This document is incomplete, but the physical form was completed, served on the respondents, and sent to the supreme court and court of appeal for ontario

26 FEB 2014 ORAL ARGUMENT                    Court file no.: M..........

 

 

“VEXATIVE LITIGAN”    file No.: M ...denied by COA without lawful cause/motion number denied/motion refused by coa REGISTRAR without reason or lawful cause

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

WAYNE FERON   Informant/Applicant

 

 

 

 

 -and-

 

 

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN    Respondent

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MOTION RECORD AND BOOK OF AUTHORITIES

 

 

 

 

look up------ impairment of this right in Kallaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 207 O.A.C. 60 at para. 31

 

[31]         However, a s. 140(1) order is an extraordinary remedy that alters a person’s right to access the courts.  Such an order may be granted in error.  For example, a s. 140(1) order may not be supported by the evidential record.  It may have been made by a judge mistakenly acting without jurisdiction, in breach of the requirements of natural justice or on incorrect legal principles.  In these circumstances, to deny an affected litigant his or her appeal as of right under s. 6(1)(b) of the CJA from a vexatious litigant order could result in fundamental unfairness. This should not be countenanced absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.  Such intent is not evident from the language of s. 140(1) of the CJA. 

 

 

 

[95]         I have had the opportunity to read the reasons of Cronk and Juriansz JJ.A. in this matter. I agree with them that an appellant may appeal a vexatious litigant declaration as of right. While I also agree that the appellant’s appeal of the vexatious litigant declaration must succeed, I reach that conclusion for different reasons.  As well, while my colleagues would dismiss the appellant’s appeal of the dismissal of her spousal support claim, I take a different position and would allow the appellant’s appeal on this issue.

 

 

[111]      In accordance with that guidance, and in the context of the provision’s purpose and legislative history, the legislature’s choice of the plain words “on application” allows vexatious litigant declarations to be brought by application or by action, but not by motion.  I am reinforced in this conclusion by the nature of the application process, which can be tailored to provide a just and expeditious determination of the issue.

(i) Purpose

[112]      The overarching purpose of the CJA when it was passed was “to comprehensively revise the legislation establishing Ontario courts and regulating their proceedings”.[2] As such, the CJA provides the important right of access to justice for the people of Ontario. Access to justice is a fundamental pillar of the rule of law. It provides litigants with the means to determine their rights and their freedoms. As MacPherson J.A. said in Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. 2000 CanLII 16886 (ON CA), (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 236 (C.A.) at para. 5: “Quite clearly, effective access to justice is a precondition to the exercise of all other legal rights.”

 

[123]      No rule permits a party to bring a motion for an order declaring a litigant to be vexatious.

            (iii) Plain reading

[124]      Further, a plain reading of “on application” compels the conclusion that the legislature intended an application to be the required process. “Application” is defined in s. 1 of the CJA as “a civil proceeding that is commenced by notice of application or by application”. This definition is plain and unambiguous. In my view, this section does not need either a liberal or a remedial interpretation. It serves justice well.

 

 

[134]      Third, an application requires personal service on the litigant, a requirement that is an appropriate safeguard given the importance of the civil right at stake. 

 

 

 

 

 

-need COURT ORDER granting Wayne Ferron lawful permission to continue this appeal(M42812)

-need COURT ORDER to appeal Justice Fieldman's  January 30, 2014 judgement given orally given from the bench

-need copy of COURT ORDER for alternative service for ORIGINAL PROCESS(CV 13-1060)

-need copy of APPLICATION(CV 13-1060)

-need copy of NOTICE OF APPLICATION(CV 13-1060)

-copy of affidavit of cervice of personal service  of  ORIGINAL PROCESS(CV 13-1060)

-need copy of letter and affidavit of service COURT relied on on January 29, 2014 for M42812

-need copy of affidavit of service for materials being relied on, at the March 5, 2014 ADJOURNED HEARING(M42812)

 

Originating Process

16.01(1) An originating process shall be served personally as provided in rule 16.02

 

 

PERSONAL SERVICE

16.02(1) Where a document is to be served personally, the service shall be made,

(a) Individual – on an individual, other than a person under disability, by leaving a copy of the document with the individual;

 

NRS LONDON REALTY LTD. v.  Glenn(1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 704 (Dist. Ct.)

In the absent of an order, service by courier is not sufficient.

