXHIBIT HOME_A and EXHIBIT HOME_A.
[382] For supporting case law, see the following:
[383] Pursuant to Singh v. Rainbow Circle Co-operative Inc.;
“[15] In this case, there is no question that the applicant failed to file a request to reactivate the Application within the time limit specified in Rule 14.4. Accordingly, the issue to be determined is whether the Tribunal ought to exercise its discretion under the Rules to extend the applicable time limit or to waive the strict application of the Rule, so as to allow the applicant to request reactivation of the Application in March 2014.
[16] In deciding whether it would be fair, just and expeditious to extend the time limit in this case, I must consider both the time limit in Rule 14.4 in the context of the overall scheme of the Code and Rules, as well as the reasons for the applicant’s request to extend it. The 60-day limit represents an attempt by the Tribunal to incorporate the values of fairness, justice and expeditiousness into this step of the proceedings and to balance those factors by acknowledging that parties will need a reasonable, but finite, amount of time to make a decision about reactivation. A request to extend the timeline must, therefore, be supported by some explanation. See Hudson v. Kingston (City),2013 HRTO 2006 (CanLII).
[17] In my view, the applicant has provided some explanation for her delay. She was obtaining medical treatment from September 2013 to March 2014. She was hospitalized during the 60-day period following the Divisional Court decision on September 18, 2013, from October 28 to November 5, 2013. It was not until the Tribunal’s request for a status report on February 11, 2014 that the respondents requested a dismissal of the Application on February 19, 2014 for the applicant’s failure to request reactivation within the 60-day time period. In these circumstances, I exercise my discretion to waive strict compliance with the 60-day time period and reactivate the Application.
order
[18] The Application is reactivated.
[19] The respondents are directed to advise the Tribunal whether they are willing to proceed to mediation by April 25, 2014.
Dated at Toronto, this 11th day of April, 2014.”
(FAIRNESS-RULE A3.1: Singh v. Rainbow Circle Co-operative Inc., 2014 HRTO 528)
[384] Pursuant to Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board;
“[1] Section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), gives this Tribunal the authority to dismiss all or part of an application where the substance of the application has been appropriately dealt with in another proceeding. In this Interim Decision, we re-examine this Tribunal’s approach to the interpretation and application of s. 45.1 when an applicant previously filed a public complaint about the conduct of a police officer under the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, as amended (the “PSA”).
[2] In Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, the Supreme Court held in an analogous situation, applying the common law doctrine of issue estoppel, that it would be unfair to preclude a public complainant from pursuing a subsequent civil claim because of the findings in the Ontario police officer discipline process. In our view, the appropriate interpretation of s. 45.1 does not permit the dismissal of a human rights application when this would lead to unfairness, given the nature of the other process and the difference in the issues at stake in that process. In light of the guidance of the Court about the unfairness that would result from dismissing a human rights application based on previous police disciplinary proceedings, these Applications must proceed.”
(PARA[1] TO [2], Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board 2013hrto1298-1)
[385] Pursuant to Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board;
“[191] The fact that there has been no disciplinary hearing in these cases also raises an aspect of fairness at issue in this case that was not at issue in Penner. Because in these cases there has been no disciplinary hearing, the effect of a dismissal by this Tribunal at this stage would be that applications alleging a breach of the Code would get no hearing at all. A dismissal without a hearing by this Tribunal on the basis solely of a decision made pursuant to a “gatekeeping” function (see Wall v. Independent Police Review Director, 2013 ONSC 3312, at para. 8) would be manifestly at odds with the intentions of the Legislature in creating the “direct access” system under the Code, as well as obviously unfair.
[192] I agree with my colleagues that s. 45.1 cannot and should not be interpreted to bar a Code application where do to so would result in an affront to basic principles of fairness. In addition, it appears to me that the use of the term “appropriately” in s. 45.1 of the Code calls for an assessment of the conclusion (result and remedy) in the other proceeding against the applicable provisions of the Code, and in light of the legislative intent behind the Code. In the circumstances of these cases, the substance of the Applications cannot be found to have been “appropriately dealt with”.
DISPOSITION
[193] In respect of all three Applications before us, I would exercise my discretion under s. 45.1 of the Code, for all of the reasons noted above, to refuse the respondents’ Requests to Dismiss these Applications, and to allow them to proceed in the Tribunal’s process. I agree with the terms of the Order as set out in the Decision of my colleagues.
(PARA[191] TO [193], Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board 2013hrto1298-1)
[386] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[8]) in his submission matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following while jumping from the year 2011(Mr. Harry Boom and Civil matter CV 12-2012-i), to the HRTO matter 2012-12585-I(BLESSING ANYANWU and denial of homeless services), without making any factual statement about the cause of Action of the HUMANRIGHTS MATTER(2012-12585-I), except for;
“On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application.”
[387] TAKE NOTICE: Causes of Actions and statements of facts ends in July 2012 in the STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600), and AMENDED-AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM(CV 12-71600),
While HRTO 2012-12585-I Cause of Action starts on September 1, 2012, below is to Blair McCreadie assertions;
“7. The Salvation Army served a Statement of Defence in response to the Action on November 14, 2012. The Salvation Army defended against the Applicant’s claim in the Action on the basis that the Amended Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.
8. The Applicant was not asked to leave the Shelter on the basis of any prohibited ground under the Code; in fact, the Applicant was discharged from the Shelter after The Salvation Army was advised that it would not receive funding from Ontario in Peel for the Applicant’s continued stay. This funding was not available because the Applicant had refused to disclose the required financial information necessary for him to establish his eligibility for such funding.
9. On September 20, 2012, the Applicant then commenced this Application…”
[388] Pursuant to Blair McCreadie, a lawyer for the GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY, in his submission(at para[20]) for another similar matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following on fairness and equity, that was sent at least two notices of incomplete application;
“20. ...one of the fundamental goals of the administration of the human rights system in Ontario is to “promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes” [RULE A3.1]. We further submit that it is a relevant factor mitigating against reactivation and in favour of dismissal.”
A3 INTERPRETATION
A3.1 The rules and procedures of the tribunal shall be liberally and purposively interpreted and applied to:
(a) promote the fair, just and expeditious resolution of disputes,
(b) allow parties to participate effectively in the process, whether or not they have a representative,
(c) ensure that procedures, orders and directions are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues in the proceeding.”
[390] Pursuant to Gurjit Singh Brar, a lawyer for the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL, in his submission(at para[15, 17]) for another similar matter ( HRTO 2012-12585-I), asserts the following on fairness and equity that was sent at least two notices of incomplete application;
“15. pursuant to s. 40 of the Human Rights Code(the “Code”), the Tribunal has the authority to dispose of Applications made under Part iv “by adopting the procedures and practices provided for in its rules or otherwise available to the Tribunal which, in its opinion, offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications”.
“
40. The Tribunal shall dispose of applications made under this Part by adopting the procedures and practices provided for in its rules or otherwise available to the Tribunal which, in its opinion, Disposition of applications offer the best opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the applications. 2006, c. 30, s. 5.”
“The HRTO strives to provide expeditious and accessible processes to help the parties resolve their dispute and that respect and reinforce the principles established in the Human Rights Code.” (FROM HRTO EMAILS)
DUE PROCESS OF LAW:
[391] Pursuant to Frederick E. Gibson in Toledo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1572;
“[5]
The issue of the impact of an incomplete transcript on the interests of an Applicant has often been before this Court in immigration judicial reviews in recent years. [1] Typical of the
reasoning of my colleagues in the cited authorities are the following comments of Justice Layden-Stevenson in the Randhawa matter, to the following effect:
Despite the capable and articulate arguments and submissions of counsel for the respondent, the
applicant has persuaded me that the board's credibility findings with respect to the witnesses in question were fundamental to the decision. I am mindful of the comments of Evans J., as then was, in Hassan v. Canada ... that given the nature of a vacation hearing, an individual is entitled to the clearest assurance that the board has given full and fair consideration to the
evidence.
[citations omitted]
[6]
Although the hearing that is here under review was not a "vacation hearing", I am satisfied that the implications of the Convention refugee hearing here before the Court equally
entitle an individual such as the Applicant to the clearest assurance that the RPD has given full
and fair consideration to his evidence.
{…}
[8]
Unfortunately, the "entire ruling" is not on the record. I am satisfied that, in the absence of the "entire ruling", this Court is substantially disadvantaged in ensuring a full and fair hearing, not only in the interests of the Applicant, but also in the interests of the presiding member himself.
[9]
For the foregoing reasons, and without consideration of the merits of the substantive issues raised on behalf of the Applicant, this application for judicial review will be allowed. The
decision under review will be set aside, and the Applicant's application for Convention refugee status or equivalent protection will be referred back to the Immigration and Refugee Board for rehearing and redetermination by a differently constituted panel.”
(Toledo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1572)
[392] Pursuant to Justice Lutfy in Razm v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration);
In this case, no meaningful judicial review can be achieved with the partial transcript, one which discloses potentially serious errors. The incomplete record does not allow me, in the words of Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in CUPE,13 "to properly dispose of this application for judicial review" on the substantive issues. “
(Justice Lutfy in Razm v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration))
[393] Pursuant to R. v. Dwyer and Lauzon at the COURT OF APPEAL;
“Conclusion
[68] With the benefit of a full argument which, unfortunately, was not presented to the learned trial Judge, we have concluded that the trial was a complete nullity, as the Judge had no jurisdiction to try the accused without a jury in the circumstances. While this conclusion may appear unduly technical, it is necessary to secure the appellants’ fundamental right not to be deprived of their liberty except by due process of law. In the result therefore, we would allow the appeal, quash the convictions and order a new trial.”
(Ontario Court of Appeals, R. v. Dwyer and Lauzon, Date:
1978-05-02)
[52] Pursuant to the BILL OF RIGHTS, one's rights cannot be taken away without a fair hearing to plea ones cause or defend against the said action;
2. ...be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations;
[394] Pursuant to Frederick E. Gibson in Toledo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1572;
“[5] The issue of the impact of an incomplete transcript on the interests of an Applicant has often been before this Court in immigration judicial reviews in recent years. [1] Typical of the reasoning of my colleagues in the cited authorities are the following comments of Justice Layden-Stevenson in the Randhawa matter, to the following effect:
Despite the capable and articulate arguments and submissions of counsel for the respondent, the applicant has persuaded me that the board's credibility findings with respect to the witnesses in question were fundamental to the decision. I am mindful of the comments of Evans J., as then was, in Hassan v. Canada ... that given the nature of a vacation hearing, an individual is entitled to the clearest assurance that the board has given full and fair consideration to the evidence.
[citations omitted]
[6] Although the hearing that is here under review was not a "vacation hearing", I am satisfied that the implications of the Convention refugee hearing here before the Court equally
entitle an individual such as the Applicant to the clearest assurance that the RPD has given full and fair consideration to his evidence.
{…}
[8] Unfortunately, the "entire ruling" is not on the record. I am satisfied that, in the absence of the "entire ruling", this Court is substantially disadvantaged in ensuring a full and fair hearing, not only in the interests of the Applicant, but also in the interests of the presiding member himself.”
[395] Pursuant to Justice Lutfy in Razm v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration);
“[6] {…}
In this case, no meaningful judicial review can be achieved with the partial transcript, one which discloses potentially serious errors. The incomplete record does not allow me, in the words of Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in CUPE,13 "to properly dispose of this application for judicial review" on the substantive issues. “
(Razm v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration))
REMEDY:
[396] The applicant respectfully request THAT THE HONOURABLE COURT ORDER:
1. An order to disclose GOVERNING COUNCIL OF SALVATION ARMY’S EMAIL MESSAGE concerning this matter.
Mr. Blessing Anyanwu already admitted in a email to Blair McCreadie, to denying the Applicant goods and services because of his legal proceeding or proceedings. I WOULD LIKE FOR THAT EMAIL TO BE DISCLOSED, SINCE THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY HAS ALREADY REFERED TO IT AS EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MATTER.
2. an order to DECLARING the APPLICANT for HRTO FILE: 2012-12585-I IMPECUNIOUS and FINANCIALLY DESTITUTE;
3. an order to DISCLOSE THE HRTO INVESTIGATIVE information for APPLICATION (2012-12585-I) WITHOUT COST, so that the Applicant can make informed decisions that are in accordance with NATURAL JUSTICE and PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS. tHE APPLICANT DOES NOT HAVE EVEN A PENNY TO BUY ONE MEAL;
4. an order to add a party(my beloved daughter);
5. an order to amend the application;
6. an order to set the date for the APPLICATION HEARING(2012-12585-I)
7. an order to SUMMON WITNESSES to assist the court;
8. if it is the case that the matter is in the wrong jurisdiction, then an order to transfer matter to a COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION (CRIMINAL COURT-ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE;
9. to give any relief or remedy this Honourable Court deems just and reasonable.
ADDITIONAL REMEDY:
[397] The applicant respectfully request THAT THE HONOURABLE COURT ORDER:
1. to direct REGION OF PEEL and the SALVATION ARMY to disclose to my person all my personal information collected at the PEEL REGIONAL HOMELESS SHELTER so I may know the matter to the full extent and be able to answer the honourable court’s question;
2. to direct REGION OF PEEL and the SALVATION ARMY to return the Applicant’s monies in the form of a personal check and a CANADA POST MONEY ORDER, as payment for search fees for services never rendered or responded to, in more than one request for my personal information collected at the PEEL REGIONAL HOMELESS SHELTER;
3. to make an order directing HRTO-REGISTRAR to disclose "NOTICE OF INTENT TO DEFER(2012-12585-i)", all of the RESPONDENTS LETTERS to HRTO-REGISTRAR, and HRTO written ruling on decision to DELAY OR DEFER HRTO 2012-12585-I at the request of the RESPONDENT.
4. TO MAKE THE trial HEARING AN IN PERSON HEARING TO BE SET AT A PLACE AND AT A TIME BY THE HRTO-REGISTRAR;
5. to enable me to travel to BRAMPTON COURTHOUSE, and serve the registrar of the same court with a REQUISITION for two certified copy of the final order for the civil matter CV-12-71600(need return bus fare and cost of certified copies), since the same court has failed to notify the Applicant of the final court order in question, the same court has failed to disclosed to the Applicant the same final court order in question, and the same court has refused to send the Applicant the same final court order in question.
6. to enable me to travel to TORONTO FAMILY COURTHOUSE, and serve the registrar of the same court with a REQUISITION for two certified copy of the final order GRANTING FULL CUSTODY FOR MY BELOVED DAUGHTER to Wayne Ferron (Applicant), whom have full custody of his oldest daughter which is being punished without lawful cause;
7. to allow the Applicant to EXAMINE HRTO file HRTO 12-12585-I and make relevant photo copies without cost;
8. an order to honour and complete the Applicant’s FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST(2014-19377-I ET AL), so that he may know his case and is enabled to give full answer to the honourable HRTO - TRIBUNAL.