 

Pursuant to NRS LONDON REALTY LTD. v.  Glenn(1989), page 6 last paragraph;

 

“(2) Secondly, because the factum and the affidavit of the defendant, Gerrie Glenn, were purportedly served on the plaintiff "by sending a copy by prepaid Purolator Courier on December 30th, 1988 to Cockburn, Foster, Cudmore & Kitely, the Solicitors for the Plaintiffs'', service by Purolator Courier in the absence of a judge's order is not yet a mode of service recognized by the rules. “

 

 

 

 

FROMOVITZ v. FROMOVITS, [1962] O.R. 120, 31 D.L.R. (2d) 221(H.C.)

Where the originating process was not served on the defendant, the entire proceeding was set aside as a nullity.

 

 

Pursuant to FROMOVITZ v. FROMOVITS, [1962] starting on the bottom of page 4 and continueing on the top of page 5;

 

“The proceedings took place without any defence being entered and, as it was proved in the trial, without the defendant spouse ever having it come to her knowledge that an action was proceeding against her for dissolution of her marriage. Judgment nisi was granted and that was followed by judgment absolute. The petitioner subsequently remarried and a child was born to the second marriage. It should be noted that in this action neither of the parties have remarried. At p. 604, Somervell, L.J., quoted from Craig v. Kanssen, [1943] 1 All E.R. 108 at p. 113,

 

per Lord Greene, M.R.:

 

In my opinion, it is beyond question that failure to serve process where service of process is required, is a failure which goes to the root of our conceptions of the proper procedure in litigation. Apart from proper ex parte proceedings, the idea that an order can validly be made against a man who has had no notification of any intention to apply for it ... has never been adopted in this country.

 

The Court found that the material on the application for the order for substitutional service had been faulty and that as a matter of fact there were probably four or five different methods by which service upon the defendant spouse could have been affected. The Court, therefore, set aside that order, the result being that the proceedings had been taken without notification to the defendant spouse, the proceedings were therefore a nullity and the decree nisi and decree absolute were both set aside. A similar result was reached in Woolfenden v. Woolfenden, [1947] 2 All E.R. 653, and also in two cases in the Canadian Courts -- Blatchford v. Van Ruyvenn, 25 A.L.R. 404 [affd [1931] 2 D.L.R. 636, A.L.R. loc cit.], and Jones v. Jones (1936), 44 Man. R. 233.”

 

 

 

-why did YRP not strike the STATEMENT OF CLAIM( CV 12-716) first, then determine  the ENT OF CLAIM( CV 12-716) to be frivolous, vexative and an abuse of process; then show that the PRIVATE PROSECUTOR is a VEXATIVE LITIGANT in a new originating process?

 

-CROWN IS A PARTY, VEXATIVE LITIGATION APPLICATION (CV 13-1060)  demands that the preceeding be an ORIGINATING PROCESS, and the Attorney General must be notified of the VEXATIVE LITIGATION APPPLICATION(CV 13-1060); hence, the directions given in  Justice Andre

Attorney General of Ontario

       c/o Legal Director of the Crown Law Office-Civil

       8^th Floor, 720 Bay Street

       Toronto, Ontario, M7A 2S9

 

 

 

 

Pursuant to R. v. Thorburn, 2010 ABQB 390;

 

“[81] On the second issue, it is a well understood principle of natural justice that a person’s

rights should not be affected without that person having the opportunity to make submissions to the decision-maker. This principle, the “audi alteram partem rule”, is often described as simply “the right to be heard” (for example, Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11 at para. 75, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249) or more traditionally that “no man be condemned unheard” (Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301 v. Montreal (City), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 793 at para. 73, 144 D.L.R. (4th) 577). Audi alteram partem also provides a person “... the right to know the case to be met”: Devon Canada Corp. v. Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2003 ABCA 167 at para. 19, 3 Admin. L.R. (4th) 154.

 

 

[82] In this instance, the hearing judge proceeded to declare the Appellant a vexatious litigant without notice to the Appellant or asking for submissions from either party on that point. The rights of a person to take matters to the courts is a basic element of Canadian society. Martin J.A. in Bianco v. 935074 Alberta Ltd., 2008 ABCA 124 at paras. 10-11, 429 A.R. 94 endorsed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s serious characterization of impairment of this right in Kallaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 207 O.A.C. 60 at para. 31, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 320 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 144:

 

 

... The court reasoned that a vexatious litigant order is “an extraordinary remedy

that alters a person’s right to access the courts,” and the denial of a right to appeal

such an order “could result in fundamental unfairness”: para. 31. [Emphasis added.]