9. to give an interim order for monies($1 088.50) to obtain/file all medical evidence relevant to matter from CLINICS, HOSPITALS, and PHARMACY. In addition to cost of travel, document handling, and the cost, the court-registrar charge to obtain certified documents;
10. money to obtain/file all HOMELESS INFORMATION from the city of toronto, relevant to the matter,
11. money to summon witnesses by registered government mail to assist this honourable court.
12. Any remedy the this honourable court may consider just.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
June 19, 2015
_____________________________
Wayne FERRON(Informant/APPLICANT)
VAGOBOND
leegalpoet@gmail.com
AS A PROTEST TO THE UNREASONABLE RESPONDENT DELAY OF HRTO 2012-12585.I, i PLACED ON THE BACK OF MOST OF MY LEGAL PRIVATE PROSECUTION DOCUMENTS THE FOLLOWING IS THE CROSS I HAD TO CARRY AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE DELAY OF HRTO 2012-12585-I, WITHOUT A NOTICE TO DEFER (2012-12585-I) ;
TAKE NOTICE: I JUST RECENTLY CAME OFF THE STREETS OF TORONTO AS LIVING AS A VAGABOND. MY RESIDENCE FLOODS AND IS INFECTED WITH BLACK MOLD; I AM FORCED TO LIVE INHUMAINLY AND EXPECTED TO BRING MY DAUGHTER WHOM I HAVE FULL CUSTODY FOR, TO LIVE THERE. I am left to die in the said conditions by ONTARIO-WORKS. PLEASE SEND ANY LEGAL SERVICE MATERIAL BY REGISTERED MAIL, TO BE PICKED UP AT THE POST OFFICE; THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT MATERIAL SERVED AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS BY REGULAR MAIL WILL BE RELAYED TO MY PERSON, IN ADDITION TO THE SMALL POST BOX CONTENTS BEING EXPOSED TO THE NATURAL ELEMENTS. I AM NOT HOME IN THE DAYTIME, I MOSTLY ONLY SLEEP AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
TO
HRTO – Registrar
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
655 Bay Street, 14th floor
Toronto, ON M7A 2A3
Phone: 416-326-1519
Toll-free: 1-866-598-0322
Fax: 416-326-2199
Email: hrto.registrar@ontario.ca
AND TO:
Blair McCreadie
THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY
Dentons Canada LLP
77 King Street West, Suite 400
Toronto-Dominion Centre
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5K OA1
Tel.: 416 863 4511
Fax.: 416 863 4592
AND TO:
Patrick O’Connor
Regional Solicitor
Regional Municipality of Peel
10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A
Brampton, Ontario, L6T 4B9
Gurjit Brar
LSUC Registration No.: 42197E
Tel.: 905 791 7800 ext 4959
Fax: 905 791 6992
gurjit.brar@peelregion.ca
APPENDEX A:
SOCIAL JUSTICE TRIBUNALS
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
__________________________________________________________
IN THE MATTER of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
-and-
IN THE MATTER of a COMPLAINT by Wayne Ferron against REGION OF PEEL and SALVATION ARMY for violation of Section 1. of the HUMAN RIGHT ACT
__________________________________________________________
________________________________________
RESPONSE to RESPONDENTS
ARGUMENTS
_________________________________________
LIVING IN THE BSMT(1 of 5 independent residence at same location) WHICH HAS BLACK MOLD GROWING FROM REPEDITIVE ALMOST DAILY FLOODING OF BSMT.
Wayne FERRON
1-18 Earlscourt Ave. Toronto,
ON, M6E 4A6
HRTO COURT - Registrar
Richard Hennessy
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
655 Bay Street, 14th floor
Toronto, ON M7A 2A3
Phone: 416-326-1519
Toll-free: 1-866-598-0322
TTY: 416-326-2027
TTY Toll-free: 1-866-607-1240
TAKE NOTICE: The Applicant has not been given an official response from the RESPONDENING parties, nor has he been properly served with official documents which has been filed with the TRIBUNAL, nor has he been instructed how, and where to serve the RESPONDENTS additional documents; 2500 Cawthra Employees has threaten to throw recently filed legal documents by the Applicant into the garbage.
The Applicant respectfully request 4 weeks to file a proper response, to documentations and argument of the RESPONDENTS, he was never properly served in accordance with civilized practice of law. Moreover, the Applicant notified all parties officially in accordance with the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT and Canadian civilized practice of law.
Again, the applicant intents to serve, and file medical information relevant to the matter before the TRIBUNAL; the Applicant is asking for a January 2014 HEARING date, so he can accumulate enough funds to collect and serve his relevant medical information; I am a human being with human worth and would like to be treated in a dignified manner.
Pursuant to the documentation served on my person at the wrong address (neighborhood which I have no dealings with and does not speak English) and not in the proper mailbox which cannot contain the very large package after I notified and gave detailed instructions of a manner to serve my person to assure service is successful or received successfully with conformation.
The respondent's arguments contain many fallacies, mainly the cause and effect fallacy. THE CIVIL STATEMENT OF CLAIM(let us call it EXHIBIT A), does not strengthen the respondent's argument but weakens it; pursuant to the Director(BLESSING ANYANWU) at PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS, at 2500 Cawthra Rd., Mississauga, the Applicant was being denied service at the same homeless shelter, and due process for trying to affect his legal rights by way of EXHIBIT A; the director(Mr. Blessings) was quite clear on the above point which he articulated many times and there was two other manager's at the said EMERGENCY SHELTER facility which witness this while they were being asked by the Applicant if their said action was legal, because of the revenge or punishment or vigilante justice dimension for exercising ones legal right . In addition to the intake clerks articulating in clear language that they were given instructions not to process or give me shelter at the same EMERGENCY SHELTER for unstated or written reasonable cause. After waiting outside for two days without food or water, the same EMERGENCY SHELTER called the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE (Officer 3424, 3470) to have THE APPLICANT removed from public property across the street from the same shelter, which they made a determination that they could not reasonable do what was being requested of them.
THE APPLICANT will state the functional PREMISES for the respondents here again. The respondents in their defense must show that the premises or impossible to be true or the arguments supporting the Applicant's PREMISES contain logical or legal fallacies which prevents the Applicant from reaching the conclusion he is trying to respectfully submit or articulate before the TRIBUNAL.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS:
PREMISE:
1) TIME: about the first week of September 2012;
2) LOCATION: PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS 2500 Cawthra Rd., Mississauga;
3) SOME FACTS: ONTARIO-WORKS and SALVATION ARMY failed to return a check endorsed for the MINITER OF FINANCE after they refuse to affect a request for personal information by the Applicant; ONTARIO-WORKS and SALVATION ARMY failed to return a $ 10.00 Canada Post Money Order, endorsed to the Salvation Army after they refuse to affect a second request for personal freedom of information request by the Applicant;
4) The Applicant was denied access to EMERGENCY SHELTER in contravention of the SHELTER AGREEMENT without reasonable cause or by distinction of his person for trying to affect his legal rights; moreover, none of the Clerk or on sight Managers could articulate to the Applicant the reason for not admitting him to the same shelter or affective due process for the purpose of eligibility for admittance;
5) The Applicant was denied due process for a determination of his eligibility to access public EMERGENCY SHELTER by distinction of his person for trying to affect his legal rights, while other homeless members of the public who had unfavorable records with the same EMERGENCY SHELTER was processed with no impediments;
6) Because the time of the occurrence in question was on a long holiday weekend, after two days of waiting across the street without food or water on public land for the Director ( Mr. Blessings) to return back to work and inform his person of the undisclosed secret reasons why he was not allowed to stay at the same shelter or be admitted to same shelter by due process;
7) After waiting outside for two days without food or water, the PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS employees called the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE (Officer 3424, and Officer 3470) to have THE APPLICANT removed from public property across the street from the same shelter, the same Officers made a determination that they could not reasonable do what was being requested of them; in addition to CRUISER 331 AND 816 passing by to check on the complainant(Wayne Ferron). ;
8) The Applicant was forced to live on the streets as a homeless vagabond while the same EMERGENCY SHELTER was not full to capacity despite their commitment to the policies and rules of the EMERGENCY SHELTERS AGREEMENT, Ontario Works paid the first two Months of the cost(OW has a receipt) of the said locker; the Applicant had to carry from place to place about 100 lb of personal belongings until he secured it in a locker at Gray Hound Bus Terminal. The RELLAVENT facts are stated briefly again above, everything else (EXHIBIT A) are just events and occurrences which adds context AND HISTORY to the matter before the TRIBUNAL.