 

 

[83] Restricting a persons’s access to the courts is thus a step that should not be taken lightly.

In Pawlus v. Pope, 2004 ABCA 396 at para. 18, 357 A.R. 347, the Alberta Court of Appeal set

aside a Queen’s Bench declaration that a plaintiff was a vexatious litigant on the basis that the

litigant sought an adjournment so that he had the opportunity to obtain counsel to reply on that

specific point. See also Hillcox v. Morrow (1995), 175 A.R. 141, 57 A.C.W.S. (3d) 728 (Alta.

Q.B.).

 

[84] Typically, declaring a person a vexatious litigant involves an application to the court anda hearing on that issue: for example O'Neill v. Deacons, 2007 ABQB 754, 441 A.R. 60, Stanny(Re), Serdahely Trust (Trustee of) v. Serdahely Estate; Haljan v. Serdahely Estate, 2008

ABQB 472, 453 A.R. 337, Bianco v. 935074 Alberta Ltd., 2007 ABQB 150, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d)

786. Instead, here the declaration of vexatious status was in a sense incorporated as a part of the

court’s remedy of refusing to issue process, rather than as a separate issue that required

submissions and judicial consideration.

 

[85] Though I have concluded the Judicature Act does not govern the question of vexatious

litigant status for the Appellant, I do note that s. 23.1(1) conforms with the audi alteram partem principle as that legislation requires a separate proceeding (an application or motion by the court), and notice to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General. Here again, evaluation of potential vexatious litigant status is a specific and separate process.

 

Page: 22[86] On this basis I conclude that the hearing judge breached the requirements of natural justice by concluding the Appellant is a vexatious litigant and requiring the Appellant obtain leave prior to filing any further Criminal Code, s. 504 private informations. I therefore make an order of mandamus instructing the Provincial Court to hold a separate hearing with a different judge to evaluate whether the Appellant is a vexatious litigant and should be restricted in some manner from filing private informations.

 

[87] This judgment will provide adequate notice to the Appellant and the Attorney General of the new provincial court proceeding, however in parallel with Judicature Act, s. 23.1(1), I instruct that the Minister of Justice also be given notice of this hearing.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Know that in accordance with Justice Feldman's Judgement on January 30, 2014 and Justice Andre July 8, Judgement, Wayne Ferron is a “VEXATIVE LITIGANT” which is band from all courts in Ontario including the COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO according to PARA[1] OF Justice Andre's prohibition which states as followes;

[2] THE COURT PROHIBITS Wayne Ferron either directly or indirectly, from instituting any proceeding or continuing any proceedings previously instituted in any court in Ontario, except until such time as he obtain leave pursuant to section 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act and as provided for in this order. {…}

 

[3] THIS COURT DIRECTS that any such application for leave{...}will be determined by the RSJ or her designee, who will

(i) give direction as to the service of the application, which shall include service on the Attorney General, and the procedure for the determination of the application, or

(ii) dismiss the application.

 

 

[4] THIS COURT ORDERS that any service on the Attorney General that directed by RSJ or her designee referred to in paragraph 3 of this Order shall only be given by registered mail addressed and sent as follows:

 

       Attorney General of Ontario

       c/o Legal Director of the Crown Law Office-Civil

       8^th Floor, 720 Bay Street

       Toronto, Ontario, M7A 2S9

 

[5] THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS that should Wayne Ferron file materials seeking to commence or continue a proceeding or any appeal in any court in Ontario without first filing and an entered Order Permitting him to do so; the proceeding shall be immediately stayed upon any person filing a copy of this Order in such court.  

 

[6] THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS that no further proceedings will be accepted from Wayne Ferron for filing or scheduling by any court in Ontario without the approval of the RSJ or her designate.”

 

 

Why am I being forced to contravene Section 3.1, Section 127(1), and Section 22.1  of our beloved  CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA; which respectively states

 

Effect of judicial acts

3.1 Unless otherwise provided or ordered, anything done by a court, justice or judge is effective from the moment it is done, whether or not it is reduced to writing.

2002, c. 13, s. 2.

 

Disobeying order of court

127. (1) Every one who, without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order made by a court of justice or by a person or body of persons authorized by any Act to make or give the order, other than an order for the payment of money, is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

22. (1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offence and that other person is afterwards a party to that offence, the person who counselled is a party to that offence, notwithstanding that the offence was committed in a way different from that which was counselled.

Idem

(2) Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an offence is a party to every offence that the other commits in consequence of the counselling that the person who counselled knew or ought to have known was likely to be committed in consequence of the counselling.

 

Definition of “counsel”

(3) For the purposes of this Act, “counsel” includes procure, solicit or incite.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 22;

R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 7.

Why am I being counseled to violate Parliamentary legislation, when I want to act lawfully in accordance with the will of Parliament.

 

Why am I here and why am I being forced and curiosed into breaking the CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA?

 

Why has the REGISTRAR proformed a judicial function in dismissing my proper appeal in getting directions on legally permitted actions?

 

Furthermore, the REGISTRAR now talks about shredding my legal document served on all parties for the aforementioned appeal before a panel concerning how to proceed lawfully  in the face of being band from all courts in ONTARIO.

 

Is it the will of Parliament for me to be push and forced into contravening the CRIINAL CODE OF CANADA.

 

I REQUIRE A WRITTEN COURT ORDER TO FREE FROM THE CONSTRAINTS OF  Justice Feldman's Judgement on January 30, 2014 and Justice Andre July 8, Judgement, to be able to lawfully partisopate in the preceeding before the this honourable court.

 

[90]  Pursuant to VIDÉOTRON LTÉE et al. and NESTAR COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al.(2003 FCA 56);

“[6] The authorities are clear that where an order or decision is not pronounced or delivered in public, the order or decision is not made until such time as the order or decision is entered by the Registry or when the parties are notified of the decision.

 

[8] {...} The Divisional Court concluded that where a decision or order was not pronounced or delivered in public, it could not be held to have been made until such time as the parties were notified of it. At pages 259, 260 and 261, Armour C.J. stated:

 

... The theory of judicial procedure is that the cogent and binding effect of the order begins immediately from the time when the order is pronounced by the lips of the Judge, and if that could be done physically which legally is supposed to be done, and which one would desire to be done if it were possible, every order would be completed on the spot, written out by the judicial officer and in curid before the Court rises, and delivered to the parties. That is the unquestionable theory of judicial procedure, and in conformity with that theory the time when the order is "made," for the two words must be considered as equivalent and capable of being substituted the one for the other. The mere defining of the words of the Court by writing and reducing them into a form in which they can be evidence in a ministerial operation which, according to the true theory, succeeds the delivery of the order by the Judge, and must be in point of fact nothing in the world more than the physical embodiment on the spot by the Court of the words which the Judge has used."

[...]

 

I am of opinion that the principle of these decisions is entirely applicable to the case in judgment, and that the month mentioned in sec. 57 of the County Courts Act commences to run from the date of the judicial opinion or decision, oral or written, pronounced or delivered, and that the judgment or order founded upon it must be referred to that date. If the judicial opinion or decision, oral or written, is not pronounced or delivered in open Court, then it cannot be said to be pronounced or delivered until the parties are notified of it.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Limits of scope of Act

(2)  Nothing in this Act,

(a) subjects the Crown to greater liability in respect of the acts or omissions of a servant or agent of the Crown than that to which the Crown would be subject in respect of such acts or omissions if it were a person of full age and capacity; or

(b) subjects the Crown to a proceeding under this Act in respect of a cause of action that is enforceable against a corporation or other agency of the Crown; or

(c) subjects the Crown to a proceeding under this Act in respect of any act or omission of a servant of the Crown unless that servant has been appointed by or is employed by the Crown; or

(d) subjects the Crown to a proceeding under this Act in respect of anything done in the due enforcement of the criminal law or of the penal provisions of any Act of the Legislature; or

(e) authorizes a proceeding against the Crown under the Employers and Employees Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 2 (2).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Right to sue Crown without fiat

3.  A claim against the Crown that, if this Act had not been passed, might be enforced by petition of right, subject to the grant of a fiat by the Lieutenant Governor, may be enforced as of right by a proceeding against the Crown in accordance with this Act without the grant of a fiat by the Lieutenant Governor. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 3.