9) The applicant (Wayne Ferron) respectfully requested of the PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS employees, for a copy of other Shelters with corresponding phone numbers, and he was denied the said information sheet; neither the Mangers nor their subordinates disclosed an information sheet of other shelters, in addition to Mr. Blessing(Director ), and failing to disclosing the same requested information concerning other shelters.
10) EXHIBIT A(AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM) was approved by the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE REGISTRAR, on the 21st of August, 2012 by attending Clerk D. des Vignes and filed on the same day in the same court;
11) EXHIBIT A(AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM) allegations occurred , in the year 2012 and before the stated year of 2012;
12) The HRTO COMPLAINT allegations occurred , STARTED ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2012;
13) THE REGION OF PEEL finance and jointly manage the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. If you speak to counselor, one is a SLAVATION ARMY COUNSELOR and the OTHER IS A ONTARIO-WORKS COUNSELOR. The first thing which is done after you are intake into the shelter, is that you are compelled to speak to, and call ONTARIO-WORKS, the aforesaid is a none negotiable requirement for staying in the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER;
14) The REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER facility is owned and operated by the REGION OF PEEL.
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
[1] Immediately upon becoming homeless, I went to the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, located in the REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL in the city of Mississauga, to seek out emergency shelter. The REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, blatantly refused to grant me(Informant) access to the publicly funded facility which provides shorter living facility and services for people from the Region of Peel Emergency Shelter needs, in addition to be bound by the ''SHELTER STANDERS'' agreement and the HUMAN RIGHT'S ACT.
[2] I am presently homeless, impecunious, and financially destitute. It seems that this is the way court cases or won, by way of “civil death”, social warfare, and denial of all the things Section 7. Of the Charter guarantees (life, liberty, security, and the pursuit of happiness).
[3] On September 1, 2012 I became homeless.
[4] On September 1, 2012 I went to 2500 Cawthra Rd in the Region of Peel, in the City of Mississauga at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, for help AT ABOUT 11:00 P.M..
[5] On September 1, 2012 at about 11:00 P.M., it was boldly asserted to my person in clear and distinct language that I was “restricted” and to “leave” the premises.
[6] On ward from September 1, 2012 I spent the nights and days homeless on the other side of the road to the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER.
[7] On September 2, 2012 at REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, an employee came across the street to inform me that the Manager restricted me and I will have to see the manager ( The director, Mr. Blessings) before I can be admitted to the same shelter. Moreover, I was advised that the managers, mainly ( The director, Mr. Blessings) would be back after the holidays on 4/09/2012.
[8] After waiting outside for two days without food or water, the PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS employees called the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE (Officer 3424, and Officer 3470) to have my person removed from public property across the street from the same shelter, the same Officers made a determination that they could not reasonable do what was being requested of them.
[9] On September 5, 2012 I went to speak to the Managers, mainly (The director, Mr. Blessings) as per the Intake Clerks at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. I spoke to two Managers extensively who neither knew, nor was able to articulate the moral or legal justification for restricting my person from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. While others who had numerous policy infringement were admitted. Moreover, they said I must speak to another manager( The director, Mr. Blessings) due in one hour.
[10] On September 5, 2012 at about 11:00 a.m., at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, I was advised in clear direct language by the Manager( The director, Mr. Blessings) that I (Wayne Ferron) was restricted from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER for a pending action against the REGION for HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION of Section 1. Of the Act. I informed him that I was only suing for $1.00 and for the good of the public; Furthermore, the legal action was on principal of improving the fair treatment of homeless individuals, or maybe I was the only person being discriminated against? I was promptly shown the door even though I advise the 3 Managers present with a qualification of uncertainty that the action being taken against my person may not be legal, for you cannot hold one's legal rights hostage, to discriminate against a person within the context of equal, and fair services to all Canadians. I was promptly; shown the door, in fact it was held open for me.
[11] On September 1, 2012 I became homeless. Ontario-Works HAS NO RECORDS OF ME BEING RESTRICTED FROM THE REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER; the matter of restriction from the REGIONAL OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, seem to be arbitrary, frivolous, vexatious, and motivated by revenge in an effort to extract vigilante justice for past complaints on HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
[12] In my view forcing a person suffer homeless when there is access to facilities to help with this said problem is an unlawful act. NOTE AND RECALL, Ontario-works HAS NO RECORDS OF ME BEING RESTRICTED FROM THE REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. Which infers that the REGION OF PEEL has no record of me being restricted? NONE! I am not even flag for any pass unreasonable acts or acts of omission. Besides, it was more than a year since I had been in any homeless shelter.
[13] On September 1, 2012 I went 2500 Cawthra Rd in the Regional Municipality of Peel, in the city of Mississauga at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER, for help AT ABOUT 11:00 P.M..
[14] On September 1, 2012 at about 11:00 pm., it was boldly asserted to my person in clear and distinct language that I was “restricted” and I must vacate or “leave” the premises!
[15] Onward from September 1, 2012 I spent the nights and days homeless on the other side of the road across from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. I called the REGION OF PEEL HELP LINE to no avail, I call the PROVINCIAL OMBUSMAN COMISSION to no avail, and I called the PROVINCCIAL HUMAN RIGHT COMMISSION to no avail; it was a long weekend with a government holiday, so all the aforesaid public institutions were closed for the long weekend.
[16] I was never given any reasonable notice or prior warning of any pending restriction, in fact on my last contact a year ago with the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER management team, I was invited to return and stay at the same shelter by the Director(BLESSING ANYANWU). Besides, restriction or active and enforced for about 1 month or less period and I had not been to the 2500 Cawthra Road, REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER in over a year. Thus, I did not expect to be rejected so I came unprepared without an alternative plan for shelter.
[17] On September 2, 2012 at REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER employees came across the street to inform me that the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER Management restricted me from the same shelter(no reason was given) and I will have to see the manager(name of manager was never disclosed) before I can be admitted to the same shelter. Moreover, I was advised that the managers would be back after the holidays on September 4, 2012(4/09/2012).
[18] On September 2, 2012 the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER staff called the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE SERVICES on my person even though I was not on their property nor was I causing and any disturbances or breaking any bylaws. I was sitting quietly under an hydro electrical pole reading and waiting patiently for the management staff whom restricted me without articulated reason or lawful cause, even-though the same facility is supported by the public purse and is bound by the SHELTER STANDARDS agreement and the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT. There was no processing of my person or assessment of my needs in accordance with policy and due process.
[19] On September 5, 2012 I went to speak to the Manager(BLESSING ANYANWU) as per the intake clerks at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. I spoke to two Managers extensively who neither knew nor was able to articulate a moral or demonstrate a legal justification for restricting my person from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. While others who had numerous policy infringement were admitted. Moreover, they said I must speak to another manager (Mr. BLESSING ANYANWU) due in one hour.
[20] On September 5, 2012 at about 11:00 a.m., at the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER I was advised in clear direct language by the manager (BLESSING ANYANWU) , that I (Wayne Ferron) was restricted from the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER for a pending action against the REGION for HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION of Section 1. of the Act. I informed him that I was only suing for $1.00 and for the good of the public; Furthermore, the legal action was on principal of improving the fair treatment of homeless individuals.
[21] I was promptly shown the door even though I advise with a qualification of uncertainty that the action being taken may not be legal, for you cannot hold one legal rights hostage to discriminate against a person within the context of equal and fair services to all Canadians. I was promptly shown the door, in fact it was held open for me.
[22] The above incidence made me feel like an undesirable human being with less social value or sub human trouble maker, whom was being punished for taking action endorsed by the will of Parliament.
[23] I was made to suffer homelessness, loss of dignity, hunger and forced to battle the natural elements for trying to affect my legal rights to bring before a court of competent jurisdiction, matters which affect the public good and the public confidence and trust in services involving a civil society. Violation of Parliamentary legislation is to be dealt with by the courts of competent jurisdiction and not by way of vigilante punishment as though the law is a slave to certain particular element of society.
[24] I was not given reasonable notice of my RESTRICTION, even though I requested personal Information disclosure on more than one occasion; the information request were simply ignored and the said institution fail to return the necessary monies to start the search and disclosure process. I should have been properly notified of the said RESTRICTION, processed by the intake office, then my application denied for a lawful or moral written articulated justification. This did not happen! I did not have due process or equal treatment given to citizen belonging to nations which effect civilized practice of law.
[25] My complaint was on a matter of principle, the public good, to recognize and acknowledge that homeless people are also people with freedom rights and human dignity; hopefully in the adjudicative process, the human condition for Canadians my improve, even if it is just a little.
[26] We are all social beings, whom must live and interact with each other because of the very nature of who we are. This is a necessary thing for social beings. It make me happy and I feel fulfilled when we are respectful to each other and are Christ like in our treatment of each other.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS:
APPLICANT'S PREMISE:
1) TIME: about the first week of September 2012;
2) LOCATION: PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS 2500 Cawthra Rd., Mississauga;
3) SOME FACTS: ONTARIO-WORKS and SALVATION ARMY failed to return a check endorsed for the MINITER OF FINANCE after they refuse to affect a request for personal information by the Applicant; ONTARIO-WORKS and SALVATION ARMY failed to return a $ 10.00 Canada Post Money Order, endorsed to the Salvation Army after they refuse to affect a second request for personal freedom of information request by the Applicant;
4) The Applicant was denied access to EMERGENCY SHELTER in contravention of the SHELTER AGREEMENT without reasonable cause or by distinction of his person for trying to affect his legal rights; moreover, none of the Clerk or on sight Managers could articulate to the Applicant the reason for not admitting him to the same shelter or affective due process for the purpose of eligibility for admittance;
5) The Applicant was denied due process for a determination of his eligibility to access public EMERGENCY SHELTER by distinction of his person for trying to affect his legal rights, while other homeless members of the public who had unfavorable records with the same EMERGENCY SHELTER was processed with no impediments;
6) Because the time of the occurrence in question was on a long holiday weekend, after two days of waiting across the street without food or water on public land for the Director ( Mr. Blessings) to return back to work and inform his person of the undisclosed secret reasons why he was not allowed to stay at the same shelter or be admitted to same shelter by due process;
7) After waiting outside for two days without food or water, the PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS employees called the PEEL REGIONAL POLICE(Officer 3424, and Officer 3470) to have THE APPLICANT removed from public property across the street from the same shelter, the same Officers made a determination that they could not reasonable do what was being requested of them; in addition to CRUISER 331 AND 816 passing by to check on the complainant(Wayne Ferron). ;
8) The Applicant was forced to live on the streets as a homeless vagabond while the same EMERGENCY SHELTER was not full to capacity despite their commitment to the policies and rules of the EMERGENCY SHELTERS AGREEMENT, Ontario Works paid the first two Months of the cost (OW has a receipt) of the said locker; the Applicant had to carry from place to place about 100 lb of personal belongings until he secured it in a locker at Gray Hound Bus Terminal. The RELLAVENT facts are stated briefly again above, everything else(EXHIBIT A) are just events and occurrences which adds context AND HISTORY to the matter before the TRIBUNAL.
9) The applicant (Wayne Ferron) respectfully requested of the PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS employees, for a copy of other Shelters with corresponding phone numbers, and he was denied the said information sheet; neither the Mangers nor their subordinates disclosed an information sheet of other shelters, in addition to Mr. Blessing(Director ), and failing to disclosing the same requested information concerning other shelters.
10) EXHIBIT A(AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM) was approved by the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE REGISTRAR, on the 21st of August, 2012 by attending Clerk D. des Vignes and filed on the same day in the same court;
11) EXHIBIT A(AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM) allegations occurred , in the year 2012 and before the stated year of 2012;
12) The HRTO COMPLAINT allegations occurred , STARTED ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2012;
13) THE REGION OF PEEL finance and jointly manage the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER. If you speak to counselor, one is a SLAVATION ARMY COUNSELOR and the OTHER IS A ONTARIO-WORKS COUNSELOR. The first thing which is done after you are intake into the shelter, is that you are compelled to speak to and call ONTARIO-WORKS, the aforesaid is a none negotiable requirement for staying in the REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER;
14) The REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER facility is owned and operated by the REGION OF PEEL.
RESPONDENT'S PREMISE:
1) THE REGION OF PEEL seems to have no premise of defense it is using to defend against the Applicant's allegations, which is a silent admission of guilt.
2) The SALVATION ARMY has tried to change or pervert the Applicant's premise and argue against a matter which is not before this tribunal and lays outside the time constraints of occurrence 2012 C 12585-I
3) The Salvation Army alts ministry allege that 2012 C 12585-I form part of CV-12-0716-00.
4) The REGION OF PEEL EMERGENCY SHELTER (2500 Cawthra Road, Mississauga) “is a short-term emergency housing facility operated by The Salvation Army as a unit of its ministry.”
[27] The REGION OF PEEL has neither been served nor filed signed responding documents.
[28] The Applicant has asserted his colour of right on more than one occasions, is here again asserting is colour of right to the $5.00 check for the Minister of Finance, and a $ 10.00 Canada Post money order for both ONTARIO WORK and THE SAVATION ARMY with the SALVATION ARMY'S name on the said DRAFT CHECK for FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST which were not affected or even responded to in addition to the monies not being returned to the Applicant.
[29] Ontario Works and the SALVATION ARMY needs to remedy or fix the above stated fraudulent actions to establish credibility before their assertions can be reasonable believed?
[30] The NOTICE OF INTENTION was served on the RESPONDENTS on or about April 29, 2013 at 2500 Cawthra Rd in Mississauga in the Municipality of Peel.
[31] The legal document, SOME ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FILED WITH HRO BEFORE A RESPONDE FROM HRO OR THE RESPONDENT PARTIES, was served on the RESPONDENTS on or about June 28, 2013 at 8:00 pm, at 2500 Cawthra Rd in Mississauga in the Municipality of Peel.
[32] The REQUISITION FOR EXTENSION OF RESPONSE TIME, was served on the RESPONDENTS on or about July 28, 2013 at 8:00 pm, at 2500 Cawthra Rd in Mississauga and 10 Peel Centre Rd in Brampton, both in the Municipality of Peel byway of registered Government mail.
[33] The Respondents has not dealt with the issues before the TRIBUNAL which concerns the denial of a service and denial of fair access to THE PEEL REGIONAL EMERGENCY SHELTER without a reasonable or lawful cause from September 1, 2012 to September 5, 2012. Nevertheless, the Applicant will try to address the Respondents concerns.
[34] The Respondents neither challenge nor deny the Applicant's account of facts occurring in the month of September 2012, a time period after the EXHIBIT A (AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM) was approve and filed. In short, occurrence 2012 C 12585-I is a different and distinct cause of action which cannot be included in the STATEMENT OF CLAIM without the approval of a SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE.
[35] The Respondents assertion in PARA [1] and PARA [2] in SCHEDULE “A” is false for the following reason. If it is the case that CV-12-0716-00 cause of Actions and 2012 C 12585-I occurred on different and distinct dates, how they possible can be a part of the same action; this is a logical fallacy which weakens the RESPONDENTS reasoning in their written submissions and cannot support their conclusion because of the following known facts:
EXHIBIT A(AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM) was approved by the SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE REGISTRAR, on the 21st of August, 2012 by attending Clerk D. des Vignes and filed on the same day in the same court;
EXHIBIT A(AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM) allegations occurred , in the year 2012 and before August 21, 2012;
The HRTO COMPLAINT allegations occurred, STARTED ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2012.
[36] The Respondents assertion in PARA [5] and PARA [6] in SCHEDULE “A” is convoluted and quite possible misleading even though the assertion or inference of ownership, and operation for the following reason:
fact, the name of the shelter is PEEL REGION EMERGENCY SHELTER, the SALVATION ARMY does not have colour of right to the aforesaid name;
fact, the REGION OF PEEL has colour of right of ownership to PEEL REGION EMERGENCY SHELTER, and is the legal entity which is ultimately or vicariously responsible for any employee or inferior entities actions in its facility;
fact, the REGION OF PEEL finance the PEEL REGION EMERGENCY SHELTER;
fact, the REGION OF PEEL oversees the operation of the PEEL REGION EMERGENCY SHELTER;
fact, one must meet the necessary approval and conditions of THE REGION OF PEEL, enforced by way of and ONTARIO-WORKS CASE WORKER to stay at the PEEL REGION EMERGENCY SHELTER;
The aforesaid is what the SALVATION ARMY is telling or asserting to the public at large;
“OUR SHELTER
The Cawthra Road Shelter opened up in spring of 2009 as a replacement for the Mavis Road Shelter which closed in November 2007. We provide wervice and support for adults who are experiencing homelessness. The Shelter has twenty rooms which can house a maximum of 80 homeless individuals. Additional we currently have ten rooms which are designated for couples. The facility is owned and operated by the Region of Peel and managed by the Salvation Army.
OUR COMMITMENT
Our commitment is to be inclusive and provide equal treatment for everyone accessing our services, while being ...”
(EXHIBIT - C. PEEL REGIONAL RESIDENTIAL SERVICES CAWTHRA ROAD SHELTER PAMPLET)
The Applicant reminds the Respondents and TRIBUNAL of RULE 4 in the PROFESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT, which states as follows;
(d) endeavour or allow anyone else to endeavour, directly or indirectly, to influence the decision or action of a tribunal or any of its officials in any case or matter by any means other than open persuasion as an advocate,
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal conduct,
[37] The Respondents assertion in PARA [8] to PARA [10] in SCHEDULE “A” is convoluted and quite possible misleading even though the assertion or inference of ownership, and operation for the following reason:
fact, having an action dismissed on the basis of “STATEMENT OF CLAIM FAILS TO DISCLOSE A REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION” does not mean that the allegations in the same action is false; on the contrary, the defendants must except that the Allegations in the action as factual truth. In short, it means that there is a technical fault in the construction of the statement of claim. The aforesaid is supported by the RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE and CASE LAW.
The context, the scope, and the assumptions made for an argument constructed in a vacuums to deny one the seat of judgment, without any finding of facts in a trial makes the following demands on the said argument;
The facts pleaded are to be taken as proved(Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959) .
RULE 21.01(1)(a) of CIVIL PROCEDURE-...question of law raised in pleading...
RULE 21.01(2) of CIVIL PROCEDURE-...no evidence is admissible without leave...
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS RIGHTS, is a constraint on all administrative process, including any legal process even though it is rearly ever mentioned.
RULE 21.02-MOTION TO BE MADE PROMPTLY
Furthermore, the SUPREME COURT asserts in the following case law;
“The complexity or novelty of the question that the plaintiff wishes to bring to trial should not act as a bar to that trial taking place.
(ii) Supreme Court of Canada
While this Court has had a somewhat limited opportunity to consider how the rules regarding the striking out of a statement of claim are to be applied, it has nonetheless consistently upheld the "plain and obvious" test. Justice Estey, speaking for the Court in Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, stated at p. 740:
As I have said, all the facts pleaded in the statement of claim must be deemed to have been proven. On a motion such as this a court should, of course, dismiss the action or strike out any claim made by the plaintiff only in plain and obvious cases and where the court is satisfied that "the case is beyond doubt": Ross v. Scottish Union and National Insurance Co.
I had occasion to affirm this proposition in Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441. At pages 486-87 I provided the following summary of the law in this area (with which the rest of the Court concurred):
The law then would appear to be clear. The facts pleaded are to be taken as proved. When so taken, the question is do they disclose a reasonable cause of action, i.e. a cause of action "with some chance of success" (Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association, [1970] 1 All E.R. 1094) or, as Le Dain J. put it in Dowson v. Government of Canada (1981), 37 N.R. 127 (F.C.A.), at p. 138, is it "plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed?"
2. And at p. 477 I observed:
It would seem then that as a general principle the Courts will be hesitant to strike out a statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The fact that reaching a conclusion on this preliminary issue requires lengthy argument will not be determinative of the matter nor will the novelty of the cause of action militate against the plaintiffs. [Emphasis added.]
3. Most recently, in Dumont v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 279, I made clear at p. 280 that it was my view that the test set out in Inuit Tapirisat was the correct test. The test remained whether the outcome of the case was "plain and obvious" or "beyond reasonable doubt".
(Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 page 23)
[38] The Respondents assertion in PARA [11] in SCHEDULE “A” is irrelevant and false for the following reasons:
fact, EXHIBIT B(NICOLE ARBOUR AUGUST 15, 2011 EVICTION LETTER) contains no assertions or justifiable cause of the Applicant refusing to disclose financial information or ONTARIO-WORKS not financing the Applicant stay at the REGION OF PEEL SHELTER; on the contrary, the Applicant had disclosed all his financial information to Ms. Nicole Arboure which she forwared to ONTARIO-WORKS, this is a necessary requirement affected immediately upon admitance to the shelter; in any event their was a active INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904) against the REGION OF PEEL from the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL which took precedence over any other rellevant decisions the REGION OF PEEL made in the rellevant time period. The REGION OF PEEL decision was surpassed and made null and void by the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL COURT ORDER until a hearing and determination.
...It has come to our attention that your stay has exceeded the 2 week period our shelter is mandated for; your original intake date was
July 7th, 2011. Although we would like to continue supporting you in this time of transition you need to have secured accommodations no later than August 22, 2011. If you are unable to secure accommodations by, we will be happy to assist you in securing a bed at a shelter outside of Peel Region...”
(EXHIBIT - B. NICOLE ARBOUR AUGUST 15, 2011 EVICTION LETTER, ONTARIO WORKS CASE W, REGION OF PEEL EMPLOYEE)
“...The Tribunal directs that the Administrator, Social Services Dept Region
of Peel, pay interim assistance to the above noted appellant effective
June 01, 2011 to November 30, 2011...”
(EXHIBIT - G. SOCIAL TRIBUNAL STANDING COURT ORDER, made an INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904)-on or about July 13th, 2011 )
[39] The Respondents assertion in PARA [12] in SCHEDULE “A” is false for the following reasons:
fact, Mr. Harry Boom in the presence of a ONTARIO-WORKS WORKER demanded that the Applicant leave without any reasonable notice, without any eviction letter such as EXHIBIT B, and under the auspices that the meeting which the Applicant was asked to leave on more than one occasion would be about budgeting for permanent housing. There was not even time for the Applicant to take his belongings; he had to leave it and retrieve it at a later date.
fact, the meeting with Mr. Harry Boom and an unnamed ONTARIO-WORKS WORKER, was for the purpose of determining a budget for permanent housing, there was no discussing or disclosing of information concerning the Applicant not disclosing financial information and ONTARIO-WORKS cutting funding; on the contrary, ONTARIO-WORKS and the REGION OF PEEL was bound by the SOCIAL TRIBUNAL STANDING COURT ORDER to provide to the Applicant interim financial support;
“...The Tribunal directs that the Administrator, Social Services Dept Region of Peel, pay interim assistance to the above noted appellant effective June 01, 2011 to November 30, 2011...”
(EXHIBIT - G. SOCIAL TRIBUNAL STANDING COURT ORDER, made an INTERIM ASSISTANCE ORDER(1106-04904)-on or about July 13th, 2011
[40] If it is the case that the HONOURABLE TRIBUNAL take the position of the REGION OF PEEL, which has failed to respond, and the SALVATION ARMY, which has responded in SCHEDUL A and concatenate the distinct claim of CV-12-0716-00 and 2012 C 12585-I into one action, then their needs to be a court order to AMEND the AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM to include the claim for September 2012 in accordance with the Honorable Tribunal's jurisdictional authority.
CONCLUSION:
[40] The Applicant respectfully submit that there is no defense, arguments, reasonable justifications, or even a significant Response from the REGIONAL OF PEEL for the allegations asserted the SUMMARY OF FACTS(PARA[1] to PARA [26]); so the REGION OF PEEL has silently excepted liability for the said allegations as stated in the SUMMARY OF FACTS or the APPLICANT'S PREMISE. In short, there is no need of proof for the aforesaid.
[41] The question now is whether; the SALVATION ARMY owes any duty or responsibilities to the Applicant that infers liability?
The Applicant respectfully summits that EXHIBIT D binds the SALVATION ARMY with some responsibility to the Applicant; EXHIBIT D, is proudly displayed at THE SALVATION ARMY GATEWAY(107 Jarvis in Toronto, a SALVATION ARMY HOMELESS SHELTER) for the public to see and read its self-binding commitment to the homeless;
“In accordance with the CITY OF TORONTO'S policy this organization here by certifies its commitment to a policy of non-discrimination and the right to be free from hate activity based on receipt of public assistance, political affiliation, religious affiliation, record of offense, level of literacy or any other personal characteristics.”
(EXHIBIT D, SALVATION ARMY'S NON DISCRIMINATION POLICY)
Furthermore; the Applicant respectfully summits that EXHIBIT E binds the SALVATION ARMY with some responsibility to the Applicant; EXHIBIT E, is proudly displayed at THE SALVATION ARMY GATEWAY(107 Jarvis in Toronto, a SALVATION ARMY HOMELESS SHELTER) for the public to see and read its self-binding commitment to the homeless;
“THEREFORE, TO OUR BROTHERS AND SISTERS WHO STRUGGLE WITH POVERTY
AND HOMELESSNESS, WE COMMIT TO...
LEARN all we can about the systemic, sociological, economic, cultural and spiritual deficits that have left them in this state.
We will listen carefully to them, for they are our greatest teachers. We will seek out the knowledge others have acquired, and teach
what we ourselves have learned to those who want to care more effectively for people who are poor or homeless;
ACT with diligence and integrity to create with them healthy, nurturing relationships, and safe, secure, dignified homes;
SPEAK on their behalf when their own voices are not heard, and support them in speaking for themselves, to the end that Canadian
Churches, governments, media and businesses would make the substantial reduction of homelessness, poverty and their root causes a high priority... ”
(EXHIBIT E, OTTAWA MANIFESTO)
Moreover; the Applicant respectfully summits that EXHIBIT F or a similar agreement for homeless shelters in the GTA binds the SALVATION ARMY with duties and obligations or responsibility to the Applicant; EXHIBIT F, is the SHELTER STANDARDS which should be enforced or encouraged to insure fair and equitable due process for access to temporary EMERGENCY SHELTER supported by public monies;
“4. Access to Shelter
4.1 Admission and Discharge
Admission and discharge records for all residents
shelter system. Length of stay is based on individual
circumstances and determined on a case-by-case basis
by the shelter.
Shelters must be able to admit new residents at all
times during their hours of operation, provided that the Exceptional circumstances where residents may be applicant is eligible for service and space is available. The shelter must have clearly written criteria, policies and procedures for admission. A copy of admission
and discharge policies must be on file with Hostel
of weapons, trafficking in illegal drugs, or serious
behaviors that compromise the health and safety of
other residents and/or staff.
{...}
The shelter
must provide a referral, confirm the bed is available
and provide transportation assistance if required.
Shelters must maintain records of all in-person and
telephone-requested admissions. All requests for
admission should include the person's name, reason
for non-admittance and to where the person was
referred. The total number of requests for admission
must be submitted monthly to Hostel Services on a
form provided (see Appendix A).”
(EXHIBIT F, page 11, 4. ACCESS TO SHELTER, TORONTO SHELTER STANDARD)
[41] Section 1, 46, and 47 of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT and the following supporting legislations, and legal instruments is what the Applicant is relying on for his humbly submissions.
PART I
FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION
Services
1. Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, family status or disability. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 1; 1999, c. 6, s. 28 (1); 2001, c. 32, s. 27 (1); 2005, c. 5, s. 32 (1); 2012, c. 7, s. 1.
46.1 (1) If, in a civil proceeding in a court, the court finds that a party to the proceeding has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the proceeding, the court may make either of the following orders, or both:
1. An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
11. An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. 2006, c. 30, s. 8.
Act binds Crown
47. (1) This Act binds the Crown and every agency of the Crown. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 47 (1).
Act has primacy over other Acts
(2) Where a provision in an Act or regulation purports to require or authorize conduct that is a contravention of Part I, this Act applies and prevails unless the Act or regulation specifically provides that it is to apply despite this Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 47 (2).
Right to life.
1. Every human being has a right to life, and to personal security, inviolability and freedom.
Safeguard of dignity.
4. Every person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honour and reputation.
1975, c. 6, s. 4.
Respect for private life.
5. Every person has a right to respect for his private life.
1975, c. 6, s. 5.
Discrimination forbidden.
10. Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap.
Discrimination defined.
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right.
1975, c. 6, s. 10; 1977, c. 6, s. 1; 1978, c. 7, s. 112; 1980, c. 11, s. 34; 1982, c. 61, s. 3.
(R.S.Q., chapter C-12 Charter of human rights and freedoms)
“In Andrews, supra, a case which challenged the citizenship requirement
for entry into the legal profession in British Columbia, this Court had occasion to
address the meaning of the term "discrimination" as employed in s. 15(1). McIntyre J. (dissenting, but on this issue stating the opinion of the Court) stated, at pp. 174-75,
that:
. . . discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities. . .
Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.
(Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991]
2 S.C.R. 22 , page 24 and 25)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
Article 11
No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
Article 14
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.
Article 15
1 . No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 50
The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal states without any limitations or exceptions.
Article 51
2. Amendments shall come into force when they have been approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with their own respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments come into force, they shall be binding on those States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the present Covenant and any earlier amendment which they have accepted.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
July 30, 2013
_________________________
Wayne FERRON
Wayne FERRON
1-18 Earlscourt Ave. Toronto,
ON, M6E 4A6
Tel: 416 420 1353,
Email: wayneferron@gmail.com
TAKE NOTICE: I JUST RECENTLY CAME OFF THE STREETS OF TORONTO AS LIVING AS A VAGABOND, EVEN THOUGH I STILL SLEEP ON THE FLOOR AND WALK THE CITY FOR FOOD!! SO, PLEASE SEND ANY LEGAL SERVICE MATERIAL BY REGISTERED MAIL, TO BE PICKED UP AT THE POST OFFICE; THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT MATERIAL SERVED AT THE ABOVE ADRESS BY REGULAR MAIL WILL BE RELAYED TO MY PERSON, IN ADDITION TO THE SMALL POST BOX CONTENTS BEING EXPOSED TO THE NATURAL ELEMENTS. I AM NOT HOME IN THE DAY TIME; I MOSTLY ONLY SLEEP AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
TO:
HRTO Registrar
Richard Hennessy
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
655 Bay Street, 14th floor
Toronto, ON M7A 2A3
Phone: 416-326-1519
Toll-free: 1-866-598-0322
TTY: 416-326-2027
TTY Toll-free: 1-866-607-1240
Fax: 416-326-2199
AND TO:
TANYA GALLOWAY
LEGAL ASSISTANT (TO ANN C. DINNERT AND JOHN H. GESCHER)
THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL
10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A and B,
Brampton, ON L6T 4B9
Phone: 905-791-7800 EXT 4586 •
Toll-free: 1-888-919-7800 •
E-mail: Info @ Peel
AND TO:
Blair McCreadie (LSUC NO. 43985S)
DENTONS CANADA LLP
77 King St West SUITE 400 , Toronto, ON, M5K 0A1
TD NORTH TOWER, TORONTO-DOMINION CENTRE
416 863 4532
LAWYER FOR
SALVATION ARMY
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS
2500 Cawthra Rd., Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
Tel: 905 281 1272
Fax: 905 273 7522
All of which is respectfully submitted.
Monday, June 19, 2015
_________________________
Wayne FERRON
Wayne FERRON
HOMELESS VAGABOND
leegalpoet@gmail.com
AS A PROTEST TO THE UNREASONABLE RESPONDENT DELAY OF HRTO 2012-12585.I, i PLACED ON THE BACK OF MOST OF MY LEGAL PRIVATE PROSECUTION DOCUMENTS THE FOLLOWING;
TAKE NOTICE: I JUST RECENTLY CAME OFF THE STREETS OF TORONTO AS LIVING AS A VAGABOND. MY RESIDENCE FLOODS AND IS INFECTED WITH BLACK MOLD; I AM FORCED TO LIVE INHUMANLY AND EXPECTED TO BRING MY DAUGHTER WHOM I HAVE FULL CUSTODY FOR, TO LIVE THERE. I am left to die in the said conditions by ONTARIO- WORKS. PLEASE SEND ANY LEGAL SERVICE MATERIAL BY REGISTERED MAIL, TO BE PICKED UP AT THE POST OFFICE; THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT MATERIAL SERVED AT THE ABOVE ADRESS BY REGULAR MAIL WILL BE RELAYED TO MY PERSON, IN ADDITION TO THE SMALL POST BOX CONTENTS BEING EXPOSED TO THE NATURAL ELEMENTS. I AM NOT HOME IN THE DAY TIME, I MOSTLY ONLY SLEEP AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS .
TO:
HRTO Registrar
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
655 Bay Street, 14th floor
Toronto, ON M7A 2A3
Phone: 416-326-1519
Toll-free: 1-866-598-0322
TTY: 416-326-2027
TTY Toll-free: 1-866-607-1240
Fax: 416-326-2199
AND TO:
Blair McCreadie
GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SALVATION ARMY
DENTONS CANADA LLP
77 KING sT. WEST, SUITE 400
Toronto-Dominion Centre
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
M5K 0A1
Phone: 416 863 4511
FAX: 416 863 4592
AND TO:
Patrick O’Connor
Gurjit Brar (LSUC.: 42197E)
REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF PEEL
10 Peel Centre Drive, Suite A and B,
Brampton, ON L6T 4B9
Phone: 905-791-7800 ext 4959
Fax: 905 791 6992
Toll-free: 1-888-919-7800
LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE:
TIME OF OCCURRENCE : STARTING about SEPTEMBER 2012 to PRESENT
PEEL REGION RESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY SHELTERS
2500 Cawthra Rd., Mississauga, ON, L5A 2X3
Tel: 905 281 1272
Fax: 905 273 7522
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
WAYNE FERRON
-versus-
REGIONAL MUNICIPLE OF PEEL ET. AL.
|
|
|
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario 655 Bay Street, 14th floor, Toronto, ON M7A 2A3 Phone: 416-326-1519 ___________________________
AMENDED APPLICANT’S FACTUM FIRST HEARING ON MATTER ____________________________________________ Wayne FERRON HOMELESS VAGABOND leegalpoet@gmail.com
AS A PROTEST TO THE UNREASONABLE RESPONDENT DELAY OF HRTO 2012-12585.I, i PLACED ON THE BACK OF MOST OF MY LEGAL PRIVATE PROSECUTION DOCUMENTS THE FOLLOWING; TAKE NOTICE: I JUST RECENTLY CAME OFF THE STREETS OF TORONTO AS LIVING AS A VAGABOND. MY RESIDENCE FLOODS AND IS INFECTED WITH BLACK MOLD; I AM FORCED TO LIVE INHUMANLY AND EXPECTED TO BRING MY DAUGHTER WHOM I HAVE FULL CUSTODY FOR, TO LIVE THERE. I am left to die in the said conditions by ONTARIO- WORKS. PLEASE SEND ANY LEGAL SERVICE MATERIAL BY REGISTERED MAIL, TO BE PICKED UP AT THE POST OFFICE; THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT MATERIAL SERVED AT THE ABOVE ADRESS BY REGULAR MAIL WILL BE RELAYED TO MY PERSON, IN ADDITION TO THE SMALL POST BOX CONTENTS BEING EXPOSED TO THE NATURAL ELEMENTS. I AM NOT HOME IN THE DAY TIME, I MOSTLY ONLY SLEEP AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS . |
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