Right to sue Crown corporation without consent

4.  A claim against a corporation of the Crown that, if this Act had not been passed, might be enforced, subject to the consent of a servant of the Crown, may be enforced as of right without such consent. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 4.

Liability in tort

5.  (1)  Except as otherwise provided in this Act, and despite section 71 of Part VI (Interpretation) of the Legislation Act, 2006, the Crown is subject to all liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it would be subject,

(a) in respect of a tort committed by any of its servants or agents;

(b) in respect of a breach of the duties that one owes to one’s servants or agents by reason of being their employer;

(c) in respect of any breach of the duties attaching to the ownership, occupation, possession or control of property; and

(d) under any statute, or under any regulation or by-law made or passed under the authority of any statute. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5 (1); 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, s. 124.

Where proceedings in tort lie

(2)  No proceeding shall be brought against the Crown under clause (1) (a) in respect of an act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless a proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representative of the servant or agent. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5 (2).

Liability for acts of servants performing duties legally required

(3)  Where a function is conferred or imposed upon a servant of the Crown as such, either by a rule of the common law or by or under a statute, and that servant commits a tort in the course of performing or purporting to perform that function, the liability of the Crown in respect of the tort shall be such as it would have been if that function had been conferred or imposed by instructions lawfully given by the Crown. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5 (3).

Application of enactments limiting liability of servants of the Crown

(4)  In a proceeding against the Crown under this section, an enactment that negatives or limits the liability of a servant of the Crown in respect of a tort committed by that servant applies in relation to the Crown as it would have applied in relation to that servant if the proceeding against the Crown had been a proceeding against that servant. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 5 (4).

 

 

Conflict

23.  Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, s. 23.

 

 

 

 

 

Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada

/2002-156 SUPREME COURT ACT

 

Motion to Stay

[SOR/2011-74, s. 30(F)]

62. Any party against whom a judgment has been given, or an order made, by the Court or any other court, may make a motion to the Court for a stay of execution or other relief against such judgment or order, and the Court may give such relief on the terms that may be appropriate.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170

 

 

 

   For the purposes of Rule 126, as McIntyre J. has indicated, we must assume that all the facts alleged by the appellant in her submissions are true.  The question then, to be decided before the matter is allowed to go to trial, is simply:  does the appellant's claim disclose a reasonable cause of action?  This is a pure question of law, and no evidence is required for its determination.  In fact, there is every advantage, in terms of saving the time and cost of a trial, to decide a question of law at the outset.  This, in fact, is the very reason for the existence of Rule 126

 

 

   L'HEUREUX-DUBÉ J. (dissenting in part) -- While I agree with my colleague, Justice McIntyre, that the Crown enjoys absolute immunity from suit even for malicious prosecution, I respectfully disagree with his conclusion that the Attorney General and, by extension, Crown Attorneys, may not.  Consequently, I would dismiss the appeal.

 

   My colleague McIntyre J. is of the view that the lower courts erred in striking out the appellant's statement of claim under Rule 126 of the Ontario Rules of Practice under circumstances where there was sufficient doubt as to the actual state of the law on the question.  He finds that the law in Canada is somewhat ambiguous as to the question of the degree of immunity of Attorneys General and Crown Attorneys.  For that reason, he orders the matter to proceed to trial.  My point of divergence from the reasons of McIntyre J.  concerns the appropriate response of this Court under the circumstances.  Since, in my view, strong policy reasons exist for granting Attorneys General and Crown Attorneys absolute immunity from prosecution for actions taken in the proper exercise of their powers, I see no reason to prolong this matter any further by remitting it to trial to decide this very same issue.

 

  

 

 I would like to make it clear at the outset that I am proceeding from the premise that any decisions taken or acts performed by the respondents in this case were done within the scope of their authority.  I perceive the claim of the appellant to be founded on the idea that her prosecution by the respondents, though carried out within the bounds of their authority, was malicious.  In this respect, I would distinguish the situation from that which arose in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 1959 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 121.  In that case, the claim was brought on the basis that the respondent had acted outside the scope of his legitimate authority.  The civil action was brought against Maurice Duplessis in his capacity as an individual, and not against Duplessis in either of his official roles as Premier of the province or as Attorney General.  As Rand J. stated, at pp. 142-43:

 

The office of Attorney-General traditionally and by statute carries duties that relate to advising the Executive, including here, administrative bodies, enforcing the public law and directing the administration of justice.  In any decision of the statutory body in this case, he had no part to play beyond giving advice on legal questions arising.  In that role his action should have been limited to advice on the validity of a revocation for such a reason or purpose and what that advice should have been does not seem to me to admit of any doubt.  To pass from this limited scope of action to that of bringing about a step by the Commission beyond the bounds prescribed by the legislature for its exclusive action converted what was done into his personal act.  [Emphasis added.]

 

 

 

 

All of which is respectfully submitted.

 

Dated at the city of TORONTO, in the province of Ontario, on this .................................SIGNED BY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

____________________________ Private Prosecutor/Informan

 

Wayne  Ferron                      

1-18 Earlscourt Ave. Toronto, ON, Postal Code         M6E 4A6

Tel: 416 420 1353, Email: I HAVE NO ISP ACCOUNT

 

TAKE NOTICE: I JUST RECENTLY CAME OFF THE STREETS OF TORONTO AS LIVING AS A VAGABOND. MY RESIDENCE FLOODS AND IS INFECTED WITH BLACK MOLD; I AM FORCED TO LIVE INHUMANLY AND EXPECTED TO BRING MY DAUGHTER WHOM I HAVE FULL CUSTODY FOR, TO LIVE THERE. I am left to die in the said conditions by ONTARIO- WORKS. PLEASE SEND ANY LEGAL SERVICE MATERIAL BY REGISTERED MAIL, TO BE PICKED UP AT THE POST OFFICE; THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT MATERIAL SERVED AT THE ABOVE ADRESS BY REGULAR MAIL WILL BE RELAYED TO MY PERSON, IN ADDITION TO THE SMALL POST BOX CONTENTS BEING EXPOSED TO THE NATURAL ELEMENTS. I AM NOT HOME IN THE DAY TIME, I MOSTLY ONLY SLEEP AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

       

TO:  

        The Clerk of the Court--Registrar

                COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

Osgoode Hall

130 Queen Street West

Toronto, Ontario, M5H 2N5

Tel:           416 327 5020

Fax:          416 327 6032

 

AND TO

 

The Attorney General of Ontario

Constitutional Law Branch

 

4th floor

720 Bay Street

Toronto, Ontario M5G 2K1

 

fax: 416 326 4015

 

AND TO:

 

The Attorney General of Canada

 

Suite 3400, Exchange Tower

Box 36, First Canadian Place

Toronto, Ontario M5X 1K6

 

fax: 416 973 3004

 

AND TO

Deborah Krick, CROWN COUNSEL

 

The Attorney General of Ontario

Criminal Law Branch

6th floor

720 Bay Street

Toronto, Ontario M5G 2K1

 

fax: 416 326 4015

 

 

 

 

court of appeal for ontario

 

Wayne Ferron -versus- R

Court file no.: M............

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO   PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT Osgoode Hall 130 Queen Street West Toronto, Ontario, M5H 2N5     _________________________________ MOTION RECORD AND BOOK OF AUTHORITIES ___________________________________________     Wayne FERRON 1-18 Earlscourt Ave. Toronto, ON,         Postal Code          M6E 4A6 Tel: 416 420 1353, Email:I HAVE NO ISP ACCOUNT   TAKE NOTICE: I JUST RECENTLY CAME OFF THE STREETS OF TORONTO AS LIVING AS A VAGABOND. MY RESIDENCE FLOODS AND IS INFECTED WITH BLACK MOLD; I AM FORCED TO LIVE INHUMANLY AND EXPECTED TO BRING MY DAUGHTER WHOM I HAVE FULL CUSTODY FOR, TO LIVE THERE. I am left to die in the said conditions by ONTARIO- WORKS. PLEASE SEND ANY LEGAL SERVICE MATERIAL BY REGISTERED MAIL, TO BE PICKED UP AT THE POST OFFICE; THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT MATERIAL SERVED AT THE ABOVE ADRESS BY REGULAR MAIL WILL BE RELAYED TO MY PERSON, IN ADDITION TO THE SMALL POST BOX CONTENTS BEING EXPOSED TO THE NATURAL ELEMENTS. I AM NOT HOME IN THE DAY TIME, I MOSTLY ONLY SLEEP AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS .